Notes

1. Gilles Deleuze, Différence et répétition (Paris: Presses Universersitaire de France, 1968), 4 (my translation).

2. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), xvii.

3. Raymond Bellour, “The Image of Thought: Art or Philosophy, or Beyond?,” in Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze’s Film Philosophy, ed. D. N. Rodowick (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 3–4.

4. Gregg Lambert, The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (New York: Continuum, 2002).

5. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues (Paris: Flammarion, 1996), 115.

1. Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953–1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), 139.

2. Ibid., 140.

3. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 324.

4. Ibid., 325.

5. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 129.

6. Deleuze, Desert Islands, 137–38.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 142.

10. Ibid., 137.

11. “Das Bedenkliche, das, was uns zu denken gibt, ist demnach keinesweg durch uns festgesetzt, nich durch uns auf gestestellt, nich durch uns nur vor-gestellt.” Martin Heidegger, Was Heist Denkin? (Tübingen: Max Niemayer Verlag, 1984), 3; What Is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).

12. See especially the passages concerning the new “conceptual personae” introduced into contemporary philosophy by writers like Blanchot; these personae refer to ideas born from living, “face-to-face” relationships that are given “new a priori characteristics” (e.g., the “friend” expresses the idea of friendship as a face-to-face experience that also bears a priori characteristics that change over time). It is in this sense one can speak of madness, in relation to Artaud’s experience, or to amnesia and aphasia, in relation to the figures of Blanchot, Celan, Chestov, and Michaux. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 4–5.

13. See especially the collection published in 1959 and translated as Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1971).

14. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 178.

15. From the French survol, which Deleuze and Guattari frequently employ to signal a manner of “flying over” the problematic field of a concept, “at infinite speed,” but in a manner also compared to the movement of a slow-motion shot that traces the contours of the problem and the finite number of conceptual components in what they call a “fragmentary whole.”

16. Foucault, The Order of Things, 327.

17. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 55.

18. Ibid., 37.

19. To my knowledge, Deleuze publicly claimed to have “signed” only three concepts: “the ritornello,” which is actually a concept first invented by Guattari; “the other person” (autrui), a concept that goes back to Leibniz but Deleuze recasts given that “Leibniz did not believe that possibles exist in the real world”; and finally, the “crystal of time,” which is derived from Bergson’s concept of duration, in which Deleuze claims to have discovered a “direct presentation of the image of thought” (see the Conclusion, n. 59).

20. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 23.

21. Ibid., 51.

22. Alan D. Schrift, Twentieth-Century French Philosophy: Key Themes and Thinkers (London: Blackwell, 2006), 300.

23. Ibid., 93.

24. Ibid., 299–300.

25. Of course, the contradiction to this thesis is Bergson (not Spinoza!), whom Deleuze chooses to champion very early in his career, for reasons I will discuss in the Conclusion.

26. Deleuze, Desert Islands, 142.

27. This contradiction is perhaps best summarized by Constantine Boundas in the following passage: “Philosopher, stutterer, thinker of an outside—but never marginal or parasitic. His philosophical apprenticeship and, later on, his career as a ‘public philosopher’ have been in accordance with France’s best and time honored ways: La Sorbonne, Professeur de Lycée, Professeur de l’Université en Province, researcher at the Centre national des researches scientifiques, Professeur de l’Université de Paris VIII, first Vincennes, and later on, St. Denis. But this rather orthodox French academic career—this molar, segmented line, as he would call it—never managed to conceal a certain taste for the outside, a desire for nomadic displacements, an openness to encounters which could cause the molar line to deviate and the rhizome to grow in the middle, or a kind of humor with which to displace the philosopher’s old irony.” Constantine V. Boundas, ed., A Deleuze Reader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 3.

28. Deleuze, Desert Islands, 142.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., 41.

32. Ibid., 40.

33. Ibid., 42.

34. Ibid., viii.

35. Epigraph appearing on the back cover of Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews, 1975–1995, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodge and Mike Taormina (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006).

36. On this point, see my “French Theory: The Movie,” Symploke 18, nos. 1–2 (2010): 293–303. See also the concluding chapter of Gregory Flaxman, Gilles Deleuze and the Fabulation of Philosophy, vol. 1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).

37. Deleuze, Desert Islands, 56.

38. Machine is a term first employed by Guattari to designate a concrete multiplicity, or later an assemblage (agencement), integrated into any Structure and thus causing it to function, or to produce, the primary example being the Lacanian notion of “l’objet petit a.” It becomes the modal point of Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of historical structures, because each contingent structure is dominated by a system of machines; therefore, in approaching any structure one must first identify its actual machines and determine how they work. Félix Guattari, Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 111–19.

39. Deleuze, Desert Islands, 93.

40. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 138.

41. Ibid.

42. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 42 (emphasis added).

43. We might see why Badiou later misunderstood the metaphysical claim of Deleuze’s entire system of philosophy, or preferred to see it as a return to Scholasticism, because he failed to understand the relationship between the metaphysical problem of the One and the Many in terms of its relations to the real social problem of desiring production (i.e., the whole and the parts). For example, Deleuze does not understand multiplicity as the singularly differentiated One that is infinitely distributed in its parts; neither is multiplicity the predicative distribution of the One in the multiple, or the Set of all sets. See Alain Badiou, The Clamor of Being, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 20.

44. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 42.

45. Ibid. With regard to the above statement, or provocation, the case of Bergson is more complicated; Deleuze defines Bergson’s philosophy as a “Theory of Multiplicity” (see Conclusion, n. 58). Nevertheless, I will return in the Conclusion to show how, even in the case of Bergson, there is a strange amalgamation with Proust concerning the new image of thought that corresponds to real multiplicity, or what Deleuze defines as the “crystal image of Time.”

1. Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs: The Complete Text, trans. Richard Howard (London: The Athlone Press, 2000), 145. Because the chronology of the French editions and thus the probable dates of composition are crucial for my argument in this chapter, I will refer to dates of French publication in the text; however, all English citations are taken from this edition, which is based on the second edition of Proust et les signes (1970). See note 6 below.

2. As Gregory Flaxman and I have discussed elsewhere, this “sensory-motor training” is vividly and ironically portrayed in several of Kubrick’s films, particularly A Clockwork Orange (1971) and Full Metal Jacket (1987). See Gregg Lambert and Gregory Flaxman, “Ten Propositions on Cinema and the Brain,” Pli: Warwick Journal of Philosophy 16 (2005): 114–28.

3. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 139.

4. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, 184–85.

5. “Words” is also the title of a late meditation by Heidegger on the poetic saying of Stefan Georg, which gives the embryonic sense of language in the images of a buried, yet undead, child and a stranger, or one “who wanders beyond the limits.”

6. The history of publication and translation of Proust and Signs is complicated. The first edition appeared in 1964, under the title Marcel Proust et les signes. The augmented second edition, which ends with a new, lengthy chapter titled “Antilogos ou la machine littéraire,” was first published in 1970. The third and final edition was published in 1976. As the preface to the third edition indicates, the “Antilogos” chapter from the second edition was broken into chapters for the third edition, and the third edition’s closing section, titled “Conclusion: Présence et fonction de la folie l’Araignée,” originally appeared in an Italian volume in 1973 (which Deleuze reworked for the 1976 edition), and was the basis of the 1975 “Roundtable on Proust.” The 1976 edition includes a preface to the third edition, but the preface to the second edition is not reprinted in the third. (The French prefaces are merely labeled “Avant-propos de la deuxième édition” and “Avant-propos de la troisième edition.”) The first English translation of the 1970 French edition appeared as Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard (New York: George Braziller, 1972).

7. Guattari, Molecular Revolution, 111–19.

8. Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 102.

9. Ibid., 142.

10. Ibid., 147.

11. Ibid., 148. “An involuntary machine of interpretation” is another name for the literary machine, or certain kinds of writing devices in general. It is involuntary because writers do not know beforehand what kinds of signs the machines they invent will produce; in fact, they don’t even know how the machine they have created will actually work—if it will work at all! The art of writing is also a process of interpreting the machine in determining the conditions of its production, in addition to interpreting the signs and effects that these created machines produce. Thus, all writers interpret according to both senses and aspects of the literary machines they create, but not all writers can be said to be good interpreters of their own machines. (In some respects, Proust and Kafka are exceptions to this general rule.)

12. Quoted in ibid., 187n.

13. Ibid.

14. Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 30–31.

15. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, vol. 2, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 10.

16. Franz Kafka, “The Metamorphosis,” in The Metamorphosis and Other Stories, trans. Joyce Crick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 30.

17. Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 94.

18. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 131.

19. “I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. To-day, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares and am happily disturbed by no passions and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions.” René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10.

20. Ibid., 24.

21. Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 97.

22. Descartes, Meditations, 23.

23. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 130.

24. Quoted in Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 95–97.

25. Marcel Proust, Du Cote de chez Swann, vol. 1, 67–69, quoted in Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 408; emphasis in original.

26. Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 174.

1. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Rhizome: Introduction (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1976), reprinted in revised form in Capitalisme et schizophrenie, vol. 2: Mille plateaux (1980). English translation: Deleuze and Guattari, On the Line, trans. John Johnston (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983).

2. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 36.

3. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, vol. 2, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 3.

4. Badiou’s dismissal of Guattari’s contribution is well known and appears in statements at the beginning of The Clamour of Being (2000). In a seminar on Difference and Repetition at The University of California at Irvine in 1993, when asked about Deleuze’s collaboration with Guattari, Derrida replied: “Deleuze est un philosophe vrai. Mais, quoi penser à l’autre type. L’affaire est très bizarre” (communication with the author).

5. See also my preface, “The Art of Commentary,” in The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Of course, some readers thought I was rejecting the function of commentary in my argument, or exhibited some form of “bad faith” in appearing to dismiss commentary in the very act of doing commentary. Rather, I was simply bringing into focus, as the very condition of my own discourse, what Foucault called the author’s—the commentator’s, in this case—“Will to Truth.” This critique has two edges, certainly, one of which would fall back on my own production of yet another “interpretation of Deleuze.” As I have already discussed and return again to address in the Conclusion, many commentaries in philosophy appear as if they are all written by Saints, as if the stain of what Deleuze calls “an essential Egoism” must be erased from the conditions of enunciation.

6. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 3.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Félix Guattari, The Anti-Oedipus Papers, ed. Stéphane Nadaud, trans. Kélina Gotman (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), 401.

10. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 6. The following passages are found in the French edition of Mille Plateaux (Paris: Les Éditions de minuit, 1980), 11–12.

11. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus Papers, 6; Deleuze and Guattari, Mille Plateaux, 12.

12. Ibid., 8.

13. Ibid., 19.

14. Ibid., 7.

15. Ibid.

16. “Machine et structure” is the title of the paper first sent to Deleuze by Guattari in 1969. In return, Deleuze makes copious notes and comments, and this exchange becomes the first occasion of their collaboration. See Françoise Dosse, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (Paris: Éditions de découverte, 2007), 233.

17. Quoted in ibid., 233.

18. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 19.

19. Ibid., 12.

20. Ibid., 13.

21. Ibid., 15.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., 22.

24. François Zourabichvili, A Philosophy of the Event, ed. Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. Smith, trans. Kieran Aarons (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2012), 205–9.

1. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 16.

2. Zourabichvili, A Philosophy of the Event, 208.

3. This formulation is owed to Nick Nesbitt’s interpretation of the four hypotheses in “Before the Law: Deleuze, Kafka & the Clinic of Right,” in Franz Kafka: A Minority Report, ed. Petr Kouba and Tomas Pivoda (Prague: Litteraria Pragensia Books, 2011), 87.

4. Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 97.

5. Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 3.

6. “Rhizome,” Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org (emphasis added). I’m certain that there are more authoritative definitions available, but this one was ready to hand and I liked the arrangement of description and species.

7. Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 174.

8. Ibid., 163.

9. Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 4.

10. Ibid., 5.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 4.

13. Ibid., 26.

14. Ibid., 28.

15. Ibid., 41.

16. Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 142.

17. These two positions, the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive, are derived from Mélanie Klein’s theory of infantile development, particularly in relation to the partial object and around the theme of guilt. Deleuze and Guattari consistently pose these terms in their reading of both Proust and Kafka; thus, Proust is defined from a schizoid-paranoid position, which is distributed across the characters of Charlus, Albertine, and the narrator; Kafka is often described in terms of a depressive position in relation to the Law (i.e., infinite debt and guilt, which amounts to the same thing in the German Schuld). And yet, in combining the literary machines of Proust and Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to incorporate both positions in their theory of desire and the unconscious. See Mélanie Klein, “Some Theoretical Conclusions Regarding the Emotional Life of the Infant,” in Envy and Gratitude and Other Works: 1946–1963 (New York: Free Press, 1984), 61–93.

18. Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 132.

19. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 43. On the advice of Ronald Bogue, I have altered the translation of “attitude,” in the second instance, to correspond to the original French: “En termes kleiniens, on dirait que la position dépressive n’est qu’une couverture pour une position schizoïde plus profonde” (Deleuze and Guattari, L’Anti-Oedipe [Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1972], 51). This can also be confirmed by Deleuze’s constant reference in Proust and Signs to the status of the law and the contract in terms of the modern world that is fragmented and not ruled by Logos. Consequently, the problem of the law appears as a formidable unity or as a primary power that controls the world of untotalizable and untotalized fragments. “The law no longer says what is good, but good is what the law says (i.e., it is good because I say it is), revealing an order that is absolutely empty, uniquely formal, because it causes us to know no distinct object, no Good of reference, no referring Logos” (Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 131).

20. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 43.

21. Ibid., 212.

22. Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 73.

23. In other words, throughout Deleuze and Guattari’s writings we find that there is always this tendency of the writer to begin or to affirm the position of the bachelor, or the thinker to begin from a depressed position of solitude, just as the masochist must begin from a perverse position at least with regard to the Oedipal organization of sexuality and “human desire.” (Kafka only offers us the most unique example of all three positions: depressive, schizophrenic, and the masochist.) But is this any different from those who begin or seek to begin again on the plane composed by their own sexuality, to become thinkers and artists, just as often as they become strangers and refugees (if not confessed perverts or criminals, as in the cases of Proust and Genet). And yet, on the basis of the above dialectic, the path via sexuality is never the final answer and more often than not leads to sadness and failure because the sexual pair always obstructs the more primary couple and sooner or later becomes an image or simulacra that blocks any access to this couple, since it is only a superficial path on the way to the primary social division: between the species and “a people who are missing.” On this question of the primary couple, or social division, also see my “The Non-Human Sex,” in Deleuze and Sex, ed. Frida Beckman (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2011), 135–52.

24. Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 49.

25. Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 145.

26. Ibid., 115.

1. Guattari, Molecular Revolution, 111.

2. Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 71.

3. Ibid., 19.

4. Gilles Deleuze, Critique et Clinique (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1993), 11 (translation mine). All following citations are from Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

5. Ibid., 15.

6. Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 96–98.

7. Guattari, Molecular Revolution, 118.

8. Sartre, Search for a Method, 96.

9. Ibid., 147.

10. Fredric Jameson, Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present (London: Verso, 2002), 199–200.

11. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 7.

12. Ibid.

13. Peter Hallward, Absolutely Postcolonial (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 333.

14. Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 16.

15. See Franz Kafka: The Office Writings, ed. Stanley Corngold (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). It is quite striking to see that Kafka’s style was not restricted to literary works, letters, and the diaries, but can also be found in letters and briefs in his occupation as a lawyer and insurance investigator. In particular, there is a series of letters to the company concerning a lack of salary increase over a period of several years with clear insinuations of anti-Semitism as the true cause. Almost term for term, the arguments and method of “free indirect discourse” employed can also be found in the stories and especially in the later novels.

16. Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 83.

17. Ibid.; emphasis added.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 140.

20. Ibid., 55.

21. On the definition of “order words,” see my Who’s Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari? (London: Continuum Books, 2008), 13–66. See also “Expression,” in Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts, 2nd ed., ed. Charles J. Stivale (London: Acumen, 2011), 33–42.

22. Elias Canetti, Kafka’s Other Trial (New York: Schocken Books, 1974).

23. Franz Kafka, Letters to Felice, ed. Erich Heller and Jurgen Born, trans. James Stern and Elizabeth Duckworth (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 253.

24. Ibid., 70–71.

25. Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 70.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 70–71.

28. Ibid., 70.

29. Ibid., 71.

30. This will be the basis for Hallward’s critical appraisal of Deleuze’s philosophy of “creative univocity,” as well as the conceptual personae of the postcolonial writer as an “absolute bachelor” (i.e., the subjective determination of a globalized literature), as two of the most powerful expressions of a singularizing form of individuation shared between two dominant traditions of philosophy and literature today. Consequently, when Hallward agrees with Badiou’s assessment that Deleuze is “the philosopher of our century,” this should be understood, not necessarily as praise, but rather as a bit like Marx’s assessment of the philosophy of Max Stirner in the first part of The German Ideology (i.e., the form of acknowledgment is ironic, given that Stirner is criticized as a pure ideologist). In this sense, “bachelor desire” would be the name for the framework of the corporate desires of the late-modernist writer and philosopher to become “singular,” “autonomous,” and finally, “impersonal”—as in Mallarmé’s famous dictum, “liberated from all servitude to any [socially] marked order of language.” See Hallward, Absolutely Postcolonial, 13–17.

31. Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 84.

32. Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 93.

33. Ibid., 95.

34. Deleuze, Critical and Clinical, 3.

35. Ibid., 4.

36. Ibid., 3.

1. A more accurate concept would be that of the “transitional object,” following Winnicott, since literary texts sometimes function as partial objects; however, for Deleuze and Guattari, partial objects are fundamentally machinic terms belonging to social assemblages, so the question would be how to “connect” the literary work to a collective assemblage of enunciation in order to account for the effects of individual identification they sometimes produce (for example, Mark David Chapman’s reading of Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye, or the number of suicides that occurred around the reading of Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther). On the theory of literature and the question of transference, see especially Gabriele M. Schwab, Subjects without Selves: Transitional Texts in Modern Fiction (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).

2. Of course, not all contemporary philosophers have engaged in this kind of reflection, which is particularly true of most academic philosophy today. In a late interview, Derrida remarked on this avoidance (without naming any particular movement or school of philosophy), saying: “Those who protest against all these questions [concerning writing in general] mean to protect a certain institutional authority of philosophy against these questions and the transformations that these questions call for and presuppose. What they are actually protecting the institution against is philosophy.” Jacques Derrida, Points: Interviews 1974–1994, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 218.

3. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, xxi.

4. Derrida, Of Grammatology, corrected edition, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 4.

5. See Introduction, 11.

6. Jacques Derrida, “Passions: An Oblique Offering,” in Derrida: A Critical Reader, ed. David Wood (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 5; Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 3.

7. Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 171.

8. For example, in 1959 Blanchot publishes Le Livre à venir, which contains a discussion of both figures around the themes of writing and madness, and Jean Laplanche publishes his influential Hölderlin et la question du père in 1961.

9. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 171.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 175.

12. Ibid., 171.

13. Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivalle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 92.

14. Gilles Deleuze, Présentation de Sacher-Masoch (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1967), 10; translation mine.

15. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 173.

16. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 148.

17. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 170.

18. Ibid.

19. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 105; emphasis in original.

20. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 175.

21. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 7.

22. Ibid., 194.

23. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 311.

24. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: Athlone Press, 1989), 172.

25. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 7–20. Elsewhere he will call this phenomenon of madness a “black hole,” referring to a nature that traps all light within itself and never emits anything but an absence of the work (Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 46).

26. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 175.

27. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 11.

28. Derrida, L’écriture et la différence (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1967), 253; translation mine.

29. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 174.

30. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 155.

31. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 194.

32. Ibid.

33. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 148.

34. Ibid., 150.

35. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 195.

36. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 76.

37. Ibid., 69.

38. Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 75.

39. Derrida, “Passions,” 17–18.

40. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 73.

41. Ibid., 33n.

42. Portions of this seminar are reproduced in the article I have been quoting from, Derrida’s “Passions: An Oblique Offering,” although the direct commentary on Deleuze’s reading has been erased and only the references to Melville’s character remain (from author’s notes).

43. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 75.

44. Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Allan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 17.

45. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 68.

46. Notes from seminar, “Questions of Responsibility,” University of California at Irvine, spring 1996.

47. Quoted in Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 75.

48. Derrida, “Passions,” 23.

49. Ibid.

50. Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972–1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 143.

51. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 15.

52. Ibid., 10.

53. Ibid., 11.

54. Ibid., 3.

55. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 4.

56. Ibid., 7.

57. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, xxi.

58. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 7.

59. Derrida, Points, 218.

60. Ibid., 219.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, xxi.

64. Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 161.

65. Ibid., 162.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., 168.

68. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 113.

69. Ibid., 168–69.

70. Derrida, Points, 354.

71. Ibid., 354–55.

72. Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 113.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid., 109.

75. Derrida, Points, 347.

76. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 5.

77. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 5.

78. Ibid., 6.

79. Thus it is significant to note that Derrida never completely renounces the word “critique,” whereas Deleuze never really makes it central to his own philosophical project. The difference is that Derrida understands his project in the tradition of a certain style of “Enlightenment” [Aufklärung] and Deleuze certainly does not; however, for Derrida the problem with the earlier philosophical works in this tradition (certainly those of Kant, but also of Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger) is that their understanding of critique was not critical enough. (Is this not Derrida’s constant criticism of Kant’s heliocentricity, Leibniz’s and Hegel’s Eurocentricity, Husserl’s logocentricity, of Heidegger’s spiritual nationalism?) The point, therefore, to push the possibilities of the critique further, to make it “hyperbolique,” to become “hypercritical,” and finally, to constantly refuse the point where the labor of negativity congeals into simple negation, or turns to reveal the resemblance of a properly metaphysical entity. As Derrida remarks, “This thinking perhaps transforms the space and, through aporias, allows the (non-positive) affirmation to appear, the one that is presupposed by every critique and every negativity” (Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982], 357).

80. See Jacques Derrida, “I’ll Have to Wander Alone,” trans. David Kammerman, Tympanum 1 (1998), http://www.usc.edu/dept/comp-lit/tympanum/1/.

81. Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable, in Complete Works, vol. 1 (New York: Grove Press, 2006), 331.

1. Deleuze, Cinema 2, 262.

2. Sergei Eisenstein, “The Filmic Fourth Dimension,” in Film Form, trans. Jay Leyda (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1949), 64–71. The principle that Eisenstein witnessed in the Kabuki is the function of a pure montage in which each element is viewed from the perspective of the total effect produced by the complete theater: “In the Kabuki . . . the Japanese regards each theatrical element, not as an incommensurable unit among various categories of affect (on the various sense organs), but as a single unit of theater. . . . Directing himself to the various organs of sensation, he builds his summation [of individual “pieces”] to a grand total provocation of the human brain, without taking any notice which of these several paths he is following” (Eisenstein, Film Form, 64). The emphasis upon a free indeterminate accord of the elements of expression, with no one determining the significance of the others, recalls a fundamental principle that belongs to Deleuze’s theory of the faculties under the arrangement of a new image of thought. See also Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, esp. chap. 5, “Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible,” 236ff.

3. Eisenstein, Film Form, 64.

4. Ibid., 65.

5. Ibid., 69.

6. Deleuze, Cinema 2, 156.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., 158.

9. Ibid.

10. Eisenstein, quoted in ibid., 211.

11. Deleuze, Cinema 2, 167.

12. Ibid., 165.

13. Ibid., 170.

14. Ibid., 167.

15. Ibid., 172.

16. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, x.

17. Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 283–84; translation modified.

18. Eisenstein, Film Form, 71.

19. Deleuze, Cinema 2, 277.

20. Ibid., 212.

21. Ibid., 318n.

22. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 198.

23. Stanley Kubrick, Interviews, ed. Gene D. Philips (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001), 69.

24. Deleuze, Cinema 2, 318n.

25. Ibid., 125.

26. Ibid.

27. Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 108.

28. Ibid., 110.

29. Ibid., 105.

30. Ibid., 108.

31. Ibid., 107.

32. Ibid., 106.

33. Ibid., 107.

1. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 206. The image of contrary ideas as “successive filters over chaos” is derived from Michel Serres’s reading of this principle in the philosophy of Leibniz. See Michel Serres, Le Système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1968), 122–24.

2. “Das Bedenkliche, das, was uns zu denken gibt, ist demnach keinesweg durch uns festgesetzt, nich durch uns auf gestestellt, nich durch uns nur vor-gestellt.” Heidegger, Was Heist Denkin?, 3.

3. Ibid., 207.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 202.

6. Ibid., 201.

7. Ibid., 202.

8. Ibid., 211.

9. For the above, see the introduction to Gilles Deleuze, ed., Instincts et institutions (Paris: Hachette, 1953), viii–xi; Deleuze, Bergsonism.

10. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 109.

11. Ibid., 108.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 111.

15. Ibid., 108.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 112.

18. Ibid., 108.

19. Ibid.; emphasis added. I would simply point out to the reader that it is difficult to discern in the above passages whether Deleuze, at this point, is merely citing Bergson or actually “channeling” the dead philosopher.

20. Ibid., 106.

21. Ibid., 107.

22. Qu’est-ce que l’acte de création? Conférence donnée dans le cadre des mardis de la fondation Femis (May 17, 1987), accessed on www.deleuzeweb.com.

23. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 202.

24. Ibid.

25. On this point, see my “Deleuze and the Political Ontology of the Friend (philos),” in Deleuze and Politics, ed. Ian Buchanan and Nick Thoburn (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2008), 35–53.

26. Deleuze, Negotiations, 160.

27. David Perkins, The Eureka Effect: The Art and Logic of Breakthrough Thinking (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 83.

28. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 207.

29. Ibid., 210.

30. Ibid., 209.

31. Deleuze and Guattari, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1991), 9.

32. Ibid., 7.

33. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 108.

34. Antonio Negri, quoted in Deleuze, Negotiations, 174.

35. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 11.

36. Ibid., 10.

37. Ibid., 12.

38. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 397.

39. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998), 181.

40. Ibid., 188.

41. On this point see my video lecture “Derrida and Violence” for the Histories of Violence web-based project created by Brad Evans, University of Leeds, United Kingdom, at http://www.historiesofviolence.com/theory/derrida/.

42. Jean-Luc Nancy, Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity, trans. Bettina Bergo et al. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 157.

43. Ibid.

44. Deleuze, Negotiations, 160. For this reason I might suggest that the contemporary analytic tradition of “possible world theory” may be more correct in taking up the most ordinary statements and events, such as “John is arriving at 9 a.m.,” rather than the partly mythic and historically spectacular events in order to determine the sense of events, or the existence of possible worlds.

45. See my preface on “The Art of Commentary,” in The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, x–xiv.

46. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 204.

47. See my Who’s Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?, esp. the chapter “The Right to Desire,” 129–38.

48. Simon Bell, Landscape: Pattern, Perception, and Process (London: Taylor and Francis, 1999), 107–10. Also see p. 109 for a diagram of Klondike Space based on Perkins.

49. Ibid., 211.

50. Ibid., 149.

51. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 112.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Seminar on “L’image movement, l’image-temps” (June 7, 1987), accessed on www.deleuzeweb.com.

55. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 112.

56. Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript to the American Edition: A Return to Bergson,” in Two Regimes of Madness, 335.

57. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Continuum Books, 2006), 120n.

58. Henri Bergson, Matière et mémoire (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1939), 169; translation mine. For our purposes, let plan P = plan(e) of immanence.

59. Deleuze, Cinema 2, 79. In the 1988 postscript quoted above, concerning Bergson’s philosophy as a general theory of multiplicity, Deleuze writes: “In Time and Free Will, Bergson defines duration as a multiplicity, a type of multiplicity. This is a unique word since he changes multiple from a mere adjective to a veritable noun. By doing so, he condemns as a false problem the traditional theme of the one and the multiple” (Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 336–37).

60. Deleuze, Cinema 2, 78. In this regard it is quite significant that this “crystalline image of time” can also be ascribed to Walter Benjamin’s observation in the following passage that appears in The Arcades Project: “Indeed, to discover in the analysis of the small individual moment the crystal of the total event. And, therefore, to break with vulgar historical naturalism” (Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999], 461). What is even more remarkable, however, is the fact that the observations of both Deleuze and Benjamin are derived from the same passage in Proust’s Recherche.

61. Deleuze, Cinema 2, 80.

62. Ibid.

63. Deleuze, Negotiations, 149.

64. Ibid.

65. Seminar on “L’image movement, l’image-temps.”

66. Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 180. See also Badiou, The Clamor of Being, 20.

67. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 210.