The Separation of Art, Architecture, and Aesthetics
Although architecture has historically been considered a “fine art,” oftentimes standing alongside painting, sculpture, music, and poetry, its status as an equal has always been in question. This unequal status emerges from the burden of architecture’s defining requirement to function—a trait not equally shared by other artforms. Architecture’s qualifications for aesthetic attention have been frequently in question because of this need to function, or its corollary: that it is not produced exclusively for artistic pleasure or contemplation.1 Confusion, however, emerges in that, while architecture is not produced exclusively for artistic enjoyment, it is at times enjoyed for its artistic qualities, meaning that, while its claim to artistic status is not as stable as that of painting or sculpture, it does reasonably exist.
One logical direction to pursue further, if one sought to ensure aesthetic attention for architecture, would be to better confirm this status as an art—as if, were it more surefooted in such status, it would be more likely to be confirmed as deserving of aesthetic attention both within and outside of the field. Architects have sought such artistic status for architecture at least since the early Renaissance, an early effort that is conveyed notably by the title of the first book on architecture theory, Leon Battista Alberti’s 1452 On the Art of Building in Ten Books (De Re Aedificatoria). This is further evinced in Georgio Vasari’s mid-Renaissance publication that arrived nearly a century later in 1568, titled The Lives of the Most Excellent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects (Le Vite de’ Più Eccellenti Pittori, Scultori, e Architettori), which again, as is obvious in the title, attempts to elevate architects from their previous status as mere craftsmen to the higher status of “artist” alongside those of painters and sculptors.
The ensuing long-term struggle between architecture being an art or not-art, however, will not be a battle fought yet again in this book. Instead, I propose that while architecture’s legitimacy for aesthetic attention could be partially verified by its status as an art, it has a greater claim by virtue of its increasingly dominant role in establishing the visual framework of human perception. I will also propose that this increasing impact of architecture on the human field of vision warrants a broadening of aesthetic discourse, such that aesthetic discourse can be stretched to include nonart cultural entities, yet not be tasked with accommodating all entities, as is the case with a Rancierian position.
The weakness of trying to confirm architecture’s status as an art in order to justify it for aesthetic attention requires some consideration. The status of what does and does not fall into the category of “art” has been and continues to be a subject fraught with centuries of controversy and continues into the recent history of analytic philosophy. An early attempt at defining art in the analytic tradition can be found in the Wittgenstein-based definition offered by Morris Weitz, who in 1956 argued that, in fact, no definition of art is possible because art is an “open concept,” and any static definition would therefore “compromise the creativity” of art. Weitz writes “To understand the role of aesthetic theory is not to conceive of it as a definition, logically doomed to failure,” meaning that the role of aesthetics is not to define what is art or not art, but rather, as he continues, “to attend in certain ways to features of art.”2 Within this definition (or nondefinition, rather), architecture could not be denied status as an art, and would therefore be worthy of aesthetic attention—but only alongside everything else in the world. It follows that if everything can be considered art, then the distinction of what is and what is not art becomes meaningless. Similarly, if everything is deserving of aesthetic attention, the nothing in particular is deserving of aesthetic attention.
A different strategy for artistic categorization lies the 1983 definition offered by George Dickie, who claimed that a work of art should be defined as “an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public,” which would disqualify architecture for status as an art, as architecture is created for a public larger than only an artworld public.3 More recently Yuriko Saito, in her book Everyday Aesthetics sought to bypass the art question entirely and claimed that confining aesthetics to art undermines percipients’ ability to engage with aesthetic properties of objects in everyday reality, a position that would, again reinstate architecture as worthy of aesthetic consideration but, again, only by virtue of its everydayness rather than its artistic value.4 (This is an expansion of aesthetic reach within analytic philosophy and loosely mirrors Rancière’s similar expansion, albeit for different reasons, within Continental philosophy.) Saito’s position would contradict Dickie’s 1983 definition and return us to a descendant position of Weitz’s 1956 definition, notably that aesthetics should not be confined to art, and that architecture would be worthy of aesthetic consideration—but again, only alongside everything else in the world. For our purposes, a final foray into the debate regarding the position of architecture as an art relative to aesthetics can be found in James Shelley’s 2018 paper “The Default Theory of Aesthetic Value,” where he describes that “works of literature are aesthetic objects as surely and as fully as are paintings, sculptures, musical pieces and dances”—yet with no mention of architecture.5 Thus, architecture would once again be disqualified from warranting aesthetic attention, by Shelley’s precise omission.
As is apparent, the problem with seeking to define architecture as an art in order to qualify it for aesthetic consideration is that even after centuries of debate there appears to be no impending resolution to the question, whether it be within art, architecture, art history, architectural theory, or aesthetic philosophy. Nonetheless, the world must go on and architecture must be built—only without any resolution of its artistic status or, I would argue, the much more important associated status of being considered worthy of aesthetic attention and guidance that comes with legitimized status as an art.
Architecture’s aesthetic dilemma is that it is currently stretched between two dominant positions with which to consider its value for aesthetic attention, being:
- Architecture is an art, and therefore is deserving of aesthetic attention, or
- Because art cannot be defined or should not be considered a special category, everything is deserving of aesthetic consideration.
While such indeterminate theoretical stretching may be serviceable for other arts (or nonarts), such an extreme taffying is particularly damaging to architecture as it places architecture in a perpetual state where it remains simultaneously not quite enough of an art to be an art, yet by most accounts is too special to be a mere everyday thing.6 By existing in this categorical limbo architecture receives not only no philosophical attention but also troublingly little aesthetic attention, as if there was going to be a gateway for philosophical attention for architecture, it would likely be through aesthetics. One might worry that neither philosophy nor aesthetics have any meaningful relationship with architectural theory, discourse, or education, despite architecture being the physically largest and most resource consuming of all human endeavors. Such worry would seem warranted.
Participating in the tennis match of architecture’s artistic and therefore aesthetic value therefore seems to be a fruitless endeavor, continually leaving architecture without any accompanying aesthetic discourse to guide or inform its creative production. I, therefore, suggest that we forgo the question of art and work in reverse, shifting from aesthetics back into architecture via another route of legitimization. Architecture’s qualification for aesthetic consideration, therefore, would need to come from a location other than its status as being, or not being, an art.
I suggest that aesthetic discourse could be slightly broadened to accommodate not only historically verifiable “art,” but also entities that are special enough through cultural characteristics other than only full artistic status, yet in doing so it not be broadened so widely as to include all entities, everywhere, and always, as is suggested within the Continental tradition by Rancière and, in the analytic tradition by Saito. To proceed with further arguments, I will therefore assume as most reasonable what I have termed a limited aesthetic expansion, where it would include architecture if architecture were able to be, if not a fully recognized art, then at least more valuable to human culture than all everyday objects, everywhere. I would also suggest that the nonart cultural value of architecture, today more than ever before, will emerge from its newly minted status as the visual framework of human perception.7