Notes

1. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 329–30. This is a question of ontology that Deleuze and Guattari share with Derrida, who, in his treatise The Politics of Friendship published three years later in 1994, writes the following: “The question ‘What is friendship?’ but also ‘Who is the friend (both or either sex)?’ is nothing but the question: ‘What is Philosophy?’” Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 240.

2. This is a term Deleuze employs more frequently in his later writings and interviews to characterize the democratic ideal of friendship based on the values of consensus and “free” communication. As Deleuze asks, “Peut-être la parole, la communication, sont-elles pourries?” The French adjective pourri indicates a much stronger sense of something being rotten, the term “corrupted” being a figurative translation. Accordingly, one of the major arguments put forward in the conclusion of their last work is that the political idea of friendship—understood as the democratic consensus of friends or equals, as well as the instruments of speech and communication—has become corrupted by being completely permeated by money (for example, appearing today as the intersubjective idealism of globalized markets proposed by contemporary neoliberalists). See Deleuze, Pourparlers, 238; Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 7ff.

3. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 18.

4. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 8.

5. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:337–38.

6. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:338.

7. For another excellent commentary on Benveniste’s etymology, see McNulty, The Hostess, viiiff.

8. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 118.

9. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 4.

10. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 462.

11. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 462.

12. For the quotation by Hayek, see Mirowski and Plehwe, The Road from Mont Pelerin, 435ff.

13. Mascolo, Autour d’un effort de mémoire, 65.

14. Deleuze, Negotiations, 174.

15. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 10.

16. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 3.

17. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 2.

18. I am referring not only to Heidegger’s role in the National Socialist Party but also to the betrayal of the philosophical friendship with Edmund Husserl when he removed his previous dedication to his teacher in a later edition of Zein und Zeit. This act of betrayal was and remains, certainly, unforgiveable.

19. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 109.

20. Of course, here I am alluding also to Paul Celan’s meditation on the Heideggerian figures of the poet and the thinker in “The Conversation in the Mountains.” See Celan, Collected Prose, 17–22.

21. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 87ff. See also Gregory Flaxman’s excellent discussion of Greek autochthony in Gilles Deleuze, 94ff.

22. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 68.

23. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:360.

24. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 71, 149.

25. Of course, Agamben’s conceptual persona of homo sacer is already in many respects, if not in most, completely indebted to the earlier testimonies of Primo Levi and Robert Antelme. First, we can point to Agamben’s appropriation of the figure of the Muselmann, where we first find the definition of “bare life” as the place where bios is so concentrated in zoē as to become indistinguishable from it—literally, a “zone of indistinction” between political life and biological life. Secondly, in the introduction to Homo Sacer, there is indeed an oblique reference to the “testimony of Robert Antelme,” which cites Antelme’s major proclamation that the experience of the camps provokes an almost “biological assertion of the belonging together of the human species” (that is, of the certainty of the unity of man, and not his irremediable division, given that the SS were indeed men like us, and thus there can be no alibi of difference that would only recapitulate, on a moral level, the fundamental assertion of every racist ideology). And yet, this claim is an example of a modern aporia, which is nothing less than the inner solidarity between modern democracy and totalitarianism, both of which make the quality of biopolitical life “the most supreme political principle” (10).

26. Although Deleuze ascribes the new conceptual persona of the philosopher, as a “Socrates who becomes Jewish,” to the writings of Maurice Blanchot, certainly two other modern philosophers come to mind who are barely mentioned in Deleuze’s writings: Levinas and Derrida. Of course, this is not simply an oversight, but the reasons for this neglect bear a complex personal history.

27. For a characterization of Antelme’s own speech, see the foreword to The Human Race, 3–5.

28. For example, see recent essays by Agamben and Braidotti in Wilmer and Žukauskaitė, Resisting Biopolitics, 21ff.

29. This is one of the questions raised by a collective research group that Cary Wolfe and I cofounded in 2013, The Society for the Study of Biopolitical Futures. See http://biopoliticalfutures.net.

30. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 31.

31. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 31.

32. Certainly two thinkers that come immediately to mind to demonstrate this nonphilosophical understanding are Schmitt and Marx, both of whom I discuss below around the conceptual persona of the “enemy.”

33. Many of Kant’s own contemporaries, including Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, took Toward Perpetual Peace to be Kant’s attempt at being humorous, or merely ironic, and in the centuries that followed most philosophers did not take it seriously. Even today there are those who view the later writings as evidence of dementia and diminishing mental capacity, certainly compared with the period of the Critique of Pure Reason. Most recently, Kant’s dementia has been the subject of psychiatric speculation, and one article provides a diagnosis of dementia praecox (an earlier term for schizophrenia), which was organically the result of a tumor in the frontal lobe. See Marchand, “Emmunuel Kant’s Dementia,” 35–39.

34. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 107.

35. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 107.

36. Of course, “the shame of being human” is a major theme first announced by Primo Levi, which is frequently referenced by Deleuze, as well as by Blanchot and Derrida.

37. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:337.

38. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 462.

39. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 462.

40. Derrida, Rogues, 100ff.

41. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 117.

42. This has served as the basic principle of the Perpetual Peace Project and the large-scale curatorial initiative that I cofounded in 2008 with Aaron Levy (Slought, Philadelphia) and Martin Rauchbauer (Deutsche Haus, New York University) and that, in 2012, sponsored exhibitions and events at Utrecht University in commemoration of the three hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of Utrecht (i.e., The Peace of Utrecht). See www.redraftingperpetualpeace.org.

43. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 422.

44. Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, 29.

1. Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 329–30.

2. Cicero, Old Age, Friendship, and Divination, 55–56.

3. Here I am particularly thinking of Beckett’s later play “Catastrophe,” which portrays three “talking heads” in overlapping monologue about themselves and their relationships.

4. I continue to employ the French term in parentheses to echo the Heideggerian term for existential care (Sorge), which is Angst.

5. A good illustration of the kind of conversation I am referring to, in which the unspeakable constitutes the linguistic condition of enunciation, expressed in the forms of prattle and idle speech between friends, is Paul Celan’s “Conversation in the Mountains,” which also cryptically refers to a conversation that did not take place between Celan and Heidegger and concerns the philosopher’s infamous “silence” concerning the extermination of the Jews. Thus, I would include this “conversation” in the genealogy of “the friend who must be suspected” but will return to this in another context. See Celan, Collected Prose, 17–22.

6. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 4.

7. See Deleuze’s earliest description of the Greek dialectic of rivalry (amphisbetesis) in Logique du sens, 292ff.

8. Here I am thinking of Althusser’s famous claim that “ideology has no history,” but would qualify this claim by observing that for Althusser this history is actually found in the progression of philosophical systems that each express the current stage of capitalism, from a stage of primitive accumulation to the full realization of the economic principle in “its last instance.” See Althusser, For Marx, 87–128.

9. Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 331.

10. Ibid. The full quotation is as follows: “Without the spirit of friendship, [the thoughts that form in the exchange of words, by writing or in person. Without that,] we are, by our own hands, outside thought.” However, the source of this quote remains a mystery, since I cannot find it in Hölderlin’s hymns. Mascolo himself acknowledges that it comes from a translation of one of Hölderlin’s poems, most likely “As When on a Holiday,” that reportedly Blanchot had translated and then published anonymously in the journal Comité in October 1968, perhaps in commemoration of the events of May ’68. Here again, in other words, we seem to have the implication of a “secret” communication of an idea of friendship between Blanchot and Mascolo, a secret that is also ascribed to Antelme, who is often represented as a kind of French Hölderlin (one who returns from his madness in Germany), which Mascolo refers to in the passage above as “this communism in thought” (ibid.).

11. Here we might recall that Nietzsche could undergo a diet of atheism only through a creative spirit of friendship, particularly his friendship with women (and with Lou Ardreas-Salomé, in particular), which is the subject of one of the concluding hymns in The Gay Science.

12. Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 75ff.

13. Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 330.

14. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 36.

15. Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 133.

16. In Search for a Method, Sartre uses this metaphor of the sulfuric acid bath negatively to criticize the idealism implicit in orthodox Marxism, where Marx and Engels reduce human beings to emanations of the historical process foretold (44). Here I am using this metaphor in order to underline the process of “purification,” in an anthropological sense, that also belonged to Marx’s earlier division of the classes as a species differentiation and the identification of a new species (Geschlecht) that will emerge at the end of the historical process. I return to take up this analysis in relation to the modern scientific racism of National Socialist ideology in the chapter on Antelme. At this point it should be clear to the reader that my discussion is guided as much by Derrida’s reflections on the subject as Deleuze’s, which are more elliptical in the last writings.

17. Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 505–6.

18. Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 506.

1. Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 116.

2. See also Strauss, “Notes on Schmitt,” 108–17.

3. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 46.

4. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 102ff.

5. For a discussion of the crucial importance of this political constitution in the urban centers of the early Roman Empire, see Meeks, The Origins of Christian Morality, 37–52. Although derived from the original Greek politeia (civil constitution), as distinct from the later Christian ekklesia (gathering, or “assembly”), the juridical meaning of politeuma seems adapted to the specifically urban and colonial context of the Roman period, often referring to the political identity of groups of immigrant and resident aliens in Hellenic cities under Roman rule. The term even gains a further figurative sense after the second century, referring to the political constitution of Christians on earth: “Our home is in heaven, and here on earth we are a colony [politeuma] of heavenly citizens” (Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon, 686).

6. In fact, only the Pauline gospel of Luke recounts a third trial of Jesus before Herod, reporting that once Pilate hears that Jesus is originally from Galilee, and therefore under Herod’s “jurisdiction” (ethousia), he remands the case to come before Herod in the sense of referring it back to a lower court. What is interesting in this context is that the gospel states that after this gesture Pilate and Herod become “friends,” whereas they were “at enmity” beforehand (Luke 23:12). A further motive for Pilate’s political strategizing is given by Flavius Josephus, who recounts that Pilate was already facing the revolt of the Jewish people against him for being the first Roman procurator to bring effigies of Caesar into Jerusalem in violation of Jewish law. This action resulted in a six-day petition by multitudes from the city, ending on the seventh with Pilate surrounding the crowds with soldiers and threatening to put them to death. As Josephus recounts this scene, the people threw themselves on the ground and bared their throats, “saying that they would take their deaths willingly rather than allowing the wisdom of their laws to be transgressed” (The Complete Works, 379), at which point Pilate relented and commanded that the images be withdrawn to Caesarea. I give here a more detailed account of this incident since Josephus provides it as a much better context for understanding Pilate’s decision concerning Jesus, which Josephus refers to as one of the many “sad calamities” that put the Jews in disorder during Pilate’s unhappy colonial administration as the Roman procurator of Judea. See Josephus, The Antiquities of the Jews, 379–80.

7. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 46.

8. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 28–29.

9. Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 62.

10. Quoted in Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 134n.

11. Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 116.

12. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 29.

13. Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 114.

14. Derrida, The Politics of Friendship,

15. Derrida, Of Hospitality, 25.

16. See Levinas, “The Asymmetry of the Interpersonal,” 215–16.

17. Levinas, De l’existence à l’existant, 95.

18. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 254ff.

19. Leibniz, The Shorter Leibniz Texts, 97.

20. Cicero, On Old Age, Friendship, and Divination, 62.

21. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 303.

1. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 2:360.

2. Derrida, Aporias, 42ff. Of course, another way to address this structure would be to say that it is “purely historical,” but then this only displaces and repeats the figure of aporia in another location, which now appears in the form of an absent mediator between nature and culture.

3. Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 403. In his examples, Simmel often designates the relationship between the stranger and property by using two German words for “alienation” and “to alienate”: Entfremden, which designates the affective and psychological sense of alienation; and entäussern, which designates the legal–commercial sense of alienation in the selling of property, the transference of ownership, and “making things external to oneself.” This distinction within the concept of alienation itself bears an interesting determination of the stranger as an autotelic designation, since, as Simmel notes above, all strangers are “traders,” implying that the activity of exchange is itself the result of the fact that the stranger is “no owner of the soil.”

4. Derrida, Of Hospitality, 55.

5. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 103.

6. Kant, Kant’s Principles of Politics, 101.

7. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 102.

8. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 102.

9. Derrida, Of Hospitality, 55.

10. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 128.

11. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 103.

12. Levinas, De l’existence à l’existant, xx.

13. Derrida, De l’hospitalité, 142.

14. For example, Simmel defines the psychological character of ambivalence (a feeling of “coolness” and perception of “detachment”) that determines the relationship with a stranger. Because of this contradictory mixture of coolness in warmth and distance in nearness, Simmel’s reading seems to prepare the possibility for the sudden turnabout and psychological repulsion against the stranger, which of course can also be inferred from the history of the European Jews. On the subjective qualities attached to social relations with strangers, see especially “The Stranger in Metropolitan Life,” 405ff.

15. Derrida, Of Hospitality, 29.

16. Derrida, De l’hospitalité, 126.

17. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 103.

18. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 103.

19. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 105.

1. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:337.

2. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:343.

3. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:343.

4. Benveniste writes, “The verb phileîn (φιλεῖν), which does not only signify ‘love,’ or affection, but also, from the earliest texts onward, ‘to kiss’; the derivative phílēma (φίλημα) signifies nothing else but ‘kiss’” (ibid., 1:344).

5. Of course, Levinas draws on this archaic meaning in his argument concerning the original signification of the ethical relationship as “involuntary election.” See Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 15.

6. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:347.

7. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:347.

8. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:344.

9. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:353 (my emphasis).

10. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:353.

11. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:338.

12. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:340.

13. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:341.

14. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:340.

15. Kant, Kant’s Principles of Politics, 101.

16. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 2:267.

1. Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, 130ff.

2. Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, 130ff.

3. Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 330.

4. Antelme, “Man as the Basis of Right,” 29.

5. Benslama, “Man’s Property/Propriety,” 71–82.

6. Antelme, “Poor Man—Proletarian—Deportee,” 18.

7. Antelme, “Poor Man—Proletarian—Deportee,” 18. (my emphasis, first sentence).

8. Antelme, “Poor Man—Proletarian—Deportee,” 19.

9. Antelme, “Poor Man—Proletarian—Deportee,” 20.

10. Antelme, “Poor Man—Proletarian—Deportee,” 21.

11. Antelme, “Poor Man—Proletarian—Deportee,” 20.

12. Antelme, “Poor Man—Proletarian—Deportee,” 21.

13. Antelme, “Poor Man—Proletarian—Deportee,” 21.

14. Antelme, “Poor Man—Proletarian—Deportee,” 21.

15. Antelme, “Poor Man—Proletarian—Deportee,” 22.

16. Antelme, “Poor Man—Proletarian—Deportee,” 22.

17. Antelme, “Poor Man—Proletarian—Deportee,” 22.

18. Mascolo, Autour d’un effort de mémoire, 23–24.

19. Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, 135.

20. Mascolo, Autour d’un effort de mémoire, 88.

21. Antelme, The Human Race, 219.

22. Mascolo, Autour d’un effort de mémoire, 65.

23. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 356.

24. Homer, quoted in Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:343–44.

25. These statements concerning the coming demographic disproportion between the richest and poorest populations globally deliberately echo a harrowing question posed by Derrida as early as 1994: “Does not the globalization of demographic reality and calculation render the probability of such a ‘context’ weaker than ever and as threatening for survival as the worst, the radical evil of the ‘final solution’?” Derrida, Acts of Religion, 91.

1. Plato, Republic, bk. 5, chapter 15.

2. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 352.

3. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 352.

4. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 79.

5. This recalls the phrase used by Georges Bataille. See “Sacrificial Mutilation,” 61–72.

6. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 471.

7. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 423.

8. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 352, 419.

9. In this regard, Don Delillo’s novel The Names is essentially a meditation on the problem of the molecular-becoming of a people, particularly with respect to the “exceptional individual” of the serial killer as a collective or group phenomenon that is more particular to democratic societies and, in the case of the novel, to the United States. See Delillo, The Names.

10. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 477.

11. I am referring, of course, to the statement “Is it Useless to Revolt?” that appeared in Le Monde in 1979.

12. Foucault, Power, 450.

13. Foucault, Power, 450.

14. Adorno and Horkheimer, Toward a New Manifesto, 49.

15. Foucault, Power, 452.

16. Deleuze, Deux régimes de fous, 223. (I have used the original French version of this text [my translation].)

17. This statement was omitted from the English translation of Two Regimes of Madness (2007). See Stivale, review of Two Regimes of Madness, 82–92, for a detailed commentary.

18. Deleuze was also writing a year after the first major campaign of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Beirut to uproot the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and five years before the first Intifada (“revolt”).

19. Deleuze, Deux régimes de fous, 223.

20. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 354.

21. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 79.

22. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 79 (my emphasis).

23. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 355.

24. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 422.

25. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 356.

26. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 422.

27. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 426. In many regards, I find these questions have a profound resonance with the meditation at the heart of Terrence Mallick’s The Thin Red Line (or the meditation on war in nature), where the main protagonist asks: “Who first started this war in nature?” “Who’s killing us?”

28. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 422.

29. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 425.

30. Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 85.

31. Derrida, Rogues, 116.

32. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 422.

33. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 423.

34. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 423.

35. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 79.

36. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 422.

37. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 421–22.

38. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 421.

39. Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 387. For the original story by Dickens, “A Respected Friend in a New Aspect,” see Our Mutual Friend, 428–37.

1. Kant, Kant’s Principles of Politics, 23.

2. Derrida also draws on Benveniste’s rich analysis of the sovereignty of the master and the self in the seminar “The Beast and the Sovereign.” See Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, 66ff.

3. Kant, Kant’s Principles of Politics, 23.

4. In The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida writes: “In other words, he is zoo-political, that’s his essential definition, that’s what is proper to him, idion; what is proper to man is politics; what is proper to this living being that man is, is politics, and therefore man is immediately zoo-political, in his very life, and the distinction between bio-politics and zoo-politics doesn’t work at all here—moreover, neither Heidegger nor Foucault stays with this distinction, and it’s obvious that already in Aristotle there’s thinking of what is today called ‘zoo-politics’ or ‘bio-politics’” (348–49). Here I cannot analyze this rich passage in detail, with its play on the senses of “peculiarity” in the Greek idion and the German Eigentuemlich, which is also made explicitly in reference to Heidegger’s concept of dasein. Therefore, one might translate the above into the following proposition: The one thing that is peculiar to human dasein is politics.

5. Kant, Kant’s Principles of Politics, 36–37 (my emphasis).

6. Kant, Kant’s Principles of Politics, 28.

7. Kant, Kant’s Principles of Politics, 30.

8. “This power as a cause working by laws which are unknown to us, is commonly called Fate; but in view of the design manifested in the course of the world, it is to be regarded as the deep wisdom of a Higher Cause directed towards the realization of the final purpose of the human race, and predetermining the course of the world by relation to it, and as such we call it Providence” (ibid., 62).

9. See Kant, Perpetual Peace, 118ff.

10. Antelme, “Poor Man—Proletarian—Deportee,” 22.

11. Antelme, The Human Race, 219.

12. Antelme, The Human Race, 219.

13. Antelme, The Human Race, 219.

14. Kant, Kant’s Principles of Politics, 27–28.

15. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 249ff.

16. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 11.

17. Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, 70–71.

18. Kant, Kant’s Principles of Politics, 27.

19. This line occurs in the “Reflections on the Observations of the Beautiful and the Sublime,” immediately after Kant also acknowledges that he has come to understand “his own deceptive feeling of superiority” with regard to the ordinary person, who was also capable of experiencing the same sublime sentiment of freedom as he was. See the Critique of Pure Judgment, AA 20.

20. Homer, quoted in Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire, 1:343–44.

21. Derrida and Vattimo, Religion, 72.

22. Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, 71.

23. Schmitt, Die Verfassung der Freheit, quoted in Bendersky, Carl Schmitt, 229. At the same time, Bendersky argues that many of Schmitt’s views during the years of 1935 and 1936, in particular, are motivated by his own political problems with the Nazi Party, especially the SS, who threatened to ostracize him for not being radical enough in his jurisprudence. Thus, like Heidegger during exactly the same period, Schmitt put on the wolf’s uniform in order advance his career—or, at least, to protect it from serious harm. Also, both were motivated by the incredible arrogance and personal ambition that went along with being leading German academics. So that we don’t immediately assume a tone of moral superiority, I imagine that if our colleagues in the academy today were put to the same test of character, we would discover that many of them might also prefer to be dressed up as wolves rather than appearing as sheep. As for myself, I would only hope I had the courage to choose poverty and ignominy over ambition—but one cannot be certain of such decisions.

24. Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, A686/B714.

25. Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, 159.

26. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 100.

27. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 107.

28. Quoted in Ellis, Kant’s Politics, 80. The treaty in question is the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), which concluded the Austrian War of Succession with a status quo ante bellum—that is to say, the restoration of prewar territories and the recognition of Prussia’s conquest of Silesia. It became the object of scorn by the French, in particular, and is referred to in popular sayings as the Bête comme la paix and La guerre pour le roi de Prusse, a resentment that became one of the motives for the conquests of the Napoleonic Wars.

29. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 107.

30. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 124. For a critical gloss on Kant’s translation of this maxim, see Ellis, Provisional Politics, 10ff.

31. Cavallar, Imperfect Cosmopolis, 70ff.

32. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 115.

33. Wiesel, Messengers of God, 31.

34. Mitchell, The Book of Job, 397–98.

35. Wiesel, Messengers of God, 32.

36. Cavallar, Imperfect Cosmopolis, 72.

37. Cavallar, Imperfect Cosmopolis, 72.

38. Cavallar, Imperfect Cosmopolis, 107.

39. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 116.

40. Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, 162–63.

41. Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, 161.

42. Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, 162.

43. Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, 162 (my emphasis).

44. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 110.