Notes

1. “About the ICTY,” http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (emphasis added).

2. A number of studies have theorized the relationship between “race” and “culture” in the twentieth century. See, for instance, Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, trans. Chris Turner (New York: Verso, 1991); Pierre-André Taguieff, “The New Cultural Racism in France,” trans. Russell Moore, in Telos 83, Spring 1990, 118–22; Richard T. Ford, Racial Culture: A Critique (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).

3. Looking at a variety of representational sites, I build on Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd’s definition of culture. They argue, “Rather than adopting the understanding of culture as one sphere in a set of differentiated spheres and practices, we discuss ‘culture’ as a terrain in which politics, culture, and the economic form an inseparable dynamic” (1). See their “Introduction,” in The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), 1–32.

4. Among the proponents of empire, this book addresses in some detail the writings of Robert Kaplan (in the first chapter) and Michael Ignatieff (in the first and fourth chapters).

5. Jodi Melamed, Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 11.

6. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 147.

7. Ibid., 145.

8. This, of course, is a myth. Puritans sought to form a religious state, expelled heretics, and certainly do not fit the mold of religious tolerance attributed to them today.

9. David Sehat, The Myth of American Religious Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 6.

10. Asad, Formations of the Secular, 241.

11. See Tracy Fessenden, Culture and Redemption: Religion, the Secular, and American Literature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008).

12. As Asad notes in Formations of the Secular, secularism is not just about the separation of church and state or tolerance; rather, it produces a narrative of transcendence, “an enactment by which a political medium (representation of citizenship) redefines and transcends particular and differentiating practices of the self” (5).

13. Writing about the Philippine context, Neferti Tadiar contrasts Spanish imperialism and U.S. imperialism in terms of their differing Christian conceptions of redemption: “Under Spanish colonialism, God may have already been the white Father, but under U.S. imperialism, he gains a benevolent countenance. In contrast to the distant Spanish God, the Protestant God of U.S. imperialism is benevolent, close, and ‘humanly near.’” See Things Fall Away: Philippine Historical Experience and the Makings of Globalization (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2009), 236.

14. W. E. B. Du Bois’s history of the Reconstruction era powerfully demonstrated that slavery determined “the whole social development of America,” and that “black labor became the foundation stone not only of the Southern social structure, but of Northern manufacture and commerce, of the English factory system, of European commerce, of buying and selling on a world-wide scale.” See Black Reconstruction in America, 1860–1880 (New York: Simon and Schuster, [1935] 1992), 13, 5. Du Bois argues that more than simply exemplifying the contradictions in U.S. democracy, the legacy of slavery has continued to determine “the limits of democratic control” (13). While the project of Reconstruction that followed the Civil War held the revolutionary promise of accomplishing democracy in the United States, Du Bois shows that ultimately the needs of Northern industry and Southern planting reproduced the system of racialized exploitation and disenfranchisement. Nearly a century later, the civil rights era seemed to once again represent an opportunity for radical social, economic, and racial change.

15. Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 13 (emphasis added).

16. Nikhil Pal Singh, Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 5.

17. Ibid., 17.

18. See, for instance, Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996); Robert Lee, Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999).

19. Melamed, Represent and Destroy, xvii. Melamed argues that post–World War II and post–Cold War racial logics can be divided into three racial systems of knowledge and governance: first, racial liberalism (mid-1940s to 1960s), the era corresponding to the civil rights movement; second, liberal multiculturalism (1980s to 1990s), the era of “repressive incorporation of the post-1964 race-based social movements,” which were contained and managed through an emphasis on identity, recognition, and representation; and, finally, neoliberal multiculturalism (2000s), which “has created new privileged subjects, racializing the beneficiaries of neoliberalism as worthy multicultural citizens and racializing the losers as unworthy and excludable on the basis of monoculturalism, deviance, inflexibility, criminality, and other historico-cultural deficiencies” (xv, xix, xxi). Like Melamed, I am interested in the strands of multiculturalism associated with the U.S. state, although there are certainly modes of multicultural thought that are not in line with the liberal and neoliberal incorporation of difference. For instance, Ella Shohat proposes that a “polycentric multiculturalism entails a profound reconceptualization and restructuring of intercommunal relations within and beyond the nation state. It hopes to decolonize representation.” See Shohat, “Introduction,” in Talking Visions: Multicultural Feminism in a Transnational Age (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1998), 1–12, 2.

20. A number of interesting studies have been done on the racial categorization of Muslims in U.S. law. Among these, Moustafa Bayoumi’s “Racing Religion” does a particularly good job of tracing this process in the law. In contrast, I am interested not in the racing of a religion but in the racing of a religious belief system—that is, how modes of religious life that do not conform to the individual freedom of conscience model are racialized. See Bayoumi, “Racing Religion,” CR: The New Centennial Review 6, no. 2 (2006): 267–93.

21. Asad, Formations of the Secular, 11.

22. On race and technology, see, for instance, Lisa Nakamura, Beth Kolko, and Gilbert Rodman, eds., Race in Cyberspace (New York: Routledge, 2000); on technology and conflict, see selections from Lisa Parks, Cultures in Orbit: Satellites and the Televisual (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005).

23. Wendy Hesford, Spectacular Rhetorics: Human Rights Visions, Recognitions, Feminisms (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011), 7.

24. Ibid., 9. Unlike Hesford, I do not necessarily see legal and humanitarian constructions of human rights as separate. As chapter 5, which focuses on the ICTY, demonstrates, legal developments in the postsocialist era are very much tied to humanitarian initiatives.

25. Julietta Hua, Trafficking Women’s Human Rights (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 10. The coarticulated relationship between racial/cultural particularity and universality in the human rights regime reflects developments in capitalism. For instance, Grace Hong argues that “late twentieth-century capital has its own universal mode: paradoxically, a universalized fetishization of difference,” most evident in the realm of consumerism. See The Ruptures of American Capital: Women of Color Feminism and the Culture of Immigrant Labor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), xiv.

26. Randall Williams, The Divided World: Human Rights and Its Violence (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xx (emphasis in original).

27. Ibid., xiv.

28. Ibid., xviii.

29. See Amy Kaplan, “Where Is Guantanamo?” American Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2005): 831–58; John Carlos Rowe, “Culture, U.S. Imperialism, and Globalization,” in Exceptional State: Contemporary U.S. Culture and the New Imperialism, ed. Ashley Dawson and Malini Johar Schueller (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007), 37–59; Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007), which analyzes contemporary U.S. imperial nationalism through what Puar terms sexual exceptionalism.

30. For instance, Ashley Dawson and Malini Johar Schueller critique Elaine Tyler May, who saw “post-9/11 policies and rhetoric as a continuation of Cold War ideologies.” See Exceptional State, 1–33, 8.

31. “Who Are Americans to Think That Freedom Is Theirs to Spread?” New York Times Magazine, June 25, 2005, 45.

32. Ibid., 44.

33. Ibid., 45.

34. “How Communists Operate: An Interview with J. Edgar Hoover,” U.S. News and World Report, August 11, 1950, http://www.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2008/05/16/how-communists-operate-an-interview-with-j-edgar.

35. Similar shifts did not occur in Western Europe. Indeed, as Fatima El-Tayeb argues, “racelessness” is the predominant ideology in Western Europe, whereby “racial thinking and its effects are made invisible” (xvii). El-Tayeb demonstrates how the ideology of racelessness enables the ongoing externalization of raced populations, including Muslims, from European nations. See El-Tayeb, European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).

36. Of course, most theorizations of European modernity and race presume a unified conception of Europe that scholars of Eastern and Central Europe have contested. Western European racial and national identities were not exclusively consolidated against others whose bodily appearance came to signify race difference in modernity. Since the time of the European Enlightenment, Eastern Europe, similar to the Orient, has been produced as a constitutive other to “the West.” A crucial distinction, however, is that Eastern Europe’s difference was imagined through its proximity to the West rather than its distance. Historian Larry Wolff has proposed that Western Europe invented Eastern Europe “as its complementary other half in the eighteenth century, the age of Enlightenment” (4). Wolff demonstrates that between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the French philosophes, most importantly Voltaire and Rousseau, led the philosophical and geographic “conceptual reorientation of Europe,” so that the significant axes of trade, travel, and culture underwent a shift from North to South and West to East (5). The result of this reorientation was significant: Eastern Europe came to stand as an intermediary link, as Balzac observed, “between Europe and Asia, between civilization and barbarism” (13). See Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994). Maria Todorova’s work on the Balkans furthers Wolff’s analysis of Eastern Europe’s in-between position in Western imaginative geographies. She argues that the Western discourse of “Balkanism,” which she distinguishes from Orientalism, has historically constructed the Balkans as Europe’s “incomplete self” (18). With its implication that the region can become complete with time, Todorova’s formulation of Balkan “incompleteness” adds a temporal dimension to theorizations about the way in which Eastern Europe has been conceived. Through an understanding of Eastern Europe as an “incomplete self,” it is possible to address the region’s discursive production as an anachronistic reflection in which the Western subject could imagine a recent European past. See Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

37. Denise Ferreira da Silva, “Towards a Critique of the Socio-logos of Justice: The Analytics of Raciality and the Production of Universality,” Social Identities 7, no. 3 (2001): 421–54, 422–23 (emphases in original).

38. Other scholars have made similar arguments. As David Theo Goldberg explains, “Just as spatial distinctions like ‘West’ and ‘East’ are racialized in their conception and application, so racial categories have been variously spatialized . . . into continental divides, national localities, and geographic regions.” See Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politic of Meaning (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), 185. Building on theories about the racialization of non-European continents, Sara Ahmed argues that European whiteness was consolidated in relation to racially conceived global geographies. Ahmed proposes that “racial others become associated with the ‘other side of the world’ . . . they come to embody distance. This embodiment of distance is what makes whiteness ‘proximate,’ as the ‘starting point’ for orientation.” See Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007), 121 (emphasis in original).

39. Borstelmann observes that during the Cold War, “parallels between political totalitarianism and racial totalitarianism [in the American South] could occasionally be striking.” Although Borstelmann attempts to show that contrary to the image of racial harmony that dominant political discourses were trying to project, racism continued to plague the United States in the early stages of the Cold War, U.S. Cold War rhetoric in fact exploited and reproduced parallels between the U.S. South and the U.S.S.R. Such comparisons worked to regionalize the problem of racism in the United States, depicting racism as a black–white issue and eliding considerations of racial problems in the nation as a whole. In addition, equating institutionalized segregation with political totalitarianism imagined racism as an “ideology” in a nation that was supposed to embody the “end of ideology.” The racialization of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. South thus projected the U.S. illiberal racist “past” onto spaces that were constructed through public discourse as needing to be modernized. See Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 4.

40. The opposition between U.S. freedom and communism through which racial progress in the United States has been narrated covers over the extensive involvement of working-class Americans, African Americans, and other U.S. minorities in Marxist and Communist organizations that opposed racism and oppression in the United States.

41. Sharad Chari and Katherine Verdery, “Thinking between the Posts: Postcolonialism, Postsocialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 51, no. 1 (2009): 6–34, 18.

42. As Edward Said famously argued, European empires mapped a coherent idea of Western civilization by producing and reproducing an authoritative discourse about the East and the Oriental other. While Said’s focus is on the Middle East as the site of Orientalist imperial fantasies, after World War II America’s map of the free world produced the U.S.S.R., the predominant emblem of Communist ideological alterity, as an important marker of “the East.” At this time, the United States further refigured Orientalist discourses, which imagined a homogeneous West, by contrasting domestic racial diversity and anti-imperialist benevolence toward the Third World with Soviet “imperialism.” See Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

43. For instance, Melani McAlister’s Epic Encounters demonstrates that in the second half of the twentieth century, U.S. cultural representations of the Middle East “have been consistently obsessed with the problem of racial diversity.” See McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 11. Christina Klein similarly discusses American Cold War modifications to the European Orientalist paradigm in her analysis of middlebrow culture and East Asia. Klein argues that the United States “became the only Western nation that sought to legitimate its world-ordering ambitions by championing the idea (if not always the practice) of racial equality” (11). She concludes that this facilitated “a global imaginary based on connection” that “legitimated U.S. expansion while denying its coercive or imperial nature” (13). See Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

44. Kate Baldwin’s Beyond the Color Line and the Iron Curtain: Reading Encounters between Black and Red, 1922–1963 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002) reconceptualizes theorizations of the black Atlantic to take into account the importance of the Soviet Union for understanding black transnationalism. Jodi Kim’s Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010) critiques U.S. imperialism in Asia by addressing Asian American literature and film in the context of Cold War geopolitics, with Asia triangulating U.S.–Soviet relations in the second half of the twentieth century. Penny Von Eschen’s Satchmo Blows Up the World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004) explores how the U.S. State Department sent jazz musicians as part of foreign policy strategy. Von Eschen explains how the United States showcased itself as a racially diverse nation through cultural exports.

45. Prior to the Cold War, the U.S. imaginary of Eastern Europe was primarily linked to the patterns of immigration from Eastern Europe to the United States. As scholars have noted, Eastern Europeans, along with the Jews, Italians, and Irish, were among the various European immigrant groups to be eventually incorporated into an American category of “whiteness” that initially included only northern Europeans. According to David Roediger, in the late 1800s, immigration from Western and northern Europe far outstripped immigration from Central and Eastern Europe, with the number of immigrants from the “other” Europe, or “new immigrants,” beginning to rise toward the end of the nineteenth century and far outstripping northern and Western European migration by the 1910s. See Roediger, Working Towards Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants Became White: The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 146. In spite of the “new immigrants’” initially precarious position in the American racial landscape, where many were discriminated against through hiring and labor practices and racist nativist attacks, they always held a position “in-between” racialized populations, such as black and Asian Americans and the older immigrant groups that constituted white Americans already enjoying the full privileges of citizenship. In other words, Eastern European immigrants were always viewed as having the potential to be assimilated into whiteness (as Theodore Roosevelt predicted, within two generations) (64). In fact, a wide variety of factors, including the great migration of African Americans to the North in the 1920s, housing laws and restrictions, and antimiscegenation laws, contributed to the gradual incorporation of southern and Eastern European immigrants into American whiteness by the 1940s and 1950s. The gradual assimilation of new immigrants in the United States has provided a model through which “ethnicity” is distinguished from race. According to Omi and Winant, for instance, ethnicity is a category that is mutable, allowing for assimilation, while race “was equated with hereditary characteristics” (see Omi and Winant, Racial Formations, 15). That is, in U.S. nation formation, racial difference is understood as the difference that always remains visible, while ethnic difference is viewed as cultural, a difference that can be shed. For more on Eastern European immigration in relation to the domestic consolidation of whiteness in the United States, see David Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class (London: Verso, 1991); Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999); Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (New York: Routledge, 1996); George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006); Omi and Winant, Racial Formations.

46. Kim, Ends of Empire, 42–43.

47. Cited in Trevor B. McCrisken, American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1974 (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 22.

48. Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 46 (emphasis added). In spite of this predominant characterization, Francine Hirsch’s study has demonstrated that Sovietization was not a homogenizing process but one that involved “an interactive and participatory process” of vastly multiethnic peoples of the former Russian Empire, of which the Soviet Union was an inheritor (5). Although the ideal of recognizing nationalities did not prevent the Soviet Union from abolishing certain cultural, religious, and linguistic practices, the ideology behind the formation of the Soviet Union nevertheless contradicts the dominant Western Cold War perspective that Sovietization was an official policy of homogenization. Thus although American racial diversity was celebrated against the negative example of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Soviet Union itself actually functioned as a kind of multicultural entity. See Hirsch, An Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005).

49. Cited in Raymond Pearson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 45–46. There were, however, a variety of books making similar arguments in the 1960s, including Robert Conquest’s The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986) and Walter Kolarz’s Communism and Colonialism (New York: Macmillan, 1964).

50. Pearson, Rise and Fall, 46. Seton-Watson distinguished between an “inner” empire, that is, the Soviet Union itself, and an “outer” empire constituting the satellite nations.

51. See Madina Tlostanova, “‘Why Cut the Feet in Order to Fit the Western Shoes?’: Non-European Soviet Ex-Colonies and the Modern Colonial Gender System,” presented at the Symposium on Gender, Empire, and the Politics of Central and Eastern Europe, Central European University, Budapest, May 17–18, 2007. Also see Stephen Velychenko, “The Issue of Russian Colonialism in Ukrainian Thought: Dependency, Identity and Development,” Ad Imperio 1 (2002): 323–67.

52. Hirsch, An Empire of Nations, 3 (emphasis added).

53. Ibid., 15. While prior to the 1917 revolution the Bolsheviks condemned all forms of imperial exploitation and called for national self-determination, after the revolution it became clear that Soviet Russia could not survive without the natural resources of the non-Russian provinces in Europe and Asia (5). According to Hirsch, “In an effort to reconcile their anti-imperialist position with their strong desire to hold on to all of the lands of the former Russian Empire, the Bolsheviks integrated the national idea into the administrative-territorial structure of the new Soviet Union. . . . They placed all of the peoples of the former Russian Empire into a definitional grid of official nationalities—simultaneously granting these peoples ‘nationhood’ and facilitating centralized rule” (5–6).

54. According to Shu-mei Shih, “The apparent inapplicability of the postsocialist framework to the West (i.e., Western Europe and the United States) is the major reason for the general lack of interest in the topic in American academia, where the discussions of postsocialism are largely confined within the now nominally debunked but actually existing area studies, the assumption being that it lacks universal significance” (28). See “Is the Post- in Postsocialism the Post- in Posthumanism?,” Social Text 30, no. 1 110 (Spring 2012): 27–50. For another argument in favor of addressing postsocialism as a global condition, see Zsuzsa Gille, “Is There a Global Postsocialist Condition?,”Global Society 24, no. 1 (2010): 9–30.

55. Of course, postcolonial theorists have used the term to describe and critique ongoing legacies of imperial rule in the postcolonial world.

56. See, for instance, Agens Heller, “Between Past and Future,” in Between Past and Future: The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Aftermath, ed. Sorin Antohi and Vladimir Tismaneanu (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 3–13.

57. Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993).

58. Chad Thompson, “Postcolonialism, Postsocialism, and Multiple Remembrances,” Socialist Studies 6, no. 1 (2010): 1–10, 9.

59. Shih, “Is the Post- in Postsocialism the Post- in Posthumanism?,” 42.

60. Ibid., 31.

61. Ibid., 29.

62. Ibid., 29.

63. Chari and Verdery, “Thinking between the Posts,” 10.

64. Ibid., 11.

65. Ibid., 12.

66. Among these, particularly incisive studies include Elizabeth Dunn’s Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of Labor (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004) and, outside of the context of Central and Eastern Europe, Lisa Rofel’s Desiring China: Experiments in Neoliberalism, Sexuality, and Public Culture (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007).

67. Excellent examples of such an approach, focusing on the cultures of Central and Eastern Europe, include Katarzyna Marciniak’s Streets of Crocodiles: Photography, Media, and Postsocialist Landscapes in Poland (Chicago: Intellect, 2011) and Aniko Imre’s Identity Games: Globalization and the Transformation of Media Cultures in New Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2009).

68. As Katherine Verdery shows, understanding communism as a mode of totalitarianism is largely wrong. Throughout the Eastern Bloc, opposition movements constantly undermined the Communist regimes. See Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 20.

69. Verdery argues, for instance, that it was socialism’s articulation with capitalism that ultimately led to its demise. See Verdery, What Was Socialism, 33.

70. Numerous critics have already addressed the importance and adaptation of Heart of Darkness in Vietnam War films such as Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now (1979) and Oliver Stone’s Platoon (1986).

1. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society, revised and enlarged ed. (New York: Norton, 1998). Speaking about the work, Schlesinger stated, “I am all for multiculturalism when that means teaching our kids about other continents, cultures, creeds, colors; when that means giving proper recognition to the role of minorities in the history of the United States; when it means seeing things from different viewpoints. But when multiculturalism is carried to the point of promoting and perpetuating separate ethnic and racial communities, I find that alarming.” Cited in Joan Sutton Strauss, “The Alarming Rise of Ethnicity: Bosnia a ‘Murderous Portent’ of Future: Arthur Schlesinger,” Financial Post (Toronto), September 14, 1992, 17.

2. Strauss, “The Alarming Rise of Ethnicity,” 17.

3. Schlesinger, for instance, in The Disuniting of America (52), argued that history, or how we know and teach the past, became an unparalleled “weapon” in the post–Cold War global and national reordering of things.

4. Ibid., 11.

5. Fukuyama, “The End of History?,”National Interest, Summer 1989, www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm.

6. In the article, Fukuyama briefly addresses, and dismisses, nationalism and religious fundamentalism as serious ideological threats to parliamentary democracy.

7. See Benjamin Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld,” Atlantic Magazine, March 1992, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1992/03/jihad-vs-mcworld/3882/. Also see Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,”Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations.

8. As Schlesinger puts it, “The United States is the only large-scale multi-ethnic society that has worked, and that is because it developed a notion of an American identity which transcends, absorbs, changes and is changed by, the subcultures which newcomers bring to this country” (cited in Strauss, “The Alarming Rise of Ethnicity,” 17). In other words, the United States uses diversity as a resource of change. Other nations and regions, those mired in conflict over race and religion, by implication, refuse change, choosing instead to violently pursue ancient conflicts.

9. Michael T. Kaufman, “The Dangers of Letting a President Read,” New York Times, May 22, 1999, B11, late edition.

10. Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 7.

11. Numerous studies of European imperial travel literature have observed that travel writing, in its historical function of culturally mapping European empires, worked to consolidate European national identities as embodiments of modernity and civilization and to justify European dominance over their racialized colonial peripheries. Mary Louise Pratt’s seminal work, Imperial Eyes, examines European travel and exploration writing since 1750 in connection to European imperial—political, economic, and geographic—expansion. Her work elaborates on the power dynamics inherent in the Western traveler’s field of vision, which she explains through the figure of the “seeing-man,” her label for “the white male subject of European landscape discourse—he whose imperial eyes passively look out and possess” (9). Building on Pratt’s work, Inderpal Grewal argues that by the nineteenth century, observation and travel were aligned to develop a “visualization of experience” as part of a racialized and gendered Western subject formation (1). In the moment of high European imperialism, travel narratives thus functioned to consolidate European whiteness over and against their racialized exteriority. See Inderpal Grewal, Home and Harem: Nation, Gender, Empire, and the Cultures of Travel (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996); Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 1992).

12. See Larry Wolff’s Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994).

13. Of course, even before the Cold War, when travel became a privileged symbol of capitalist subjects’ mobility, travel narratives were important to Western European views of Eastern Europe. Historians of Eastern Europe, such as Larry Wolff and Maria Todorova, have demonstrated that between the eighteenth century and the start of the Cold War, the travel narrative served as the predominant cultural form through which the West has imagined Eastern Europe. Yet while, according to Wolff, “the invention of Eastern Europe” in the eighteenth century did not require Enlightenment thinkers to physically travel to Eastern Europe in order to imagine its physical and moral landscapes, in the Cold War period Western travelers had to penetrate the Iron Curtain in order to demonstrate their freedom to move. See Wolff, Imagining Eastern Europe; Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

14. As Caren Kaplan shows, “Travel is very much a modern concept, signifying both commercial and leisure movement in an era of expanding Western capitalism.” See Kaplan, Questions of Travel: Postmodern Discourses of Displacement (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996), 3.

15. Henry Luce, “The American Century,” in Culture and Containment: 1929–1945, ed. Warren Susman (New York: George Braziller, 1973), 324.

16. Fabian, Time and the Other, 6.

17. J. M. Degérando, cited in Fabian, Time and the Other, 7.

18. Ibid., 7, 11–12 (emphasis in original).

19. Ibid., 2.

20. Ibid., 26.

21. Ibid. (emphasis in original).

22. Ibid., 27, 146. In Time and the Other, Fabian further contrasts secular and natural time, an important distinction for the emergence of anthropological knowledge. For my purposes here, however, I am limiting my discussion to his elaboration of secular time and its relation to the trope of travel.

23. Ibid., 144.

24. Anita Starosta, “Eastern Europe, Literature, and Post-Imperial Difference” (PhD dissertation, UC Santa Cruz, 2009), 31 (emphasis in original).

25. Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 258.

26. Melani McAlister’s chapter “Iran, Islam, and the Terrorist Threat, 1979–1989,” in Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), extensively explores “the cultural and political work that the representation of terrorism did in mapping certain moral geographies, and the role of that mapping in supporting U.S. expansionist nationalism” (201).

27. On the domestic front, emphasis on the Soviet threat abroad obscured the Reagan administration’s racist policies and destruction of social welfare networks throughout the 1980s. Borstelmann, for instance, explains that “Reagan rode to victory in 1980 on a wave of unhappiness with inflation, unemployment, and the seizure of American hostages in Teheran. His defeat of Carter carried racial significance. . . . His political ascendancy built from the Watts riots of 1965, as he was elected governor of California a year later as a proponent of law and order. His opposition to civil rights bills in the 1960s is well known. In 1980 Reagan continued the Republican strategy of appealing to disaffected white Southern voters, in particular by rejecting affirmative action. . . . The Justice Department opposed affirmative action, narrowed its definition of racial discrimination, and supported federal tax exemptions for racially discriminatory schools. The administration’s economic policies favoring wealthier Americans and cutting social spending disproportionally hurt nonwhite citizens” (Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 259–60). While in office, the Reagan administration’s trickle-down economic policies thus widened the gap between poor and wealthy Americans, and the burdens of his cuts to social spending fell disproportionately on nonwhite citizens.

28. James Kyung-Jin Lee, Urban Triage: Race and the Fictions of Multiculturalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), xiv.

29. Peter McLaren, “White Terror and Oppositional Agency: Towards a Critical Multiculturalism,” in Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader, ed. David Theo Goldberg (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994), 51.

30. Lee’s book was broadly circulated and well received, gaining a nomination for the National Book Award and winning the Jean Stein Award.

31. Andrea Lee, “Double Lives,” in They Went: The Art and Craft of Travel Writing, ed. William Zinsser (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991), 57–74, 57.

32. Ibid., 58.

33. Her work was excerpted in the June 30 and July 7 editions of the New Yorker.

34. December 3, 1979, 120–40.

35. New Yorker, February 18, 1980, 25.

36. “Talk of the Town,” New Yorker, July 14, 1980, 22.

37. Ibid., 120.

38. Ibid., 133.

39. Kate Baldwin, Beyond the Color Line and the Iron Curtain: Reading Encounters between Black and Red, 1922–1963 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002), 3–4.

40. Lee, “Double Lives,” 59.

41. Ibid., 60.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 61.

44. Ibid., 65.

45. Ibid., 66.

46. Ibid., 70.

47. Ibid., 73.

48. Ibid., 71.

49. New York Times, October 6, 1981, C9.

50. In Pratt, Imperial Eyes, 78.

51. Susan Jacoby, “One Year in Moscow,” New York Times, October 25, 1981, BR3.

52. Allison Blakely, in his historical look at Russian representations of blackness, argues that it is Lee’s light skin that allows her to observe racism in the U.S.S.R. He writes, “Andrea Lee, a black American who accompanied her husband during his ten months as an exchange student in Russia, . . . elicited the following comment from an Ethiopian she met: ‘Most of my African classmates hate it here. . . . The Russian narod, the masses, call us black devils and spit at us in the streets.’ Lee was apparently not recognized as black by Russians because of her light complexion. She observed several clear signs that strong negative racial feelings toward blacks as well as other non-Russian nationalities persist in Soviet society” (141). At the same time, there is no indication in Russian Journal, or in Lee’s later consideration of her time spent in the U.S.S.R., that her light complexion allowed her a more whole or unbiased view of the U.S.S.R. In fact, Lee paints a very negative portrait of the Ethiopian students’ attitude toward black Americans—an attitude that the Russians she encounters do not seem to possess. See Blakely, Russia and the Negro: Blacks in Russian History and Thought (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1986).

53. Patricia Williams, Seeing a Color-Blind Future: The Paradox of Race (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1997), 4.

54. This chapter was part of the excerpt included in the June 30, 1980, issue of the New Yorker.

55. Russian Journal, 67.

56. Ibid., 68.

57. Ibid., 183.

58. Ibid., 184.

59. Ibid., 183.

60. Ibid., 183–84.

61. Ibid., 234.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., 8.

65. Yelena Khanga, with Susan Jacoby, Soul to Soul: The Story of a Black Russian American Family, 1865–1992 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992). Most reviewers of Soul to Soul praised the memoir for addressing the complicated connections between U.S. racial history and Cold War history. Eric Foner’s review in the New York Times, “Three Very Rare Generations,” was the only one to suggest that Khanga’s book fell flat in relation to the radical history of the black diaspora that it told (December 13, 1992, 14, late edition, East Coast).

66. James McBride, “Yelena Khanga’s Voyage of Discovery: A Black Soviet Journalist, Learning—and Teaching—in the Land of Her Grandparents,” Washington Post, February 4, 1998, B1.

67. Gary Lee, December 20, 1992, X2.

68. Karima A. Haynes, “How a Black/Jewish/Polish/Russian/African Woman Found Her Roots,” Ebony, December 1992, 44.

69. V. R. Peterson, “Review of Soul to Soul,” Essence, December 1992, 42.

70. Shortly after Yelena’s birth, in 1962, her father was assassinated in Tanzania.

71. Soul to Soul, 27.

72. Dale Peterson, Up from Bondage: The Literatures of Russian and African American Soul (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000), 11.

73. Soul to Soul, 229.

74. Ibid., 252.

75. V. R. Peterson, “Review of Soul to Soul,” 42.

76. Soul to Soul, 297.

77. Ibid., 114.

78. Ibid., 115.

79. Ibid., 271.

80. Ibid.

81. Quoted in Diane E. Lewis, “A Black Journalist from Russia Dreams of Cooperative Effort,” Boston Globe, November 30, 1992, 52.

82. Kate Baldwin, Beyond the Color Line, 253.

83. Valerie Bunce, “Postsocialisms,” in Between Past and Future: The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Aftermath, ed. Sorin Antohi and Vladimir Tismaneanu (New York: Central European University Press, 2000), 122–152, 136–37.

84. See the organization’s mission statement and history on its website, freedomhouse.org.

85. Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), xxi.

86. Ibid., 48.

87. This argument was first outlined in Balkan Ghosts and developed in more detail in Robert Kaplan, Eastward to Tartary: Travels in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucus (New York: Random House, 2000), 12, 32.

88. Cynthia Simmons, “Baedeker Barbarism: Rebecca West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falcon and Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts,” Human Rights Review, October–December 2000, 109–24, 109. Kaplan himself has ardently denied wanting to influence policy in the Balkans in favor of isolationism. Responding to reports that Clinton used his book as an excuse against intervention, having “inferred that the region’s peoples had never lived together peacefully very long,” Kaplan writes, “This sort of report wouldn’t bother me had I been, like so many others, opposed to intervention. Unfortunately . . . I wasn’t. From late 1992 to the present . . . I have been an unambiguous, public interventionist.” Kaplan’s response was published as the opinion piece “Reading Too Much into a Book,” New York Times, June 13, 1999, republished in Balkan Ghosts: New Edition (New York: Picador, 2005), xxix.

89. Simmons, “Baedeker Barbarism,” 110.

90. Ibid., 113.

91. Ibid., 114, 116.

92. Kaplan, “Reading Too Much into a Book,” xxix.

93. Ibid., xxxi.

94. Ibid.

95. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, xxiii.

96. Ibid., xvi.

97. Ibid., xv.

98. Ibid., xvi, xvii.

99. Ibid., xvi.

100. See Vesna Goldsworthy, Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998). Goldsworthy argues that Kaplan “ensures that Central Europe’s most monstrous creation of modern times, Hitler, can be unburdened on the Balkans” (7).

101. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, xxiii.

102. Ibid., xxxvi.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid., 97.

105. Ibid., 76.

106. Ibid., xxiii.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid., 175.

109. Ibid., 108.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., 108, 122.

112. Ibid., 16 (emphasis in original).

113. Ibid., 25.

114. Ibid., 169.

115. Ibid., 174.

116. Ibid., 179–80.

117. Ibid., 122–23.

118. Ibid., 38.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid., 149–50.

122. Ibid., 58.

123. Kaplan, Eastward to Tartary, 33.

124. Ibid., 6.

125. Ibid., 26. In Eastward to Tartary, the sequel to Balkan Ghosts, Kaplan further expands on the distinctions between the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires, arguing that the difference in development between those nations, like Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic that had been affected by Hapsburg rule, and those like Romania and Bulgaria that had been under Ottoman rule, remains profound in spite of the fifty years of communism throughout the Eastern Bloc (6).

126. Ibid., 285.

127. Ibid., 287.

128. Shu-mei Shih, “Is the Post- in Postsocialism the Post- in Posthumanism?,” Social Text 30, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 27–50, 29.

129. See Robert Kaplan, Surrender or Starve: The Wars behind the Famine (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), and Soldiers of God: With the Mujahidin in Afghanistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990).

130. “The Coming Anarchy” was published in 1994 in Atlantic Monthly magazine and has caused much debate. In the piece, Kaplan takes a Malthusian perspective that nature and resources, rather than imperial legacies, cause Africa’s problems. Republished in The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War (New York: Random House, 2000).

131. Kaplan’s critique of liberal humanitarian impulses is most clearly articulated in The Coming Anarchy, while his post-9/11 Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground (New York: Random House, 2005) is ardently supportive of an aggressive U.S. imperial policy.

132. See Patrick Brantlinger, “Kipling’s ‘The White Man’s Burden’ and Its Afterlives,” English Literature in Transition 50, no. 2 (2007): 172–91, 185.

133. Cited in Brantlinger, “Kipling’s ‘The White Man’s Burden’ and Its Afterlives,” 185.

1. An Unlikely Weapon, directed by Susan Morgan Cooper, Morgan Cooper Productions, 2008.

2. See Patrick Hagopian, “Vietnam War Photography as a Locus of Memory,” in Locating Memory: Photographic Acts, ed. Annette Kuhn and Kristen Emiko McAllister (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 201.

3. See, for instance, Michael Griffin, “Media Images of War,” Media, War & Conflict 3, no. 7 (2010): 7–41.

4. Luciano explains that in the nineteenth century, grief as the affective time of feeling became a compensatory mechanism for the perceived mechanization and fast pace of a modernizing nation. See Arranging Grief: Sacred Time and the Body in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 6.

5. Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 428.

6. As a number of scholars have noted, Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, a novel that addresses multiple and overlapping imperial projects and critiques the brutality and horror embedded in European civilizational discourses, became a dominant narrative frame through which the Vietnam War was dramatized in the U.S. imaginary. See, for example, Margot Norris, “Modernism and Vietnam: Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now,” Modern Fiction Studies 44, no. 3 (1998): 730–66. Also see Said, Culture and Imperialism, xix.

7. Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, ed. Paul B. Armstrong (New York: Norton, 2006).

8. “Address of Senator John F. Kennedy Accepting the Democratic Party Nomination for the Presidency of the United States—Memorial Coliseum, Los Angeles,” July 15, 1960, The American Presidency Project, ed. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 15.

12. “Address of Senator John F. Kennedy.”

13. Ibid.

14. According to Richard Slotkin, throughout U.S. history, the frontier has symbolized the possibility of the nation’s spiritual regeneration through violence. See Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860 (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1973); Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Harper-Perennial, 1993).

15. Slotkin writes that Thomas Jefferson’s and Frederick Jackson Turner’s conception that U.S. democratic principles regenerate in the frontier and Andrew Jackson’s principle of territorial conquest in the frontier all have at their foundation the Puritan idea that spiritual regeneration occurs in the New World frontier (Gunfighter Nation, 11).

16. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 77.

17. Ibid., 14.

18. This included an argument for promoting diversity. As Kennedy explained in a 1962 speech, “We must reject over-simplified theories of international life—the theory that American power is unlimited, or that the American mission is to remake the world in the American image. We must seize the vision of a free and diverse world—and shape our policies to speed progress toward a more flexible world order.” Address given at the University of California at Berkeley, March 23, 1962, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-Reference/JFK-Speeches/Address-At-The-University-Of-California-At-Berkeley.aspx.

19. In Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 527.

20. Ibid., 585.

21. William Spanos, America’s Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).

22. James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature, Art (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 105.

23. These are named as the three primary causes for criticism in the addendum to the 1910 Encyclopedia Britannica entry on the Congo Free State (in Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 113). The collapse of humanitarian concerns into non-Belgian free-trade interests in Africa abounded in British reformers’ writing on the subject of the Congo Free State. In particular, ideas about “freedom” depended on the European nations’ negotiations regarding their sovereignty in colonial holdings, and through respect for these agreements certain forms of imperial rule were deemed principled and just. Edmund Morel, the founder of the Congo Reform Association, a group that publicized the atrocities in the Congo Free State, explained it thus: “A European Government may be justified in evolving theoretical paper rights of sovereignty over land which—and such land does exist in many parts of tropical Africa—is, through pestilence, inter-tribal warfare, emigration, or some such cause, really and truly ‘vacant.’ . . . But to treat native land-tenure as a factor of no account in Afro-European relationship . . . is merely an attempt to cover spoliation, robbery, and violence under legal formulae (see “Property and Trade versus Forced Production,” in Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 164). According to Morel, beyond the claiming of “vacant lands,” once imperial sovereignty is established there is a correct and an incorrect way to deal with native populations. In contrast to the Congo Free State’s abuses, Morel cites the positive example of “voluntary labor of the natives” in French Senegal and British Gambia to prove the “commercial proclivities of the Negro” and to argue for their participation in the principles of free labor and free trade (170). Morel concludes that what would be a proper humanitarian and moral project for Europeans to undertake is thus one that would lead to the development of capitalist principles in Africa. He writes, “In helping him to develop his property on scientific lines; in granting him internal peace; in proving to him that he is regarded not as a brute, but as a partner in a great undertaking from which Europe and Africa will derive lasting benefit—Europe will be adopting the only just, right, and practical policy” (171). The limits of the liberal critique, launched within a framework that took as a priori the justice of European capitalist, scientific, and civilizational principles in Africa, were made manifest in the inadvertent association between humanitarian action in Africa and European profit from African “voluntary labor” that, as Morel noted, “supplied Europe with £100,000 worth of high-class cocoa, and they and their relatives on the French Ivory Coast sent us £500,000 worth of mahogany” (170).

24. Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 22.

25. Alan Simmons, “Conrad, Casement, and the Congo Atrocities,” in Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 187, 189.

26. Adam Hochschild, “Meeting Mr. Kurtz,” in Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 177–78.

27. Chinua Achebe, “An Image of Africa,” Special Issue on Literary Criticism, Research in African Literatures 9, no. 1 (Spring 1978): 1–15.

28. Ibid., 8.

29. Ibid., 3.

30. Ibid., 9.

31. Ibid., 13. Hunt Hawkins, for instance, writes in response to Achebe that “the lasting political legacy of Heart of Darkness, more than any confirmation of racism, has been its alarm over atrocity. Its title has entered our lexicon as code for extreme human rights abuses, usually those committed by whites in non-Western countries but also those committed in Europe” (quoted in Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 375). Of course, Achebe’s point is that the metaphysical production of Africa as object enables the formulation of atrocity to begin with.

32. “To Roger Casement,” in Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 270.

33. Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 33.

34. Ibid., 36.

35. Ibid., 95.

36. Ibid., 95–96.

37. Ibid., 70.

38. Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

39. Norris, “Modernism and Vietnam,” 731.

40. Ibid., 735.

41. From Hearts of Darkness: A Filmmaker’s Apocalypse, written and directed by Fax Bahr and George Hickenlooper, Cineplex-Odeon Films, 1991.

42. Amy Kaplan, “Left Alone in America: The Absence of Empire in the Study of U.S. Culture,” in Cultures of U.S. Imperialism, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993), 18.

43. Ibid., 19.

44. Hearts of Darkness even suggests that previous failures, such as that of Orson Welles, to translate Conrad’s novel successfully for the big screen represent a sort of filmmakers’ curse. The “curse” is made manifest in Francis Coppola’s individual, creative journey into darkness and the obstacles beyond the crew’s control encountered during the production process, such as the typhoon that stopped production for two months and Martin Sheen’s heart attack.

45. As Kim Worthy argues, in spite of the documentary representation of Francis Coppola as a Hollywood outsider and underdog who suffers great losses throughout the filming process, Hearts of Darkness is not about a loss but about a victory at Cannes. See “Emissaries of Difference: Conrad, Coppola, and Hearts of Darkness,” Women’s Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 25, no. 2 (1996): 153–67.

46. Bahr and Hickenlooper, Hearts of Darkness.

47. According to an interview with Hagedorn, both stories are inspired by actual events that took place in the Philippines. The first is based on an alleged hoax about the Tasaday tribe from Mindanao, in the southern Philippines. The second is about Francis Ford Coppola’s filming of Apocalypse Now in the Philippines beginning in 1976. See http://us.penguingroup.com/static/rguides/us/dream_jungle.html.

48. Jessica Hagedorn, Dream Jungle (New York: Penguin, 2003), 305.

49. Ibid., 85–86.

50. “A Conversation with Jessica Hagedorn,” http://us.penguingroup.com/static/rguides/us/dream_jungle.html.

51. Hagedorn, Dream Jungle, 219.

52. Ibid., 247.

53. Ibid., 248.

54. Ibid., 248 (emphasis in original).

55. During the Vietnam War, journalistic reports critical of U.S. warfare and even imperialism often objectified Vietnam as a peasant nation, which was outside of modernity until it was violently brought into Cold War politics through U.S. militarism. As Hagedorn’s Dream Jungle insightfully demonstrates, fictions about war, even those that strive for an antiwar message, do not necessarily step out of dominant national and imperial frames and might replicate the very violence they propose to critique. Indeed, they often depend on existing imperial worldviews and thus re-create temporalizing fictions of prehistory and premodernity through which to envision the possibility of national recovery.

56. Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 2004), 21.

57. Ibid., 101–2.

58. Ibid., 106.

59. The association between the camera as weapon and the violence of representation is, of course, well established. Barthes and Sontag both draw on this association. Recently, Judith Butler elaborated on Barthes’s and Sontag’s theorizations, arguing that the camera’s agency is a technology of war rather than an extension of the person holding the camera. See Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (New York: Verso, 2010).

60. Butler, Frames of War, 76–77.

61. Ibid., 49–50.

62. This is, for instance, the main logic of Philip Jones Griffiths’s antiwar book of photography, Vietnam Inc. (New York: Phaidon, 2001), originally published in 1971. The text accompanying the images posits that the village system in Vietnam, unchanged for thousands of years, has made the Vietnamese impossible to defeat, and that the nation is incompatible with the ideologies that the United States wants to export through war.

63. David Grosser, “American Hearts and Minds,” in From Hanoi to Hollywood: The Vietnam War in American Film, ed. Linda Dittmar and Gene Michaud (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 276.

64. As John Carlos Rowe points out, even documentaries that attempt to tell alternate histories are often normalized in their reception. He cites Hearts and Minds as one example. Rowe argues that in a war in which reality seemed illusive amid the chaos and irrationality, realist aesthetics helped satisfy the desire to explain and rationalize horrific events. In this sense, the documentary form functions as an “idea weapon” in that it furthers the illusion of realism. Thus even though, as I am suggesting here, the still image of horror, which Davis’s documentary incorporates into its form, functions as a punctum to rationalizing discourses about the war, the “real” that is seen as the defining feature of the documentary form and photojournalism also served an alternate function of restoring reason. See Rowe, “Eyewitness: Documentary Styles in the American Representations of Vietnam,” in Cultural Critique 3 (Spring 1986): 126–50.

65. Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 90. On the relationship between the still photograph and docudramas depicting the Vietnam War, see Sturken’s Tangled Memories.

66. Ibid., 92.

67. See, for instance, Susan Sontag’s discussion in Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Picador, 2003), 59, and Barbie Zelizer’s About to Die: How News Images Move the Public (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

68. Sylvia Shin Huey Chong, The Oriental Obscene: Violence and Racial Fantasies in the Vietnam Era (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2012), 77.

69. Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 42.

70. Ibid., 53, 74.

71. Ibid., 71–72.

72. Eddie Adams: Vietnam, ed. Alyssa Adams (New York: Umbrage Editions, 2008).

73. Vivian Sobchack, cited in Chong, The Oriental Obscene, 89.

74. Ibid., 11.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., 12.

77. Ibid., 17.

78. Ibid., 16.

79. Ibid., 16. In contrast, Adams’s own view of his photography emphasized the process of framing war over the idea that photographers convey a transparent access to reality. In the collection of photos, Adams is quoted as stating, “I think all war should be shot in black-and-white. It’s more primitive. Color tends to make things look too nice. It makes the jungle in Vietnam look lush—which it was. But it wasn’t nice” (42). Unlike the contemporary mythologizing of Vietnam as accessible and transparent and, therefore, open to moral action, Adams’s perspective emphasizes that he self-consciously depicted Vietnam as primitive to convey a message about the evils of war. For him, it was necessary to portray Vietnam carefully so that the lush setting did not exceed its intended message—about war, about suffering, and about death. This conception of the Vietnamese landscape articulated by Adams as symbolic of the United States’ descent into chaos and brutality is echoed in countless portrayals of the jungle as leading to savagery and making victory for the United States impossible. For instance, Larry Burrows’s well-known 1963 Life magazine photo essay, which portrays death and devastation, is subtitled, “We Wade Deeper into the Jungle.”

80. Robert Hariman and John Lucaites, No Caption Needed: Iconic Photographs, Public Culture, and Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 2.

81. Ibid., 2.

82. Ibid., 183.

83. Cited in Noam Chomsky, “Visions of Righteousness,” in The Vietnam War in American Culture, ed. John Carlos Rowe and Rick Berg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 22.

84. Ibid., 21.

85. Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 61–62.

1. Charlie Wilson’s War, directed by Mike Nichols, Universal Studios, 2007.

2. Cited in Mark Graham, Afghanistan in the Cinema (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 51.

3. Graham proposes this reading in Afghanistan in the Cinema, 53.

4. On Christian iconography and the frontier myth, see Richard Slotkin’s Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860 (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1973) and Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Harper-Perennial, 1993).

5. For conceptualizations of Afghanistan as the “graveyard of empires,” see, for example, Milton Bearden, “Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires,” in Foreign Affairs (November–December 2001), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57411/milton-bearden/afghanistan-graveyard-of-empires, and Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: Norton, 2009).

6. Stephen Vlastos, “America’s ‘Enemy’: The Absent Presence in Revisionist Vietnam War History,” in The Vietnam War in American Culture, ed. John Carlos Rowe and Rick Berg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 55.

7. “Text of the Reagan Message to Congress on Foreign Policy,” New York Times, March 15, 1986, 4.

8. ABC News, February 19, 1981.

9. ABC News, November 18, 1985.

10. Interview, ABC News, November 22, 1983.

11. “Transcript of Reagan’s State of the Union Message to Nation,” New York Times, January 26, 1988, A16.

12. “Text of the Reagan Message to Congress on Foreign Policy.”

13. Interview with Mark Palmer of the State Department, ABC News, November 18, 1985.

14. Cited in Graham, Afghanistan in the Cinema.

15. Leslie H. Gelb, “The Doctrine/Un-Doctrine of Covert/Overt Aid,” New York Times, February 21, 1986, A14.

16. Cited in Gelb, “The Doctrine.” For a critique of the Reagan Doctrine as vague, see John R. Wallach, “Reagan Misuses History in Seeking Aid for the Contras,” New York Times, April 13, 1986, E25.

17. “Excerpts from the President’s Speech in California on U.S.–Soviet Relations,” New York Times, August 27, 1987, A8.

18. Ibid.

19. CBS, special broadcast, January 4, 1980.

20. “Renewing the Compact,” New York Times, July 18, 1980, A8.

21. NBC Nightly News, January 14, 1982.

22. Robert Pears, “Arming Afghan Guerillas,” New York Times, April 18, 1988, A1.

23. “America: Where Do We Go from Here?” CBS News, February 1, 1980.

24. Pat Mitchell and Jeremy Isaacs (producers), Cold War “Soldiers of God,” narrated by Kenneth Branagh, CNN, September 29, 2001; original air date 1998.

25. CBS Evening News, April 4, 1980.

26. CBS Evening News, December 15, 1982.

27. “Inside Afghanistan,” CBS, 60 Minutes, April 1, 1980.

28. NBC Nightly News, June 11, 1984.

29. “Red Star over Khyber,” PBS, Frontline, narrated by Judy Woodruff, December 13, 1984.

30. Ibid.

31. Rosanne Klass, “The New Holocaust,” National Review 4 (October 1985): 28–29.

32. Orrin G. Hatch, “Don’t Forget the Afghans,” New York Times, November 22, 1985, A35.

33. Cited in Jean-Francois Revel, “The Awful Logic of Genocide,” National Review 4 (October 1985): 22–28.

34. Ibid. In line with the emphasis on Soviet brutality against civilians, numerous news reports cited the practice of planting land mines, masked to look like children’s toys, so that when a young child picks up what he or she thinks is a toy, the mine detonates, maiming the child but not killing him or her. A representative report is Dan Rather’s “Inside Afghanistan,” CBS, 60 Minutes, April 1, 1980.

35. A number of news reports used the phrase “hidden war” to describe the Soviet invasion, for example, NBC Nightly News, June 11, 1984.

36. Revel, “The Awful Logic of Genocide,” 22.

37. Klass, “The New Holocaust,” 29.

38. NBC Nightly News, July 19, 1980.

39. CBS Evening News, December 15, 1982.

40. ABC News, September 10, 1985.

41. Reagan made this comment on March 21, which he proclaimed to be Afghan Day, dedicating an upcoming space shuttle launch to the people of Afghanistan (NBC Nightly News, March 10, 1982).

42. Cited in Hatch, “Don’t Forget the Afghans.”

43. CBS Evening News, April 5, 1983.

44. Interestingly, and possibly to show their own transparency of journalistic practice, Dan Rather introduced the third part of Durschmied’s “Under the Soviet Gun” with a report that the Soviet state news agency critiqued the CBS special as justifying undisguised U.S. interference in Afghanistan, CBS Evening News, April 7, 1983.

45. Interview with Frank Anderson of the CIA, in Soldiers of God.

46. “Afghanistan: Scenes from a Secret War,” 1984, http://www.documentaryfree.com/watch/afghanistan-1984-scenes-from-a-secret-war.

47. Soldiers of God.

48. ABC News, December 27, 1984.

49. “The Face of Afghanistan’s Pain: An Anonymous Portrait Echoes a Nation in Turmoil,” NPR, The World, September 24, 2001.

50. Rae Lynn Schwartz-DuPre, “Portraying the Political: National Geographic’s Afghan Girl and U.S. Alibi for Aid,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 27, no. 4 (2010): 336–56, 344.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., 347.

53. Ibid., 348.

54. Ibid., 351.

55. “Search for the Afghan Girl,” National Geographic Channel, Explorer, 2002.

56. Wendy Hesford and Wendy Kozol offer an insightful reading of the famous 1985 National Geographic image of an Afghan girl juxtaposed with the 2002 image of the same girl as a grown woman wearing a veil. They write, “The 1985 National Geographic Afghan girl cover image that features the girl’s apparent beauty and innocence appeals to Western viewers’ sensibilities about who deserves and needs rescue” (6). In contrast, on the 2002 cover, the veil “functions as a symbol for Third World Women—secrecy, obscurity, and silence. . . . The veil has been configured in much of Western discourse as exemplifying the Other’s imprisonment—a configuration upon which the United States has been dependent in its nationalist discourse of military intervention” (6). Adding to Hesford and Kozol’s argument, I suggest that these two images also testify to the ways in which religion, as an increasingly important category in geopolitics, has been gendered. In 1985, the cover featuring the unveiled girl represented Afghanistan’s need to be rescued from “godless” Soviet imperialism; after 9/11, the cover with the veiled woman represents Middle Eastern women in need of rescue from Islamic fundamentalism. Both visual calls to rescue, however, justify U.S. military presence. See Just Advocacy? Women’s Human Rights, Transnational Feminisms, and the Politics of Representation (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2005).

57. Chengzhi Zhang, “The Eyes That Will Make You Shiver,” trans. Chee Keng Lee, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 5, no. 3 (2004): 486–90.

58. Zhang discusses the technological “dazzle” in the episode as providing a verdict on the true identity of the Afghan girl, just as weapons technologies determine the outcome of the U.S. war in Afghanistan.

59. Greg Zoroya, “National Geographic Tracks Down Afghan Girl,” USA Today, March 13, 2002, www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002/03/12/afghan-girl.htm.

60. Rose Capp, “The Quiet American,” Senses of Cinema, 24, www.sensesofcinema.com/2003/24/quiet_american/.

61. Cited in Joe Wiener, “Quiet in Hollywood,” Nation, December 16, 2002, 6–7.

1. Van Helsing, directed by Stephen Sommers, Universal Pictures, 2004.

2. “In the President’s Words: ‘We Act to Prevent a Wider War,’” New York Times, March 25, 1999, A15, late edition.

3. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” in The Globalization Reader, ed. Frank J. Lechner and John Boli (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000), 27–33.

4. Cited in Inderpal Grewal, Home and Harem: Nation, Gender, Empire, and the Cultures of Travel (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996), 26.

5. Although it has been debated whether Romania can be considered a Balkan nation, it generally falls under this classification in the Euro-American popular imaginary. My use of moral geographies builds on Edward Said’s elaboration of imaginative geography in Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), which he develops to explain how space and time, as history and geography, attain meaning in cultural, political, and academic formations. He was particularly interested in the emergence of the concept of “the West” through the imagining of “the Orient.” According to Said, “Space acquires emotional and even rational sense by a kind of poetic process, whereby the vacant or anonymous reaches of distance are converted into meaning for us here. The same process occurs when we deal with time” (55).

6. “In the President’s Words.”

7. Branka Arsić, “On the Dark Side of the Twilight,” Social Identities 7 (December 2001): 551–71, 551.

8. Tomislav Longinović, “Vampires Like Us: Gothic Imaginary and ‘the serbs,’ in Balkan as Metaphor: Between Globalization and Fragmentation, ed. Dušan Bjelić and Obrad Savić (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2002), 45.

9. Ibid., 51. I wish to be more than clear that I am not proposing to exonerate Milošević as a chief player in the destruction of Yugoslavia, nor am I suggesting that the world should have passively observed the conflict in the region escalate. Instead, I am attempting to assess the media and military technologies and the political and legal narratives through which the U.S.-led West of the post–Cold War order has been able to establish its often violent imperial interests as universal, benevolent, and humanitarian.

10. Ibid., 55.

11. Tim Allen, “Perceiving Contemporary Wars,” in The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Racial Violence, ed. Tim Allen and Jean Seaton (New York: Zed Books, 1999), 11–42.

12. See Tomislav Longinović, Vampire Nation: Violence as Cultural Imaginary (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011).

13. John Bowen, “The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 4 (1996): 3–14, 3.

14. “Speech: ‘I’ll Leave the Presidency More Idealistic,’” New York Times, January 19, 2001, A24, late edition, East Coast.

15. I cite the term “blood and belonging” from the title of Michael Ignatieff’s book on the “new” nationalisms of the 1990s, which exemplifies the essentializing logic in dominant explanations of ethnicity and conflict. See Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993).

16. Jasminka Udovicki and Ivan Torov, “The Interlude: 1980–1990,” in Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia, ed. Jasminka Udovicki and James Ridgeway (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), 83 (emphasis added).

17. Susan Woodward, “International Aspects of the Wars in Former Yugoslavia,” in Udovicki and Ridgeway, Burn This House, 217.

18. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, founded in 1943, consisted of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and two autonomous provinces within Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo).

19. “Clinton on Kosovo: ‘We Can Make a Difference,’” New York Times, February 14, 1999, 1:8, late edition, East Coast.

20. Clinton, cited in “War and Analogy,” New York Times, April 18, 1999, 4:18, late edition, East Coast.

21. Clinton, “In the President’s Words.”

22. Ibid.

23. Clinton, “A Just and Necessary War.”

24. Michael Ignatieff, “The Next President’s Duty to Intervene,” New York Times, February 13, 2000, 4:17, late edition, East Coast.

25. “Clinton, Saluting Kosovo Albanians, Urges Forgiveness,” New York Times, November 24, 1999, A1, late edition, East Coast.

26. Ibid.

27. Serge Schmemann, “From President, Victory Speech and a Warning,” New York Times, June 11, 1999, A1, late edition, East Coast.

28. See Longinović’s discussion of “the failure of universal humanism” predicated on the “ceaseless return of the desire for survival at the expense of the blood of the other” (95) in Vampire Nation.

29. See Nina Auerbach and David Skal’s preface to the Norton Critical Edition of Bram Stoker’s Dracula (New York: Norton, 1997), xii.

30. www.pomgrenade.org/BM/.

31. Since NATO’s Operation Allied Force is remembered as the “first internet war,” Pomgrenade’s web art can be read as a form of activism that repurposes wartime media technologies to intervene in the dominant modes of U.S. militarism since the end of the Cold War.

32. Paul Virilio, War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception (New York: Verso, 1989), 85.

33. Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 18.

34. Stoker, Dracula, 278.

35. Ibid., 34.

36. Ibid., 277.

37. Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire (New York: Verso, 1993).

38. Ibid., 4, 5.

39. As Judith Halberstam has pointed out, “Dracula is not simply a monster, but a technology of monstrosity.” She makes the case, therefore, for the “productivity of gothic fiction” (106). See Skin Shows: Gothic Horror and the Technology of Monsters (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995).

40. Carol Senf, “Dracula: The Unseen Face in the Mirror,” reprinted in Stoker, Dracula, 425.

41. Stoker, Dracula, 211.

42. Ibid., 277.

43. In 1990, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of Serbia and its two provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, and the republic of Montenegro.

44. “Hit Smarter, Not Harder?,” CNN.com, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/legacy/airstrikes/.

45. See Michael Mandel, “Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage, and International Criminal Law,” in Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2003), 293.

46. Joseph J. Eash III, “Harnessing Technology for Coalition Warfare,” NATO Review (online edition) 48, no. 2 (2004): 32–33, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2000/0002-11.htm.

47. Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 2003), 24.

48. Ibid., 59.

49. Avery F. Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 12.

50. Stoker, Dracula, 41.

51. Ethan Bronner, “Historians Note Flaws in President’s Speech,” New York Times, March 26, 1999, A12, late edition, East Coast.

52. Clinton, “Statement on Kosovo,” March 24, 1999, reprinted in History, Policy, Impact, Miller Center, University of Virginia, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3932.

53. ABC Nightly News, March 27, 1999.

54. Ibid.

55. CBS Evening News, March 28, 1999.

56. CBS Evening News, March 29, 1999.

57. ABC Nightly News, April 11, 1999.

58. April 4, 1999.

59. CBS Evening News, April 10, 1999.

60. Ibid.

61. Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 256.

62. Richard Cohen, “A Look into the Void,” Washington Post, April 16, 1999, A29, final edition.

63. ABC, Nightline, April 12, 1999.

64. Rob Noland, “Vengeance of a Victim Race,” Newsweek, April 12, 1999, 42.

65. Ibid.

66. Tony Blair, cited in Mick Hume, “Nazifying the Serbs, from Bosnia to Kosovo,” in Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis, ed. Philip Hammond and Edward S. Herman (Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 2000), 70.

67. Hume, “Nazifying the Serbs,” 72.

68. Barnor Hesse, “Im/Plausible Deniability: Racism’s Conceptual Double Bind,” Social Identities 10, no. 1 (2004): 9–29.

69. Ibid., 14.

70. The conflation of “ethnicity” and “religion” has continued to frame post-9/11 coverage of U.S. interventionism in the Middle East, in which the figure of the “Muslim” stands for the ethnic, religious, and cultural difference that presents a fundamental threat to Western civilization.

71. See Marcus Banks and Monica Wolfe Murray’s “Ethnicity and Reports of the 1992–95 Bosnian Conflict” on the media’s use of the term “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia in Allen, Media of Conflict, 147–61.

72. Jean Seaton, “The New ‘Ethnic’ Wars and the Media,” in Allen and Seaton, The Media of Conflict, 43–63.

73. Ibid., 52.

74. See Stuart Allen and Barbie Zelizer, eds., “Rules of Engagement: Journalism and War,” in Reporting War: Journalism in War Time (New York: Routledge, 2004), 3–21. Allen and Zelizer’s introductory remarks demonstrate that the coverage of the U.S. war in Iraq, in which the practice of “embedding” journalists with combat troops made explicit the cooperation between the national media and the military is just the most recent example of how media images have been crucial for raising public support for military actions and intervention.

75. Society of Professional Journalists, “Reference Guide to the Geneva Conventions,” http://www.genevaconventions.org/.

76. Piers Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy, and Intervention (New York: Routledge, 2002), 1.

77. Ibid., 128.

78. Mirjana Skoco and William Woodger, “The Military and the Media,” in Hammond and Herman, Degraded Capability, 79–87.

79. Ibid., 81.

80. Howard Kurtz, “Serb Units Arrest, Interrogate, Expel Western Journalists,” Washington Post, March 26, 1999, A26, final edition.

81. NATO Press Conference with Jamie Shea, April 23, 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p9904231.htm.

82. Amnesty International, “Collateral Damage” or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force (New York: Amnesty International USA, 2000), 41.

83. Cited in Amnesty International, “Collateral Damage,” 42.

84. CBS Evening News, April 21, 1999.

85. Shea, cited in Hammond and Herman, Degraded Capability, 85.

86. Goran Gocić, “NATO versus the Serbian Media,” in Hammond and Herman, Degraded Capability, 88–93. Gocić cites examples of the “barbaric” regime’s ironic MTV-style response to NATO. For instance, in the case of the shot-down stealth bomber, RTS broadcast images “captioned with a parody of the Windows ’95 warning: ‘This aircraft has performed an illegal operation and will be shot down,’” and people carried placards saying “Sorry, we did not know it was invisible” (89).

87. Tony Weymouth, “The Media: Information and Deformation,” in The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?, ed. Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (London: Pearson Education, 2001), 143–62, 153.

88. Wendy Kozol, “Domesticating NATO’s War in Kosovo/a: (In)Visible Bodies and the Dilemma of Photojournalism,” Meridians 4, no. 2 (2004): 1–38, 14.

89. NATO Press Conference, March 25, 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm.

90. Lisa Parks, “Satellite Views of Srebrenica: Tele-visuality and the Politics of Witnessing,” Social Identities 7, no. 4 (December 2001): 585–611, 589.

91. Ibid., 589.

92. ABC Nightly News, April 10, 1999.

93. Blaine Harden, “What It Would Take to Cleanse Serbia,” New York Times, May 9, 1999, 4:1, late edition, East Coast.

94. NATO Press Conference, April 23, 1999.

95. Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” trans. Libby Meintjes, Public Culture 15, no. 1 (2003): 11–40, 30.

96. “Waging Peace,” ABC, Nightline, June 14, 1999.

97. Skoco and Woodger, “War Crimes,” in Hammond and Herman, Degraded Capability, 31–38, 37.

98. “Waging Peace,” narrated by Ted Koppel, ABC, Nightline, June 16, 1999.

99. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 19.

100. Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 2.

101. Cited in William Glaberson, “Conflict in the Balkans: The Law,” New York Times, March 27, 1999, A8, late edition.

102. Cited in Robert M. Hayden, “Biased Justice: ‘Humanrightism’ and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” in Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas, 259–85, 279.

103. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 11–12.

104. Even the political and media rhetorics that accompanied the post-9/11 U.S. aggression in Afghanistan and Iraq, which were much more explicit about U.S. national security as the foremost factor, continued to cite humanitarian ideals and universal values to justify intervention (for instance, spreading freedom, eliminating terrorism, liberating women, removing a rogue dictator, and installing democracy).

105. Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 164 (emphases in original).

106. “Address by Former President Nelson Mandela,” in the Kosovo Report, 15.

107. Diana Johnstone, “Humanitarian War: Making the Crime Fit the Punishment,” in Masters of the Universe? NATO’s Balkan Crusade, ed. Tariq Ali (New York: Verso, 2000), 147–70.

108. Alex Callincos, “The Ideology of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Ali, Masters of the Universe, 175–89.

109. Michael P. Scharf and William A. Schabas, Slobodan Milošević on Trial: A Companion (New York: Continuum, 2002), 3.

110. Roger Cohen, “From Bosnia to Berlin to the Hague, on a Road toward a Continent’s Future,” New York Times, July 15, 2001, 4:7, late edition, East Coast.

111. George Kennan, “Introduction: The Balkan Crises 1913 and 1993,” in The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry, International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), 3.

1. Directed by Hans-Christian Schmid, 23/5 Filmproduktion GmbH and Zentropa Entertainment, 2009.

2. See, for instance, Wendy Hesford’s chapter on Bosnia, “Witnessing Rape Warfare: Suspending the Spectacle,” in Spectacular Rhetorics: Human Rights Visions, Recognitions, Feminisms (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011), and Jasmina Husanović’s article, “The Politics of Gender, Witnessing, and Postcolonial Trauma: Bosnian Feminist Trajectories,” Feminist Theory 10, no. 99 (2009): 99–119.

3. Debra Bergoffen, “February 22, 2001: Toward a Politics of the Vulnerable Body,” Hypatia 18, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 116–34, 116.

4. Ibid., 118.

5. Writing about British rule in Egypt, Samera Esmeir argues that with colonial rule, humanity ceased being a condition of birth, becoming instead a juridical category (3). In her incisive analysis of the colonial records, Esmeir finds that through colonial legal reforms aimed at taking Egyptians out of a state of lawlessness, conditions of excessive suffering, and inhumanity, “colonial powers carved out a space for their own intervention” (13). Moreover, as “modern law endows itself with the power of humanization, and declares that its absence signals dehumanization, modern law effectively binds the living to the powers of the state” (2). With what Esmeir terms the emergence of a juridical humanity, colonial rule produced “new men who would owe their ‘being’ and ‘life’ to the law” (2). Humanity thus became an “evolutionary narrative” that needed to distinguish between “humanity and its history” in a “chronological movement from the past to humanity (humanization, becoming human)” (86). See Juridical Humanity (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012), 3.

6. From Resolution 827. Go to http://www.icty.org/sid/319.

7. As of 2012, it is not scheduled to close until 2016.

8. Scholars and commentators have often noted that the major distinction between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Tribunals and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) is the former’s emphasis on identifying and prosecuting criminals as opposed to the latter’s emphasis on establishing the truth while granting amnesty to perpetrators. Darryl Robinson, for instance, points out that during the ICC negotiations, truth commissions were regarded as an acceptable supplement to the proceedings of international courts, providing a forum for record keeping, education, reparations, and reconciliation, but not as an alternative, due to the contradictory aims of amnesty and prosecution. See “Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions, and the International Criminal Court,” European Journal of International Law 14 (2003): 481–505. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there has been a movement for establishing a TRC, which is seen as providing a more comprehensive sense of justice for the victims than the ICTY. See Beyazit Akman, “Tribunal vs. Truth: ICTY and TRC in the Case of the Former Yugoslavia,” HUMSEC Journal 2 (2008): 125–44. At the same time, the ICTY sees a TRC in the former Yugoslavia as taking away funds from its operations and, with its own emphasis on establishing the truth and a historical record, as largely redundant. Moreover, in spite of the idea that a TRC could lead to a more comprehensive sense of justice for the victims, as South Africa’s TRC demonstrates, granting amnesty tends to be viewed as fundamentally unjust (that is, more in the service of reconciliation than justice).

9. “Inside the Tribunal,” http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY.

10. “About the ICTY,” http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY.

11. “Achievements,” http://www.icty.org/sid/324#developing.

12. “Achievements,” http://www.icty.org/sid/324#bringing. As of 2012, of the accused, sixty have been convicted of crimes, while thirty cases are in the process of being tried.

13. “The Cost of Justice,” http://www.icty.org/sid/325.

14. As of 2012, 121 countries have ratified the treaty acknowledging the authority of the ICC as a permanent international criminal court. The United States, with concern over submitting its military actions to non-national juridical bodies, has not ratified the treaty.

15. Rachel Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal in the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, Politics, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 12.

16. Ibid., 12–13.

17. Isabelle Delpha, “In the Midst of Injustice: The ICTY from the Perspective of Some Victim Associations,” in The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society, ed. Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms, and Ger Duijzings (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 219.

18. Ibid., 226. Delpha notes that many Bosnians blame the United Nations’ “Blue Helmets” and the United States and Western Europe more broadly for the siege of Sarajevo and the massacre in Srebrenica and wonder why their leaders are not on trial at The Hague but are, rather, the ones sitting in judgment.

19. In a similar critique to Delpha’s, Sanja Kutnjak Ivković argues that the structural preconditionality that pressed the nations of the former Yugoslavia to submit their domestic politics to the ICTY as the condition for entering into negotiations with the European Union and the primacy of the ICTY over the national courts point to a “democracy deficit” within the Tribunal and a new hierarchy of nations. See Reclaiming Justice: The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Local Courts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 84, 119, 153.

20. Ivković, Reclaiming Justice, 57. Rachel Kerr also argues that for the ICTY, the creation of a historical record has been important, especially since there are multiple versions of the “truth” on the ground. For Kerr, the supremacy of the ICTY’s jurisdiction over war crimes accords it the authority to enact this important task of setting a unified history on record, as part of the reconciliation process (62).

21. “About the ICTY,” http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY.

22. Cynthia Enloe used the term “new feminist consciousness” to describe the relationship between the activism surrounding rape warfare and feminist progress. See “Afterword: Have the Bosnian Rapes Opened a New Era of Feminist Consciousness?,” in Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ed. Alexandra Stiglmayer (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 219–30.

23. Catharine MacKinnon’s article “Turning Rape into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide,” which was published in the July 1993 issue of Ms. magazine, spurred American feminists’ interest in the Balkan Wars. MacKinnon argued that the availability of pornography in the former Yugoslavia led to what came to be known as the rape and death camps. This is an argument for which she came under much criticism, especially by feminists across the former Yugoslavia who contended that there was in fact much less pornography available there than in many Western European nations and in the United States. See, for instance, Dubravka Žarkov’s The Body of War: Media, Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-up of Yugoslavia (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007).

24. Todd Salzman, “Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia,” Human Rights Quarterly 20, no. 2 (1998): 348–78, 348.

25. A prominent example, the documentary Calling the Ghosts, one of the best-known portrayals of victims of rape in the former Yugoslavia, ends with Jadranka Cigelj, the main subject of the film, at The Hague, where she gives testimony. A number of feminist scholars have written compellingly about the ethics of representing rape in that film. See Wendy Hesford’s “Witnessing Rape Warfare” in Spectacular Rhetorics; also see Katarzyna Marciniak, “Pedagogy of Anxiety,” Signs 35, no. 4 (2010): 869–92.

26. Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 108–9.

27. Ibid., 135.

28. Cynthia Enloe, “Afterword: Have the Bosnian Rapes Opened a New Era of Feminist Consciousness?,” in Stiglmayer, Mass Rape, 219.

29. Ibid., 222.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., 221.

32. Even prior to the establishment of the ICTY, Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s final report of the Special Rapporteur to the Commission of Experts, which established the need for an international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, assessed that rape as a form of “contempt and hatred” is “one of the most tragic aspects of the plight of the Muslim population” in Bosnia. Cited in Sara Sharratt, Gender, Shame, and Sexual Violence: The Voices of Witnesses and Court Members at War Crimes Tribunals (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 6.

33. “Crimes of Sexual Violence,” http://www.icty.org/sid/10312.

34. Interview in Sexual Violence and the Triumph of Justice, DVD, ICTY Outreach Programme and ITSS Production, 2011.

35. Sharratt, Gender, Shame, and Sexual Violence, 20.

36. Cited in “International Justice Failing Rape Victims,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Special Report, TRI Issue 483, February 15, 2010, http://iwpr.net/report-news/international-justice-failing-rape-victims.

37. Ibid.

38. Interview in Sexual Violence and the Triumph of Justice.

39. Sharratt, Gender, Shame, and Sexual Violence, 30.

40. Hesford, Spectacular Rhetorics, 96.

41. Debra Berghoffen, Contesting the Politics of Genocidal Rape: Affirming the Dignity of the Vulnerable Body (New York: Routledge, 2012), 67.

42. Ibid., 1.

43. Ibid., 2.

44. Ibid., 70.

45. MacKinnon compares the wars in the Balkans to the Holocaust, but for her, this time sex, and not religion or ethnicity, became the primary marker of the victims. She writes, “The world has never seen sex used this consciously, this cynically, this elaborately, this openly, this systematically, with this degree of technological and psychological sophistication, as a means of destroying a whole people. With this war, pornography emerges as a tool of genocide” (75). MacKinnon, in a sense, originated the idea that genocide in the former Yugoslavia was gendered. MacKinnon’s article has been widely critiqued by feminist writers from Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, as well as from the United States and Western Europe, for its sensationalist and exploitative use of women’s testimony, the unfair treatment of Balkan feminists, and the assumption that only women can be victims of rape. Of particular interest, however, is the question of what makes this genocide not just gendered but postmodern in MacKinnon’s estimation. MacKinnon is particularly troubled that the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims are not racially distinguishable. She claims that the Serbs used this in their favor. According to the article, Serb soldiers videotaped themselves while raping Muslim women, but because they placed crosses around the women’s necks, they were able to claim the footage as evidence of Muslim soldiers raping Serbian women. MacKinnon writes, “Serbian propaganda moves cultural markers with postmodern alacrity, making ethnicity unreal and all too real at the same time” (76). For MacKinnon, racial and religious identities in the Balkans are confusing and interchangeable; what is certain is the biological determinacy of sexual difference, and it is through this difference that the Muslim woman is visible as a victim of war crimes. Reprinted in Stiglmayer, Mass Rape.

46. MacKinnon, “Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace,” in Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 153.

47. Ibid., 153.

48. Ibid., 154.

49. Tracy Fessenden, “Disappearances: Race, Religion, and the Progress Narrative of U.S. Feminism,” in Secularisms, ed. Janet R. Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008), 140.

50. Ibid., 139.

51. Ibid., 141.

52. Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia’s president from the end of World War II through his death in 1980, gave the 40 percent majority Bosnian Muslim population the status of an ethnicity (narod) in the 1971 census. The republic also had large minority populations of Christian Orthodox Serbs (30 percent) and Catholic Croats (20 percent). After 1991, the division in Bosnia along ethnic and religious lines paralleled the nationalism in Croatia and Serbia.

53. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 159.

54. Ibid., 171.

55. Ibid.

56. See Žarkov, The Body of War, 148; Tone Bringa, “Islam and the Quest for Identity in Post-Communist Bosnia-Herzegovina,” in Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States, ed. Maya Shatzmiller (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 24–34.

57. Bringa, “Islam and the Quest for Identity,” 33, 34.

58. For instance, Michael Sells, who has written extensively on religion in the former Yugoslavia, argues that during the war, “Serbian Orthodoxy [was] . . . the clearest and most obvious example of how religious myth and ritual were exploited” to create a homogeneous national conception of “Serbs” leading to ethnoreligious “cleansing” (212). See “Sacral Ruins in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Mapping Ethnoreligious Nationalism,” in Religion and the Creation of Race and Ethnicity, ed. Craig R. Prentiss (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 211–34.

59. Ibid., 212. Sells thus ranks Serbian religious nationalism as the most genocidal, Catholic Croat nationalism as “reactively genocidal,” and Islamic nationalism as not being indigenous to the region and, therefore, not genocidal.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., 217, 221.

62. For an excellent discussion on the kinds of legal claims enabled by emphasizing ethnic identity as opposed to religious identity within Europe, see Saba Mahmood, “Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?,” Critical Inquiry 35, no. 4 (Summer 2009): 836–62. As Mahmood argues within the context of the Dutch cartoon controversy, “Arguments about the racialization of Muslims provoke the fear among Europeans that if this premise is conceded or accorded legal recognition then European Muslims will resort to European hate-speech laws to unduly regulate forms of speech that they regard as injurious to their religious sensibilities” (851). The distinction between the treatment of race and religion in the law rests on the opposition between “immutable biological characteristic[s]” and matters of choice, with race falling into the former and religion into the latter category (852).

63. See, for instance, Swanee Hunt, This Was Not Our War: Bosnian Women Reclaiming the Peace (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004).

64. Elizabeth Neuffer, The Key to My Neighbor’s House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda (New York: Picador, 2001), 5.

65. Hunt, This Was Not Our War, 2.

66. Ibid., 137.

67. Ibid., xv.

68. Allen, Rape Warfare, 90.

69. Cited in Robert D. Kaplan, “A Reader’s Guide to the Balkans,” New York Times, April 18, 1993, BR1.

70. Swanee Hunt, Worlds Apart: Bosnian Lessons for Global Security (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011), 50.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., 202.

73. Ibid., 157.

74. For instance, Roy Gutman, an American journalist who first broke the stories of the rape and death camps in the United States and Europe, proposed in his foreword to the most widely cited book on rape warfare in Bosnia, Stiglmayer’s Mass Rape, that Muslim traditions facilitated the use of rape as a genocidal strategy on the part of the Serbs. He writes, “In the conservative society in which the Muslims of rural Bosnia grew up, women traditionally remain chaste until marriage. . . . [Victims of rape] have well-founded fears of rejection and ostracism and of lives without marriage or children. In this regard the pattern of rapes of unmarried women of childbearing age fulfills another definition of genocide—the attempt to block procreation of the group” (x). For a more detailed critique of such representations of Muslim traditionalism in scholarship on rape warfare, see Žarkov, The Body of War, 144–48.

75. Ruth Seifert, “War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis,” in Stiglmayer, Mass Rape, 56.

76. Alexandra Stiglmayer, the editor of Mass Rape, is clearest in her articulation of how “difficult” these women are to find: “It was not easy to find these women. In the refugee camps we visited, how frequently we were told: ‘Of course we have cases of rape; I can show you the women, but they don’t talk about it’” (83). Later in the chapter, Stiglmayer quotes a Muslim doctor, who seems to reaffirm that many more women were raped than spoke out because, according to him, “‘There’s a psychological problem here. . . . Muslim society is patriarchal. A woman’s honor is important, and the men are jealous” (91). Cited in “The Rapes in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Stiglmayer, Mass Rape.

77. According to Talal Asad, “The American secular language of redemption, for all its particularity, now works as a force in the field of foreign relations to globalize human rights. . . . Hence ‘democracy,’ ‘human rights,’ and ‘being free’ are integral to the universalizing moral project of the American nation state—the project of humanizing the world.” See Asad, Formations of the Secular, 147.

78. Ibid., 157 (emphasis in original).

79. “Statements of Guilt,” http://www.icty.org/sid/203.

80. “Witness DD,” http://www.icty.org/sid/10124.

81. “Habiba Hadžić,” http://www.icty.org/sid/10123.

82. “Grozdana Ćećez,” http://www.icty.org/sid/196.

83. Wendy Brown, “‘The Most We Can Hope For . . .’: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism,” South Atlantic Quarterly 103, no. 2–3 (2004): 451–63, 453.

84. “About the ICTY,” http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY.

85. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 4, 6, 10.

86. Ibid., 83.

87. Ibid., 176.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., 187.

90. Ibid.

91. Clea Koff, The Bone Woman: A Forensic Anthropologist’s Search for Truth in the Mass Graves of Rwanda, Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo (New York: Random House, 2004), 152.

92. Ibid., 16–17.

93. The ownership of bodies, particularly those that have been reduced to the status of bare life, is the foundation for meaning making by distinct regimes of power. During the war, bodies in the camp were meant to signal the degradation of an entire ethnic or religious group. As Dubravka Žarkov argues, during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, ethnicity was produced through the living and symbolic bodies of men and women. The wars themselves, and the technologies of war, became the modes of production of ethnicity and nationalism. According to Žarkov, the raped female body was always necessarily also an ethnic body. Through the production of femininity as vulnerability, sexual violence against women was simultaneously vested with meanings of victimization and linked to territory. See Žarkov, The Body of War, 2, 153, 172.

94. “Stevan Todorović,” http://www.icty.org/sid/225 (emphases added).

95. Brown, “‘The Most We Can Hope For . . .,’” 461.

96. Jasmina Husanović’s excellent article, “The Politics of Gender, Witnessing, and PostColonial Trauma,” discusses Žbanić’s films as responding to the war in Bosnia through a creative approach to political loss as a politics of hope (101). Addressing culture as a site through which such critique can take place, she posits the importance of moving away from thinking of Bosnia through the lens of survival and healing and moving on to a politics of reimagination and transformation that is based on a hopeful politics of witnessing. Here I am emphasizing a politics of refusal in place of a politics of hope in order to move away from a future-oriented temporality, which risks being engulfed in the messianic temporality of human rights, and toward a complex, heterogeneous temporality that emerges in Žbanić’s films.

1. Swanee Hunt, This Was Not Our War: Bosnian Women Reclaiming the Peace (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), xv.

2. “Top Secret America,” Frontline, PBS, http://video.pbs.org/video/2117159594/.

3. According to Frontline, the exact amount of money spent by the NSA in the years after 9/11 is one of the best-kept secrets of the new war.

4. For instance, during the 2009 protests in Iran following that country’s controversial presidential election, the death of Neda Agha Soltan was captured on a camera phone, and the video quickly went viral. While many of the traditional news sources, which rebroadcasted her death in the United States, blurred out her face in a show of respect, on online platforms one was able to see the full horror of her lying in an alley, bleeding from the mouth after being shot by the government-sponsored patrol, which was attempting to squash the mass demonstrations. In this case, new technologies of communication were interpreted not just as changing the way in which the world reports the news but as disabling closed, antidemocratic, and nonsecular regimes, such as the one in Iran, from keeping their oppression hidden from the world’s view. U.S. news sources framed Neda’s death as the story of a young woman whose aspiration to leave the antidemocratic nation and live a secular, modern life with her boyfriend was quite literally killed by the Iranian state. Yet it is hardly an accident that a dying woman’s body would come to elicit the West’s humanitarian gaze by symbolizing the repressive nature of the regime—notions of Islamic terror have, after all, referenced sexual oppression as a foremost mark of illiberalism, especially after 9/11. The image of a Muslim woman’s dying and injured body, whose sacrifice has come to emblematize the desire for democracy, gender equality, and sexual freedom in Iran, although seemingly disconnected from the ongoing occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq in fact circulates as the visible counterpoint justifying “top secret America” as being, fundamentally, about global human justice.

5. “Boston Explosions: ‘Please Don’t be Arabs or Muslims,’” Al Jazeera.com, April 16, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/04/201341681629153634.html, accessed on May 10, 2013.

6. “Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Were Refugees from Brutal Chechen Conflict,” Washington Post, April 19, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-19/world/38660077_1_russian-caucasus-boston-marathon-chechnya.

7. “Boston Suspects: Immigrant Dream to American Nightmare,” CNN.com, April 21, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/19/us/massachusetts-bombers-profiles.

8. “The Wrong Kind of Caucasian,” Al Jazeera.com, April 21, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/04/2013421145859380504.html.

9. “U.S. Senator Says 4,700 Killed in Drone Strikes,” Al Jazeera.com, February 21, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2013/02/201322185240615179.html.

10. Jennifer Epstein, “White House: Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Not an ‘Enemy Combatant,’” Politico.com, April 22, 2013, http://www.politico.com/politico44/2013/04/white-house-dzhokar-tsarnaev-not-an-enemy-combatant-162298.html.

11. Cited in “Boston Suspects,” CNN.com.