3 Actor, Avatar
When Ismael in Fanny and Alexander enters Alexander’s mind, he sees a vision: “You are thinking of a person’s death.” He stands behind Alexander, holding him close, and follows the outline of the vision in Alexander’s mind, narrating it to the boy as he sees it unfold: “A door flies open. No, first a scream, a hair-raising scream, goes through the house …” And on the soundtrack we hear the scream, and in a crosscut we watch the door fly open. I revisit this moment from Fanny and Alexander because it illustrates in such a complex way the relationship between the director (the auteur) and the actor, the auteur, the actor, and the film. The vision of the Bishop’s death (for this is what Ismael recounts) exists first in Alexander’s mind. Ismael, through his supernatural power of perception, is able to go into Alexander’s mind and give the vision back to Alexander, who whimpers, “Stop it! I don’t like for you to talk that way,” to which Ismael responds, “I am not the one who’s speaking.” The merging of two minds into one will and one vision that takes place in this sequence mirrors the performance of the auteur’s vision by the actor, who acts as an extension of the auteur’s will, but also extends it, materializes it in a way peculiar to that actor. The difficult point here is that it is not clear who brings about the death of the Bishop. While Ismael claims that he is only producing Alexander’s words, Alexander’s story, clearly he takes Alexander in a direction the boy could not have predicted. The boundless self that characterizes auteurist filmmaking disperses the auteurist vision among bodies and wills. When the object of the auteurist vision is self-projection, it is not altogether clear whose self is projected, ultimately. In textual autobiography, the pronoun “I” stands for both the subject narrating events from the past and the person who experienced the events in the past: the younger self. In that way, “I” becomes a construction that involves both past and present selves, and the temporal distance between the two aspects of the “I,” the “I” who writes and the “I” who experienced, collapses into the narrative space of “here and now.” This is the observation made by Elizabeth Bruss, a point I revive now in order to consider more closely what it means to split the narrating subject and the actor within the narration into two separate bodies. In auteurist cinema, where the identity of the director assumes a significant position in the consciousness of the viewer, it is particularly obvious when someone who is not the director plays a role identified (usually in paratext) with the director. The viewer who understands that the director’s identity is in some sense evoked by the narrative or other elements of the film sees that an actor (or actors) stand(s) in the director’s place, and a dynamic takes shape in which the relationship between actor(s) and director occupies part of the viewer’s interpretation and reception of the film. In some cases an ongoing working relationship develops between auteur and an actor or group of actors(s), which strengthens for the viewer the identification between particular actors and the autuer whose vision they enact.
Ingmar Bergman directs Bertil Guve as Alexander in The Making of Fanny and Alexander
So the deployment of an actor or actors in a succession of roles by an art-cinema author becomes an intrinsic part of the director’s self-projection, as much a part of that projected self-image as a particular aesthetic or repetition of theme. And indeed, in some film scholarship actors have been subsumed entirely by the idea of the director’s larger vision. For various reasons, theories of film acting from early film history to the auteurist era tended to see actors as part of the mise-en-scène, as props, or, as Peter Wollen writes, “noise.”1 There was a tendency to imagine that “film technology and cinematic technique produce screen performances,”2 drawing on arguments like the one put forward by early Soviet film theorist Lev Kuleshov, who wrote polemically: “Apart from montage, nothing exists in cinema. . . . The work of the actor is absolutely irrelevant.”3 By this he meant that it is the editing process of cutting up the actors’ performances and bodies and putting them back together again that makes up a narrative and a screen performance, rather than the sustained projection of character typical of most drama. James Naremore, in his book on film acting, offers an anecdote about Humphrey Bogart’s performance in Casablanca that illustrates this point: Bogart relates how the film’s director, Michael Curtiz, asked him to nod to his left, simply as an isolated gesture, not in response to anything in particular. Naremore writes, “Bogart did so, having no idea what the action was supposed to signify (the film, after all, was being written as it was shot). Later, when Bogart saw the completed picture, he realized his nod had been a turning point for the character he was playing: Rick’s signal to the band in the Café Américain to strike up the Marseillaise.”4
But if I argue for the embodied status of the auteur, it seems necessary to account for actors, too, as persons, who not only inhabit or perform someone else’s vision, but have vision and agency of their own. The development of “star studies” in film acting theory has opened up a space in which film actors can be considered as film authors in a way that parallels thinking about cinematic auteurs as “brands.”5 And more recent writing on theories of film performance moves to reclaim the actor as person in much the same way I have worked to conjure the embodied auteur; as the editors of More Than a Method write: “In spite of the apparent disappearance and promised transcendence of the body, twentieth-century film and media technology actually confirmed the centrality of corporeal bodies.” Further, the same editors argue, as I do for the auteur, that “technological developments, such as cinema, have transformed our ideas about performance, the body, and the self.”6 The collaborative efforts of others—cinematographers, composers, credit designers—are obviously important, but it is the actor’s body on the screen. As Bergman says in Ingmar Bergman Makes a Movie, “[The actors] expose themselves so terribly in front of the camera, while I hide in the darkness.” Yet when the film is directed by an art-cinema author, the actor becomes an instrument of the auteur, and the director, even when “hiding in the dark,” functions as the prevailing genius of the film, so that the relationship between the director’s vision and the actor’s performance achieves a peculiar significance.
Given the personal nature of self-projection, it is not surprising that the actor/director relationship is not confined to the film narratives they produce: auteurs and their actor-avatars are sometimes lovers or spouses, biological or adoptive parents and children, or mortal enemies. In these instances, the triangular construction set up between auteur, actor(s), and spectator relies on a violation of the boundary between the “real” and the narrated reality of cinematic self-projection, so that it becomes useful, even necessary, to discuss the type of off-screen relationship that usually receives attention primarily in movie gossip columns. Here I would like to think about these relationships, both personal and cinematic, more deeply in order to ask: What is the nature of the auteurist subject in relation to the actor? What role does a film actor play in representing some aspect of the auteur’s self-projection, and how does film acting lend itself to auteurist self-construction? To what degree does the actor’s representation include the actor’s self-projection? To what degree does the actor become an auteur? How do auteurist films make use of the viewer’s perception of human relationships (on-screen and off) in order to craft a more complex notion of selfhood? And what might be the philosophical and ethical ramifications of using another human being in the act of self-projection? Are we to take seriously the notion, put forward explicitly or implicitly by a number of auteurs, that true art demands sacrifice—a human sacrifice?
As a case in point: Shadow of the Vampire (E. Elias Merhige, 2000) dramatizes and parodies the making of the original vampire film, Nosferatu, by F. W. Murnau in 1922. In the film about the film, Murnau, played by John Malkovich, is so obsessed with creating a lifelike representation of the undead that he hires a real vampire, Max Schreck, played by Willem Dafoe, for the starring role. When members of the cast begin to disappear, the claim is indeed made that art demands actual human sacrifice. There are at least two vampires in this film, and Schreck may be the less dangerous of the two. Shadow of the Vampire points up the macabre and opportunistic aspects of the cinematic auteur as romantic genius and the actor as a mere instrument or avatar of the auteurist’s vision, but it also reveals how the actor’s involvement can overthrow the director’s well-laid plans. The German actor Max Schreck did play the role of a vampire in the original film; Merhige’s fantasy that Schreck (whose name means “terror”) was a real vampire plays into the theory of cinematic acting that argues that cinematic actors do not act in auteurist films at all, but instead are selected by the auteur for the innate qualities they possess that allow them simply to be the embodiment of the auteur’s vision (Wollen).7 It is then the responsibility of the director to create the performance through framing (and in the best-case scenario, controlling) “natural” behavior and editing the bits and pieces captured in takes. For the actor’s part, it seems that there is a choice: to be subsumed by the auteur’s vision and “meld” with the director, or to stage a kind of coup that resists or undermines the director’s project, or to create a symbiosis that allows for the artistic expression of both auteur and actor to project something both of and different from themselves—another subject. In Merhige’s film, the actor escapes the director’s control and begins to wreak bloody havoc. But one must ask: Is it the director or the actor who plays the role of vampire? Without the actor there is no transmissible vision, or to cite my epigraph from Bergman once more, “Without a you, no I.” At first flush this proclamation sounds like a loving embrace; but there is a vampiric obverse as well: I need you to exist—and you need me.
James Naremore argues in his book on cinematic acting that it is often the actor rather than the director who stands at the center of the film, at least as far as the audience is concerned. And in the examples he has chosen, it is certainly the case that the actor reigns as the primary projected and received image: Humphrey Bogart, Marlon Brando, Marlene Dietrich, and so on. In the American Hollywood tradition, one most often refers to the actor’s (star’s) performance as the dominant feature of the film. In art-house cinema, in contrast, the dominant model is reflected in François Truffaut’s assertion that he and Jean-Pierre Léaud produce an amalgam self-projection in the figure Antoine Doinel, and it is this model that raises questions about the nature of selfhood generally and cinematic selfhood particularly. The actor performs as the auteur’s disembodied other—or better, the figure on the screen is a disembodied other for the auteur, the actor, and the audience. Identity in this situation does not adhere to a single body but is a projection of numerous bodies.
The blurred boundary between self and other finds a parallel in the blurred boundary between on- and off-screen worlds. Who is the director as “real-life” person in relation to the actors who figure in his self-projection? What does it mean, for instance, when Werner Herzog makes a documentary film about his most famous actor with the working title “Herzog’s Kinski”? What does it mean when Ingmar Bergman writes a script about one of his stormy adulterous affairs and gives it to Liv Ullmann to direct, his former star and former lover from yet another stormy adulterous affair? What does it mean when both Andrei Tarkovsky and Pedro Almodóvar cast their own mothers in their films? When Truffaut casts a young man to play Truffaut as a child and then virtually adopts the young man, installing him in an apartment, buying his clothes, paying his school tuition, while the young man goes on to play Truffaut in successive films? We can understand the art-house auteur as a strategy, a function, a theoretical model, but these directors seem intent on a kind of self-manifestation in auteurism that necessarily involves the appropriation of other bodies, other lives. Can we describe such self-manifestations as cinematic autobiography, following Baecque’s and Truffaut’s argument that each film reflects the life of its director, each film is narrated in the first person? (This does not imply necessarily that the film is autobiographical in the traditional sense; it may not relate the director’s life story in any discernable way, but it does form part of the auteur’s self-projection.) Or are we dealing with a new twist on first-person narration?
One response, articulated first by Elizabeth Bruss and developed further by Susanna Egan, might be to imagine a new type of selfhood and narration in cinema, a collaborative subjectivity (intersubjectivity) that would expand the genre of autobiography to include cinematic self-projection.8 This is in line with Truffaut/Léaud’s invention of Antoine Doinel. And on the face of things, the notion of collaborative subjectivity seems appealing, communal—an attractive alternative to the dominant paradigm of romantic genius. But one does not have to look very hard to see how the performance of intersubjectivity can become a horror show. The thing that neither Bruss nor Egan takes into consideration is the power structure implicit in the director/actor relationship and the conflict it can generate. There are numerous and often-repeated tales of sadistic directors—Carl Theodor Dreyer and Maria Falconetti in The Passion of Joan of Arc, Alfred Hitchcock and Tippi Hedren in The Birds and Marnie, Lars von Trier and Nicole Kidman in Dogville— most of which point to a sadistic male/masochistic female pairing, though I would argue that Werner Herzog’s work with Klaus Kinski fits the same mold. The excuse for the excessive pressure placed upon the actor in all of these cases and others like them is the drive for truth in cinematic representation—that the actor not merely pretend to experience or feel what is depicted in the cinematic image, but that the audience be allowed to see him or her in the actual experience, with actual emotions. Film’s medium, photography, carries with it the presumption of “reality,” and the sense in film that the recorded action not only could have happened, but in some sense did happen, was experienced by real humans, real bodies. In the case of a performance like Falconetti’s, when the character she plays concludes her life by burning at the stake, it is of course not possible (except in the underground genre of the “snuff” film) for the viewer to imagine that she actually dies. But as Kinski puts it, the vampire-auteur asks that the actor follow him “unto death.”9 This means that the viewer should experience the actor as on the brink of utter collapse, an effect that can be brought about by overwhelming repetition of takes, long work hours, isolated and dangerous working conditions, and extreme physical demands, among other things. Falconetti’s hair is in fact brutally shorn to her bleeding scalp in The Passion of Joan of Arc, Kinski spends long and excruciating hours in makeup in Nosferatu and lives for weeks in the snake-and-insect-infested remote Amazonian jungle for Fitzcarraldo, Hitchcock has his stage crew on the set of The Birds fling live, aggressive birds at Tippi Hedren, and on and on.
But once Kinski has expressed his disgust with Herzog’s demand that the actor follow the director “unto death,” he asks himself why he continues to go along with it? Why, if Herzog’s demands are so unreasonable and cruel, does Kinski agree to work with him? Kinski does not provide a clear answer, but if we look at other cases, such as Falconetti’s work with Dreyer, we see that the actor of course participates willingly, making the self-sacrifice an important part of his or her self-projection within the film. The legends of sadistic directors give too much credit to the force of the author’s will and too little to the actor’s committed contribution. Dreyer, in defending himself against charges that he was a sadist in the direction of his actors, answered, “A director cannot force an actor to do anything that the actor doesn’t have the strength for. It has to come from within, and without compulsion.”10
Naremore’s book addresses the long-standing prevalence of the Stan-islavskian technique, which demands that the actor draw on his or her real-life experience in order to produce the required emotional response. But as the catalogue of tortures above indicates, if the actor is unable to locate a parallel experience from his or her life’s memories, the director can place the actor under such stress that the desired emotion will find its way forward in response to the director’s pressure; in fact, some auteurist directors, such as Andrei Tarkovsky, would argue that the actor’s psychological involvement with a role is irrelevant. For Tarkovsky, the actor’s earlier life experiences are important only inasmuch as they are reflected naturally in the actor’s appearance, body and gestures and voice—it is the director’s vision and intervention, in his estimation, that determines what the actor’s appearance means, not any intentionality on the actor’s part.11 The auteur pressures the actor into bringing the auteur’s vision into reality; it is the actor’s body and being that is supposed to represent the auteur’s thoughts and feelings, so that the actor is absorbed into the auteur’s self-model, in the sense that he or she becomes an extension of the auteur’s body.
And yet in Tarkovsky’s remarks, one can detect a fear lurking around the edges of apparently confident statements. An actor (as well as other collaborators) can threaten the auteur’s passion for control and self-expression. Truffaut’s book on Alfred Hitchcock addresses this issue frankly: “Throughout his entire career [Hitchcock] has felt the need to protect himself from the actors, producers, and technicians who, insofar as their slightest lapse or whim may jeopardize the integrity of his work, all represent as many hazards to a director.”12 And so from the auteur’s point of view, an actor may at any time sabotage the work of auteurist self-projection. The power does not rest solely in the auteur’s hands—but the power, in the view of auteurs like the ones in this study, ought to reside in the auteur’s vision. Thus the actor, in the view of the auteur, becomes a kind of mirror image for the auteur’s inner vision, and thus subsumed under the self-projection of the auteur.
So can it be fair to think of the actor a mere avatar for the director, a second self, a doppelgänger whose actions and emotions find their source in the director’s vision? Director Robert Bresson refers to his actors as “models” and their method of acting “automatism,” a term that brings to mind the vampire (Nosferatu), the sleepwalker (The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari), and the robot (Metropolis, The Golem) of early German cinema.13 Perhaps there is something about cinematic acting that lends itself to this metaphor for direction and acting, the metaphor of the hypnotist and his subject, the vampire and his victim. Pedro Almodóovar says of directing actors, “My aim is to lead [them] to express what I desire and what I have a very precise idea about. Any means are justified to arrive at this.”14 Almodóvar’s characteristic evocation of the idea of desire in conjunction with his filmmaking is coupled with the equally characteristic implication of violence: he will adopt any means necessary to attain his desire. And the specific nature of cinematic acting transforms the idea of what is usually imagined as the actor’s “expression.”
Andrei Tarkovsky claims that keeping the actors ignorant of the auteur’s artistic vision provides a restraint that paradoxically frees the actors to experience each moment of their roles more naturally: “In front of the camera the actor has to exist authentically and immediately, in the state defined by the dramatic circumstances. Then the director, once he has in his hands the sequences and segments and retakes of what actually occurred in front of the camera, will edit these in accordance with his own artistic objectives, constructing the inner logic of the action. If the film actor constructs his own role, he loses the opportunity for spontaneous and involuntary playing within the terms laid down by the plan and purpose of the film.”15 He goes on to say, “[The actor’s] task is to live!—and to trust the director” (140).
Truffaut represents this situation in his fictional film Day for Night; his actors and technicians express extreme frustration with the director’s habit of handing out lines for the next day in the evening just before everyone retires, and further, that these lines can be based on things that have happened that day in the “real” world of filmmaking, in their “real” lives, in the “real” conversations their director overhears and then appropriates for his script. But the fictional auteur of Truffaut’s film (played by Truffaut himself), claims the practice as a mark of his creative genius. Breaking down the actor’s role into single frames of gesture or refusing to give the actor access to the film’s script are just two possible strategies an auteur might employ in order to ensure the actor’s complicity in the auteurist vision. It is not always the case that the auteur chooses to withhold the film’s script from his actors (Ingmar Bergman, for instance, usually blocked out the entire script with his actors before shooting), but it is a hallmark of auteurism that the actors are to serve the overarching vision of the director. And actors who do not conform to a prominent auteur’s vision can find themselves without employment. Tippi Hedren, according to her own account, was blocked for many years by Hitchcock from working with other directors after she refused to make any more films with him, and Bergman also had a reputation for sabotaging the careers of estranged coworkers.16 What distinguishes the actors from other elements of the film—the technicians, the props, the set—is their existence as individual subjects, often with their own public images, which not only threaten to escape the control of the auteur during film production but have free play outside the realm of the auteur’s films.
Yet while an actor may achieve a reputation with cinema audiences as a readily identifiable entity, a “star,” an active subject on his or her own beyond the grasp of a particular auteur, there are intrinsic problems surrounding the actor’s status as a subject in film acting. As Nare-more points out, even leaving aside the fragmentation effected on an actor’s performance by virtue of film’s frame-by-frame editorial intervention, the actors we see in films are often only apparently individual and integrated human beings. Stuntmen can take the place of actors in dangerous scenes, body doubles appear in scenes that reveal too much skin; in scenes that require only the filming of hands, any similar pair of hands will do, and of course the practice of voice dubbing removes our certainty that the voice we hear is that of the actor breaking into song, an oddity played for laughs in a climactic scene from Singing in the Rain. Bergman, within the narrative of his film Persona, alludes to the possibility of one person’s body (and in particular, hands or faces) replacing another’s; Almodóvar makes repeated use of the tropes of voice dubbing, plastic surgery, cerebral death, and transplantation in his films, all with an eye toward disrupting the normally accepted limits of identification between a single body and a single person.17
Poring over images of directors working with their actors can reveal something about the relationship in which the actor becomes a kind of projected avatar, someone who literally “takes the place” of the auteur. In two parallel images (published in The Adventures of Antoine Doinel), we find Truffaut (in the top image) and Léaud (on the bottom) performing nearly the same gesture: each man sits behind a desk and holds one leg aloft in order to inspect a shoe. The grimace, the position of the leg, the clothing—they are all near matches.18 It is likely that these photos come from Bed and Board’s tournage collection, since Truffaut seems to be modeling a gesture for Léaud from a scene that occurs in that film. As I noted above, Robert Bresson calls his actors “models,” with the idea that they are mere mannequins or marionettes, posed and manipulated by the director, who has his hands firmly on the strings. But one can think of “model” in another sense as well: the auteur models the performance for the actor, offers the gesture and the mark to hit, and the actor performs the visualized action in place of the director.
I would like to emphasize and unpack the idea of the actor taking the director’s place. So far I have discussed how auteurs act in films—as fictional figures, as versions of themselves. But largely auteurs direct their films, and others, actors, take up a position in front of the auteur’s camera. That position, however, is determined by the auteur’s vision for the film, and even when the action filmed is not autobiographical, there is a sense in which the actor takes the director’s place. If we follow a typical mode of auteurist thinking, the director has envisioned some action, some placement of figures in his head, and it is up to him to communicate to the actor how to position his or her body in order to reproduce the auteur’s inner vision so that it can be filmed and projected. The director can take hold of the actor’s body and move it, or the director can model a gesture for the actor to copy, as shown in the images from the tournage of Truffaut’s Bed and Board. Similar situations crop up when one flips through tournage images: Werner Herzog (in an apparently comic mood) modeling an antic pose for actor Clemens Scheitz in Nosferatu; Ingmar Bergman laying his head on a table to show Bertil Guve how to “feel sick” in the opening scene of Fanny and Alexander (see this chapter’s title image); Frederico Fellini creating a gesture for Marcello Mastroianni in 8½. Pedro Almodóvar explains that he “very often” plays scenes for his actors to imitate and declares, “I have the reputation of being a good actor. What’s true is that while I’m shooting I feel as if possessed by each character.”19 In the grips of that possession, then, he becomes the character and then asks the actor to become him: “When one of the characters [in The Law of Desire] reproaches the director [a character in the film] for being inspired by her, he replies, ‘You become me.’ That’s what links me most to the character” (68). This exchange from The Law of Desire confounds the viewer with its oscillation between actor and auteur. Does the director draw on the actor’s essence for his artistic vision, or does the actor “become” the director in the process of realizing his vision? Is the “character” a site for intersubjectivity between the actor and auteur? All of the instances cited above involve a transfer from the auteur’s imagination to the actor’s body, and when the auteur performs a gesture for the actor to emulate, it becomes quite apparent how the actor functions as a kind of body double for the director—“becomes” the director. When the actor’s role involves staging the auteur’s life story in some sense, the need to understand the actor as double becomes especially crucial.
Andrei Tarkovsky’s Mirror underscores this point by eliminating the visual presence of the actor who stands in for Tarkovsky in the representation of the auteur’s live events; we hear his voice as he talks on the telephone to his mother or with his ex-wife, but we do not see him. “Tarkovsky was frequently tempted to include himself in his films,” writes Robert Bird. “While he chose not to narrate Mirror himself, he did include a shot of his hand tossing the bird; the first edits showed his face, but the studio opposition to such self-indulgence perhaps strengthened his own doubts about whether his subjectivity could be represented by the very screen that in Mirror seems to look with his eyes.”20 The highly regulated and collaborative system of film conception and editing in the Soviet Union thus restricted to some degree what Bird calls “self-indulgence,” and one wonders what might have become of Tarkovsky’s project of self-projection had he made Mirror, his most clearly autobiographical film, in the West. But Bird makes a valid and insightful point about the necessity for the auteur’s absence from scenes that are meant to be auteurist “mindscreens,” that is, to borrow from Bruce Kawin, sequences of films (or entire films) that project the auteur’s subjectivity. By removing even the actor who “takes his place” from the screen, Tarkovsky performs the auteur’s absence for the audience, makes it clear to us that the events in the film, whether memories, dreams, or documentary sequences, belong to a subject beyond the reach of the spectator’s gaze.
Intimate Connections
Given that such a symbiosis of performance can take place between the art-cinema director and actor, is not surprising that their relationship often becomes intensely personal or arises from an already established intimate or familial relationship. In the art-cinema context, this type of intimate relationship seems to be almost required as a kind of platform from which the auteur might most easily stage self-projection. If the actor is linked to the auteur by blood, through sexual intimacy, or simply in the way the actor’s career and reputation are forged through his or her work with a particular director, then an inextricable connection forms between the actor’s image and the director’s. For this reason (among others), it is not surprising that auteurs often retain a troupe of actors who work with them from film to film and become an integral part of the auteur’s projected image.
The most commonly cited intimate relationship is the seduction of the female actress by the male director; Bergman’s series of intimate relationships with his actresses—Harriet Andersson, Bibi Andersson, and Liv Ullmann—or Woody Allen’s with his—Louise Lasser, Diane Keaton, and Mia Farrow—provide typical examples. Of course one can argue that this applies not only to art cinema but also to cinema in general. But I would maintain that despite superficial similarities, the auteur’s relationship with his actors carries a different valence than the standard “Hollywood casting couch” story, in which the director demands sexual favors of a prospective actor in return for a role in his film.21 Auteurist relationships of this type are imagined (by the author, the actor, the public, or a combination of these) not only in terms of power structures or sexual intrigues. Instead, they can be envisioned as artistic, quasi-mystical partnerships that shape the self-projections of both auteur and actor. French actress Jeanne Moreau, who starred in Truffaut’s Jules and Jim, speaks to this: “It’s an extraordinarily intimate exchange, which can lead to a romantic relationship, and sometimes to a much more complex, subtle relationship which is difficult to imagine and which is akin to artistic creation.”22 When Truffaut offers his perception of the director’s side of this relationship, we seem to return to the vampire/“Hollywood casting couch” model: “When I am working, I become attractive. I feel it and at the same time this work, which is the best in the world, puts me in an emotional state that is propitious for the beginning of a love story [original in English]. Before me, there is usually a young girl or woman, agitated, fearful and obedient, trusting and ready to surrender herself. What happens next is always the same. Sometimes the love story is synchronized with the filming and ends with it; at other times it continues afterward, by the will of one or both.”23 But reading more closely, it is possible to pick up the sense of compulsion or inevitability that Truffaut feels in conjunction with his film work. It is not he himself, but “this work” that presses not only the actor but also the auteur into a position of surrender to the “love story” that rules them both. The “story” of their off-screen love arises from and runs parallel to the story that unfolds in filming and on the screen. And Truffaut, in a remark I cite earlier, stresses that the new auteurist cinema of which he will be a part should create films that are “acts of love,” thus extending the “love story” to the spectator as well. So clearly this story is not only about romantic sexual relationships, and even in the case of romantic sexual relationships, it is about something more. It seems to be more about the forging of an intersubjective force, an analog self that will have the power to project outward from an isolated subject and touch both the collaborative partner and, ultimately, the cinematic audience. This becomes clearer if we first move away from the (apparently) familiar and understood realm of cinematic romance into other relational forms, beginning with Truffaut’s frequently discussed relationship with actor Jean-Pierre Léaud.24
Mon semblable, mon frère (mon fils, moi même)
A collection of Truffaut’s screenplays entitled The Adventures of Antoine Doinel contains a preface by the director in which he attempts an answer to the question: “Who is Antoine Doinel?” The simple response is that “Antoine Doinel” is the name of a figure that appears in five of Truffaut’s films (one short, four feature-length) and is always played by the actor Jean-Pierre Léaud. But the situation is in fact much more complicated than that, as Truffaut’s preface makes clear. He claims that he is not only identified mistakenly as Jean-Pierre Léaud’s father; he is also confused with Jean-Pierre Léaud/Antoine Doinel himself. To illustrate the latter confusion, he relates an anecdote about something that happened the morning after one of his Antoine Doinel films aired on television: “I stepped into a café where I had never been before. The owner came up to me, saying, ‘I recognize you! I saw you on television yesterday!’ Obviously it was not me he had seen, but Jean-Pierre Léaud in the role of Antoine Doinel.” The café owner goes on to remark, “You looked much younger [in the film]!” In relating these incidents Truffaut implies that such errors are not singular (“I seldom bother to rectify a misunderstanding”) and are perfectly understandable—that is, he and Léaud do resemble one another so closely that he is not surprised when they are mistaken for each other.25 Further, he seems to enjoy the confusion; at least, he chooses not to correct it, and he places it at the head of his discussion of Antoine Doinel as a way of beginning to explain the figure created by both Truffaut and Léaud: “The reason I mention this incident is that it illustrates fairly well the ambiguity (as well as the ubiquity) of that imaginary personage, Antoine Doinel, who happens to be the synthesis of two real-life people: Jean-Pierre Léaud and myself” (7).
In 1958, at the age of fourteen, Léaud answered an advertisement in France-Soir for the role of Antoine Doinel in The 400 Blows, Truffaut’s first feature-length (and autobiographical) film. Léaud had already appeared a year earlier in a minor role in a swashbuckling romance; the film for Truffaut would be his first starring role, and so the two of them make a serious start on their film careers together. Truffaut explains in the preface to the Doinel screenplays that he was looking for a child who resembled him at that age—not necessarily a physical resemblance, but a “moral resemblance.” Léaud, with his careless and cocky attitude overlying tension and anxiety, reminded Truffaut of the mischief-making truant he was as a child, and he decided that Léaud was the person to play Doinel. At that age, interestingly, Léaud’s physical resemblance to the director that Truffaut mentions up front in the preface was not readily apparent. Instead, the physical resemblance seems to be the outcome of years of working together. For the relationship does continue beyond the first “love story” of The 400 Blows, to borrow from Truffaut’s remarks on director/actor romances. Like the actresses in those romances, the child Léaud stood in a submissive position to the film’s director. But though the first iteration of “Antoine Doinel” was conceived as an autobiographical figure for François Truffaut, it became obvious to the director as filmmaking went on that the young man who played the role contributed something of his own nature to the Doinel character: “Jean-Pierre turned out to be a valuable collaborator in The 400 Blows. He instinctively found the right gestures, his corrections imparted to the dialogue the ring of truth and I encouraged him to use the words of his own vocabulary” (8). Further, Léaud began to recognize, according to Truffaut, the way in which his own life mirrored Doinel’s (and thus Truffaut’s). Truffaut describes how the boy burst into tears on first viewing the film: “Behind this autobiographical chronicle of mine, he recognized the story of his own life” (8). Thus rather than seeing The 400 Blows as Truffaut’s autobiography, the viewer should understand that the film is a collaborative and intersubjective autobiography, a recasting of the nature of selfhood and self-representation.
For the next twenty years (until Love on the Run, 1979), Truffaut and Léaud continued their work on “Antoine Doinel,” with Léaud slowly growing toward Truffaut’s “present,” though he would of course never catch up to Truffaut’s real age while Truffaut lived.26 And during this period one might say that a physical resemblance was created and cultivated. When Léaud, like Truffaut before him (and like Antoine Doinel), was expelled from school, Truffaut stepped in to find him a new school and paid the fees; he bought clothing for Léaud and provided lodging within easy reach of his own home.27 He became, in other words, a kind of surrogate father to Léaud while the young man’s career took shape under Truffaut’s tutelage and that of another of the great French New Wave auteurs, Jean-Luc Godard.28 For Godard, however, Léaud played quite a different role. As Nataša Durovicová points out, modernist self-reflexivity in Truffaut’s work contains an autobiographical element, while Godard’s “undermin[es] the authorial presence and authority”—or at least pretends to do so.”29 Léaud seems to perform as a deconstructive element in Godard’s films, while Truffaut engages the actor fully in the construction of his auteurist self-projection. One cannot help but wonder whether Godard’s appropriation of Léaud as a figure is a kind of argument against Truffaut’s project. Certainly the two auteurs represent divergent approaches to the auteurist project, and Léaud would then constitute an important marker for the ways in which they differ: the same and yet not at all the same.30
Truffaut’s image of Léaud, highly personalized from the beginning, becomes more and more indistinguishable from Truffaut’s own self-image, as Truffaut’s statements make clear. And Léaud indeed grows up to be a man who resembles Truffaut in hair and eye color, and facial features, even down to the lines on his face; this is evident in an image of the two men taken by photographer Richard Avedon in Paris in 1972, just after the release of Bed and Board. In that image, the physical resemblance between the two men is further enhanced by their nearly identical hairstyles, and their clothes, which exhibit the same cut and style. In December 1994, a retrospective of the Antoine Doinel films in New York inspired a brief New Yorker review entitled “Truffaut’s Twin,” which was illustrated by Avedon’s portrait.31 The photograph is not neutral on the point of the men’s resemblance; it aims to bring forth and underscore that likeness. By placing their high foreheads close together and nearly on a line with one another, Avedon lets us see the similarities in the strong noses and thin mouths, the hair and eye color. Certainly we can understand how a café owner might have been persuaded that his customer Truffaut was an older version of the young man in the television film. And some aspects of their resemblance are not merely natural or coincidental, but performative. They wear identical suits, shirts, and ties. They are both scrupulously cleanshaven, and one wonders whether the remarkably similar distance between their eyebrows might have been influenced by treatment with tweezers. The work of semblance performed by each man moves him closer to the other, or rather, closer to Antoine Doinel, who represents an aggregate self, a projected image. Each man wears his hair at about the same length and parts it in a similar style, though on opposite sides. This last feature—the same yet opposite hair part—is in fact a characteristic of a rare kind of identical twin, a “mirror” twin, who displays “mirrored” characteristics in such features as handedness or hair parts. The hair part on opposite sides in this particular image, while perhaps not designed with this in mind, helps to produce the effect of a mirror image in the two men’s faces.32 Thus Truffaut’s stated purpose, to make films narrated in the first person, evolves ultimately into a revised understanding of what a “person”—either grammatical or actual—is. In this case we could say that the person is fictional—Doinel—but he is not only fictional. He belongs also to the embodied author and his coauthor, both of them, and to the narrative of a life they make together.
Truffaut dedicates his film The Wild Child to Jean-Pierre Léaud, as I discussed in chapter 2. This dedication deserves a second glance here. When asked about it, Truffaut responded, “The choice of this story is more revealing than I myself thought, and I realized it afterwards: while I was shooting the film, I relived a little the shooting of The 400 Blows in which I initiated Jean-Pierre Léaud into the cinema, during which I taught him what cinema basically is. . . . Until The Wild Child, when I had had children in my films I identified with them, and here, for the first time, I identified with the adult, the father, so much so that when the editing was finished I dedicated the film to Jean-Pierre Léaud because that changeover, that shift, became completely clear for me, obvious. It is a film whose significance was brought home to me from the outside, by friends, by people who spoke to me about the film.”33
When Truffaut makes The Wild Child, in other words, it is no longer a question of the actor taking Truffaut’s place as a child. Instead Truffaut has grown into a man, a father, and now he is ready to make Bed and Board, a film in which Léaud portrays the Antoine Doinel figure as a grown man as well. The interesting thing perhaps is that Truffaut has “fathered” Léaud all this time, has made the young actor not only his protégé, but also his son. So Truffaut’s moment of maturation (becoming a “father” to his film actor) occurs simultaneously with Léaud’s maturity within Truffaut’s films: the elder auteur and the younger actor grow together, in a peculiar reading of film time, and Truffaut also leaves his son Léaud behind to turn to another “creature,” the wild child, the gypsy actor Jean-Pierre Cargol. It is no coincidence that the story of The Wild Child mirrors precisely this kind of fathering and formative relationship in the historical account of an Enlightenment scientist and a primitive child, with Truffaut playing the role of the father.
Mothers and Their Auteurs
Truffaut’s relationship with Jean-Pierre Léaud lays bare the way in which auteurist film can draw upon the metaphor of paternity in the interaction between actor and director. In many of Truffaut’s observations, though he admits that Léaud has had important roles in the films of other directors, it is clear that he sees Léaud (or at least, the Léaud who is also Doinel) as his creation. In his estimation, their work together forged a near biological resemblance between the two of them, both physically and psychologically. The familial relationships at the heart of auteurism can, however, move in the opposite direction: a number of the auteurs in this study exhibit a profound interest in their biological parents, so that the parental relationship forms a significant part of the auteurist self-projection. In particular, the maternal figure plays an important role, even to the extent that the auteur’s mother can appear as an actor in his films.
A closer look at the presence of mothers (and to some extent, fathers) in auteurist filmmaking reveals a fascination with identity and personal origin on the part of the auteur. Meditating on the lives of parents extends the story of the auteur’s life to a time before his or her birth, a time that cannot be accessed through direct means, but instead must be pursued through the same materials used in filmmaking: stories and photographs. And if the self is imagined as collective rather than individual, as must to some degree be the case in auteurist self-projection, parents offer the foundational example of the way in which human lives are inextricably linked, whether through biology or lived relationship or both. Ingmar Bergman, while most obsessed with his mother as a figure, also dwells in his writing and filmmaking on his parents’ marriage, and his father’s role (and Bergman really saw it as playing a role) as prominent pastor in the Swedish church. Andrei Tarkovsky’s father was a renowned poet, and his mother an actress; both perform in his autobiographical Mirror. Woody Allen returns to depictions of his family in Annie Hall, Radio Days, and other films, though his actual family members do not perform as actors. And Almodóvar (who partners with his brother Augustín in their production company, El Deseo) repeatedly uses his mother as an actress in his films, though not with reference to their real family life.
In particular, the auteur’s representation of his mother can become an act of exploration, an inquiry into the ultimate source of intersubjectivity, in the sense that the mother’s biological (and subsequently, often, psychological) symbiosis with the artist child troubles the boundaries between these two entities, calls their status as individual subjects into question. This view of the maternal would seem to map neatly onto the Freudian notion that a son must separate from the mother in order to enter the world of language, subjective expression, and selfhood. But while the auteurist image of the mother does seem to underwrite the claims of French feminists—namely, that the mother in patriarchal systems represents the prelinguistic, mysteriously blank, and unknowable origin of life—there is also a tendency to envision the mother as a model for the auteur’s creative genius. She performs as his “creator” and thus provides the source for his creativity. We see in several instances an attempt to enter the mother’s subjective perspective, give voice to the mysterious maternal space, make it the center of the film’s focus. In this way, the mother is repossessed by the auteur and appropriated as part of the auteurist vision—she becomes part of the image he sees in his interior mirror and then projects on the cinematic screen.
When the auteur’s actual mother (as opposed to the Mother) enters the cinematic frame, one can see the way in which the mother’s body eludes the kind of categorization ordinarily assigned to images of the Mother. The flat surface of the photographic film image seems to replicate at first the impenetrable and wordless mask of the Mother, but in the auteurist films in which the directors’ mothers appear, it becomes clear that the auteurist project aims to move past the surface and attempts to enter the mother’s subjective position, in part in order to establish the filmmaker’s source of identity. The mother, like other actors in auteurist films, becomes the auteur’s avatar. In pursuing an analysis of several auteurs, I will interweave accounts of the maternal thematic with examinations of the performance of auteurist mothers, with an eye toward understanding these performances as a part of the auteur’s self-projection. To demonstrate, let me first turn to Ingmar Bergman.
Swedish state television released Bergman’s documentary film Karin’s Face in 1984, two years after his valedictory “retirement” with the making of Fanny and Alexander. The fourteen-minute film is a brief account of his mother’s life in photographs; there is no voice-over narration, only spare piano music (played by Bergman’s ex-wife, Käbi Läretei), and occasional explanatory intertitles. The method Bergman employs in this little film forecasts Ken Burns’s treatment of Civil War documents for the American television series aired in 1990. In Bergman’s documentary, still photography becomes “live” through the film camera’s treatment of the images: now panning, now tracking out, now coming in for an extreme close-up of mouth, hands, details of clothing, or eyes. Often a close-up will focus on just one eye. We begin with Karin Bergman’s passport, issued, the intertitle tells us, just a few months before her death. Essential biographical information—date of birth, marital status, maiden name, etc.—is conveyed by the camera’s panning movement down over the document, so that the passport becomes part of the narration, a device that allows the film to show rather than tell. What becomes clear in the repetition of images of Karin’s face is that Bergman is fascinated by how his mother’s face remains recognizably hers from young childhood through old age, and how the photographs oscillate in character between a kind of opaque, closed generic form (top photo) and moments of candid, if not always entirely legible, expressiveness (middle and bottom photos).
It seems quite remarkable that Swedish National Television would support such an unswervingly personal project: Ingmar Bergman’s meditations on photographs of his mother and family. But Bergman’s stature at the time and his status as “retired” filmmaker allow him to be viewed with nostalgia and reverence, in much the way he views the images. Further, it could be argued that the photographs—provincial school photographs, wedding photographs, passport photographs—are not merely images of Bergman’s mother, but generic icons that take on the function of representing an entire generation of Swedish women. The meditation, importantly, is not centered around Karin as a person, but on photographic images of Karin, and, as I have implied above, these images are in a concrete (as well as an abstract) sense impenetrable. In Den goda viljan (Best Intentions), the biographical novel about his parents’ marriage, Bergman writes, “Carefully I touched the faces of my parents,” when in fact he is touching photographs of his parents. The actual parents are dead now, and untouchable. An early shot in Karin’s Face shows a pair of well-groomed hands opening and thumbing through the heavy gilt pages of an old family photo album. One imagines that the hands are Bergman’s, and the fact that this sequence is in color (as opposed to all the other images of the film, which are sepia and black-and-white) marks it as part of the present, a present that cannot truly enter into the past. No narrating voice informs or reminisces for the viewer—we are confronted with the impassive images and the sparse annotations that mark them, names and dates, the name of a photographic studio, and then the occasional intertitle, telling us, for example, that Henrik Bergman (Bergman’s father) lost his father at an early age. Only once is there an evaluative comment: when the intertitle labels Karin and Henrik Bergman’s engagement photograph as “extremely odd.” In fact, it is not the character of his parents that Bergman seeks to represent, but relationship—theirs to each other, theirs to him. And it is not the photographs themselves, but the arrangement of them and the camera’s various perspectives on them, the rhythm of the presentation, that give the viewer a way into reading them. We seem to move toward a penetration of the photographic surface when the film camera moves in to focus on a single eye, as if that eye could provide a portal into the pictured subject’s mind. But the photographs, unlike the “moving” photographs of film, remain dead; Bergman cannot bring Karin back to life, as the cinematic “magic” of twenty-four frames per second seems to vivify the still image and allow the dead to breathe, walk, speak. In the intertitles and the photographs’ arrangement, Bergman seems to want to speak for his mother, he sets out to ventriloquize her, but her static and mute body unmasks a profound auteurist conundrum: the actor is not the auteur. The filmed person is not even a person, but a photograph of a person. The cinematic actor’s body and subject are irreparably fragmented, mere vehicles for the auteurist vision, and any other impression we receive is mere illusion. What is demonstrated time after time is the impossibility of breaking through the photographic surface, just as it is impossible to look into the heart or mind of another human being, even one as symbiotically related to oneself as one’s mother.34 Karin’s Face marks the beginning of a cinematic and literary project for Bergman. In Magic Lantern, and in the semiautobiographical epic Fanny and Alexander, Bergman begins to return to the kinds of scenes represented in the family photograph album featured in Karin’s Face. And it is in his “retirement” that a full-force exploration of his mother’s girlhood and his parents’ troubled marriage takes form: in the novelistic biography Best Intentions, made into a film with Bergman’s screenplay in 1992; in the book and film Sunday’s Children, an episode from Bergman’s childhood about his father, directed by Bergman’s son Daniel in 1992; in the short novel about Bergman’s mother’s young womanhood and adulterous affair, Private Confessions, directed by Liv Ullmann as a television film in 1996. Thirty years after Bergman’s mother’s death in 1966, in other words, he is still working to bring life to the still, smooth surface of the photographic images in his family album, taking over his mother’s generative function.
Karin Bergman in a formal pose in Karin’s Face
Karin Bergman in a candid pose in Karin’s Face
Karin Bergman in a candid pose in Karin’s Face
When Andrei Tarkovsky first began to outline a plan for the film that became Mirror, he called it “Confession” and envisioned a hidden-camera interview with his mother, in which he would pose questions he had written in advance. His use of the word “confession” in this context begs further exploration. Who is confessing, and what? In the original film script (which the Soviet film authorities blocked because they found the hidden camera unethical), Tarkovsky’s mother would have been the person “confessing,” either in the sense of helping her son to outline her life story or in the sense of responding to an interrogation with some kind of confession of wrongdoing. In the finished film script, we receive a hint at what Tarkovsky might see as his mother’s crime; at one point the film’s narrator receives a tongue-lashing from his ex-wife, who criticizes his relationship with his mother: “Until you die you will not forgive [your mother] the fact that she destroyed her life for you.” If we return for a moment to the idea that the actor sometimes literally takes the director’s place in film, we can see that Tarkovsky’s introduction of his mother into his cinematic world resurrects her, refuses her sacrifice of her life for his, and replaces his image with hers. Now the woman who gave up her career as a writer to support her ultimately errant husband and gave up her chance at an independent life to raise her children takes up the place of central interest in Mirror, a film that is often described as Tarkovsky’s (autobiographical) confession. The actor who plays her son, the narrator, the actor who voices Tarkovsky’s lines, so to speak, does not even appear on the screen.
In Mirror, then, Tarkovsky shifted the film from a documentary to a narrative mode, but he kept his mother in the frame as an actress.35 Within the film’s story, the protagonist’s young mother is played by Margarita Terekhova, but Tarkovsky’s own mother, Larisa Tarkov-skaya, plays the protagonist’s mother as an old woman.
In creating Mirror, Tarkovsky re-created his own world, but also, and perhaps more important, his mother’s; like Bergman, his exploration of his mother’s marriage and personal history forms the essential basis for his own self-projection. Robert Bird remarks, “It wasn’t until [Tarkovsky] changed the focus of the film from the mother to the protagonist that he changed the title to Mirror.36 But it is not clear that Tarkovsky ever really “changed the focus of the film.” It is true that the finished film, Mirror, as opposed to the originally conceived documentary interview, includes the perspective of a fictional son, but from beginning to end the film seeks to come to an understanding of the mother’s experience of the past, in part by interrogating her photographic image.
The narrative of Mirror opens with a young woman sitting on a weathered wooden fence, looking out across green fields and forests. We (the camera’s perspective melded to the viewer’s) approach her from behind and then move around to look at her face. Natasha Synessios reports that this image—the woman seated on the fence, smoking a cigarette—re-creates as precisely as possible a photograph taken of Tarkovsky’s mother during his childhood, during the wartime years. The woman in Mirror wears the same clothes, has the same hairstyle, sits on the same sort of fence in the same sort of posture as Tarkovsky’s mother had done thirty years earlier. But while the evocative black-and-white photographic image from the 1940s presents an impenetrable, two-dimensional surface, the color film image moves through three-dimensional space; it enters the photograph, so to speak, in order to move from behind the woman and reveal the environment that surrounds her, enter into her space.
Larisa Tarkovskaya plays the director’s mother in The Mirror
Though attempting to enter the mother’s mental and emotional space seems a major preoccupation in Mirror, the figure of the mother remains an enigma. She is often pensive, silent, shedding tears for which the viewer is offered no narrative explanation, or suffering extreme anxiety about things that seem trivial when no proper context is offered. Beyond re-creating the three-dimensional space in which his mother moved (down to rebuilding the dacha in which she lived and planting buckwheat outside so it would grow as it had thirty years before), Tarkovsky provides a kind of narrative voice for his mother’s thoughts. Not the typical narrator, however—in this instance, he engages his father, Arsenii Tarkovsky, a celebrated poet, to read selections from his poetry in a voice-over that seems to speak to the mother figure of the film. The poems address the love between the poet/father and the young mother, a love that apparently has suffered with the poet’s absence and the mother’s solitude during the war. Thus both Tarkovsky’s mother and father play roles in the film (as both parents figure in Bergman’s Karin’s Face), though the father’s role is limited to his voice, a voice that works primarily to establish something about the mother’s character, while the auteur’s biological mother appears as the protagonist’s mother as an old woman.
The film’s narrative claims that the narrator’s wife closely resembles his mother as a young woman, and old photographs reveal that the faces of the two women—Tarkovsky’s mother as a young woman and the actress who plays her—are in fact strikingly similar. In order to stress this resemblance, Tarkovsky casts the same actress to play the two roles, wife and young mother. In one striking dream sequence, the actress playing his young mother is confronted by a mirror in which not her image, but the face of Tarkovsky’s aged biological mother, appears. Within the frame of the narrative, interestingly, this is the son’s dream, not the mother’s. In the son’s projection, the mother is young and old all at once. And at the conclusion of the film, once again the aged woman appears in the same frame with her “younger self,” underscoring something that marks Bergman’s representation of his mother as well: the conflation of past and present that is embodied by the mother’s presence, the violation of time’s ordinary sequential nature.
One of the appearances of Tarkovsky’s mother in Mirror involves a meeting between the narrator’s mother and his son—but it is a non-meeting because the two do not recognize each other. In a supernatural sequence, the boy (who appears in the opening prologue as the television viewer) waits alone in an apartment. He has an encounter with a mysterious woman who suddenly appears and as suddenly disappears, leaving only a condensation ring on the table where her cup of tea sat, and that ring slowly evaporates and disappears as well. Then the doorbell rings, and Ignat goes to answer (see the image of Larisa Tarkov-skaya). There stands Tarkovsky’s mother, and she asks after the person who, she believes, lives in that apartment. But Ignat does not know that person. The old woman is bewildered, confused; she searches Ignat’s face, seeming at some level to recognize him, while he clearly does not know her. She goes away, he closes the door, and the viewer is left to wonder about the scene’s significance. Tarkovsky explained in an interview that “although he did not have a logical understanding of, or explanation for, the fact that her grandson did not recognise her, he needed to see his mother’s face a little frightened, a little shy. . . . It was very important for me to see my mother in this state. The expression of her face when she is shy, confused, disconcerted. . . . It was very important for me to see this state of the soul of someone whom I feel very close to, this state of depression, of emotional awkwardness. It is like a portrait of someone in a state of humiliation.’”37 Then the question arises as to why it was necessary for Tarkovsky to see his mother, his actual mother, not an actress playing her role, in a state of humiliation. In placing his mother in this position, he brings about her submission to his vision. She becomes his creature, and in some respect he may also take his revenge on her for the sacrifice she offered him and his sister, the renunciation of her own artistic life in service of his. At the same time, he restores her to artistic life by making her an actress in his film.
In moving from Andrei Tarkovsky to Pedro Almodóvar, it is tempting to point to Almodóvar’s homosexuality and hypothesize about the way in which the filmmaker’s strong identification with his mother corresponds to the cross-gender performances that proliferate in his work. But in fact Almodóvar’s engagement of his biological mother, Francisca Caballero, as an actress within the framework of several of his cinematic narratives corresponds in some vital respects to Tarkovsky’s use of his mother in Mirror. One is the use of the mother to evoke landscapes and narratives of the rural past, the premodern. Jean-Claude Seguin notes Caballero’s importance in an article on geography and the body in Almodóvar’s films: “The maternal figure, Francisca Caballero, is the most complete portrait of the penetration of the rustic into the city. Whether she is a television news announcer, a literary journalist, or a dancing extra, she embodies oddity, the untouchable transplant, a body encased in the city, uncorrupted and incorruptible, pure of any urban contamination” (my translation).38 As in Tarkovsky’s Mirror, the mother’s body acts as a chronotrope, a site that combines the village and culture of the filmmaker’s childhood with his urban present: in the first of the films in which she appears, Francisca Caballero does indeed, with her hair pulled back in a bun, her body armored in a plain black dress, in her countrified manners and language, represent the landscape and the culture of the filmmaker’s past.
She is solid and soberly dressed, a standout in the flash and color of the hip Madrileño society that dominates Almodóvar’s palette.39 This type of evocation of his mother’s world appears frequently in his work: in the villages of Talk to Her and Bad Education, and significantly in Volver (2006), a film that includes in its plot the return of a dead mother. The visually arresting opening of Volver focuses on a ritual performed in a wind-blasted La Mancha cemetery by a small crowd of traditionally dressed women, virtually indistinguishable from one another in their black dresses. About his representation of La Mancha, Almodóvar says, “I come from there, and even if it is an embarrassment to say so, I admit that [representing La Mancha constitutes] a confession, an evocation of my roots” (162). In this way Almodóvar, a figure whose work showcases the verve and radical departure of Madrid’s movida of the 1980s, signals a tenacious connection to an older Spain, a Spain he projects through the body of his mother. This is true of Tarkovsky’s geographic axis of maternal representation as well; his mother is the dacha, the countryside, memory. The difference between the two filmmakers is the way in which they relate ultimately to the rural past. Tarkovsky idealizes the Russian countryside and colors it with nostalgia, while Almodóvar embraces Madrid as the center of his representative universe, and, in fact, he brings his mother into Madrid, forcing a marriage between what Seguin calls “the maternal image” and the urban cultural landscape.
Francisca Caballero in Pedro Almodóvar’s What Have I Done to Deserve This?
Thus Seguin’s reading of Francisca Caballero as an actor in her son’s films is only partially accurate. It is interesting, for instance, that he refers to Caballero as “the maternal figure,” when in fact she often does not play a mother figure at all. She is the mother of the protagonist in Tie Me Up, Tie Me Down, and in What Have I Done to Deserve This? she appears as a villager who, if not a mother herself, declares that she cared for the protagonist of that film when she was a baby. (Her role is listed officially in the credits not as “mother” or “babysitter,” but as “dental patient.”) But in Women on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown, she plays a television news announcer, and in Kika she is a journalist. It is not that she is a “maternal figure” (unless maternal means “older woman” or “traditionally built older woman”); she is Almodóvar’s mother, a fact that one does not necessarily know unless one knows who “Francisca Caballero” is.40 She indicates Almodóvar’s relationship to the maternal not by acting as a mother, but by being his mother and offering (to those in the know) a link between the narrative of the film and Almodóvar’s narrative of his life. Like Tarkovsky’s mother or Bergman’s mother, Almodóvar’s mother forms part of the auteurist compact with spectators and performers as the biological director’s avatar.
Francisca Caballero as a newscaster in Pedro Almodóvar’s Women on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown
Beyond casting his mother as actress, Almodóvar returns repeatedly to investigations of the significance of the mother-son relationship in a way that complicates the question of where one person begins and another ends, particularly in an autobiographical context. A reading of one of his films—All About My Mother—uncovers the auteur’s autobiographical impulse, the way he connects self-formation to the maternal figure, the importance of mother-as-actress, and the disintegration and re-formation of bodies into new persons. First, the director notes that the figure of the son (a character who loses his life in the first fifteen minutes of the film) is a stand-in for Almodóvar: “All About My Mother is as autobiographical as any film about a director from La Mancha who just won an Oscar. “All About My Mother even talks about the way I became a spectator and how I became a filmmaker.” In other words, the figure of the son Esteban in the film does not share biographical details with Almodóvar but evokes a deeper kinship; Almodóvar explains that Esteban is “a sensibility,” not unlike Truffaut’s claim of Jean-Pierre Léaud’s “moral resemblance” to himself (204-5).
In All About My Mother, Esteban/Almodóvar requests that his mother read the opening of Truman Capote’s Music for Chameleons to him. The filmmaker explains to an interviewer that this “was one of the texts that I had selected for my mother to read before the camera in a film that I always wanted to make and now never will. Basically, it would consist of putting a camera in front of her so that she could talk, because what she needs to do is talk and tell stories about things, and she is very entertaining. She would read—something she does very well—a series of texts. She would be this mother who is teaching you what’s best. How are we to understand, from the selection of that text, “what is best”? Like Tarkovsky’s original idea of putting his mother into a secretly recorded interrogation situation, with the questions written by him, Almodóvar, too, writes a script for his mother, or at least, he gives her the lines to say, the ones he considers best, ironically. His mother’s notion of “best” does not really enter into this picture. That he places her in the position of reading from Capote’s book points toward the importance of her acceptance of his notions of identity and authorship; the title Music for Chameleons marks a clear association between the son’s sensibility and one of the dominant themes of the film: identity transformation.
Here I would like to argue that Almodóvar’s interest in bodies in transformation has direct relevance not only to his drive to upset norms of gender construction, but he deals in complicated ways both with self-construction and film as a mode of self-representation. Unknown to Esteban, his long-absent father has had a sex change and is now a woman. And one of the primary figures of the film is Agrado, a formerly-male woman (played by a female actress) who explains in detail to a theater audience how she paid for the operations that turned her into a woman: so and so many pesos for buttocks, breasts, lips, and so on. The enumerated parts of the body conform to the way in which actors’ bodies are broken down and reassembled in film, but also to the way in which a female actor can become the avatar of a male, how several different bodies can be assembled under the name of the single auteur, who in his turn is also not one, but many, acting under the sign of the auteur.
Another way Almodóvar represents the body reassembled is through the motive of transplantation. After the shocking car accident that takes Esteban’s life in an early sequence of the film, we see that his mother, Manuela, makes the difficult decision to donate Esteban’s organs. Because she works in the transplantation unit, Manuela has access to confidential records and is able to hunt down the identity of the person who receives her son’s heart. And not only Manuela is obsessed with the material, corporeal heart. The film obsessively focuses on the heart’s removal from Esteban and transfer from Madrid to La Coruña, transported in a cooler via helicopter. Irrationally yet persistently, Manuela identifies Esteban’s heart as Esteban, and its transferal to another human being creates an amalgam of Esteban and that person, to the degree that Manuela travels to La Coruña to see “her heart.” Esteban’s heart is not only his—it is his donee’s and his mother’s, and the topos of transplantation thus segues into the topos of intersubjectivity or the topos of the avatar—but the person with Esteban’s heart in his body is now a version of Esteban, and by virtue of the connection between Manuela and Esteban, he is a version of Manuela as well (a reference seems to be implied to the circulatory system in pregnancy, when the expectant mother shares blood-flow with the fetus she carries).
It is not merely the case that Manuela works in the transplantation unit; she has the unusual job of working as an actress there, which underscores the idea of mother as actress, working according to someone else’s script. It happens that Manuela performs in a film as a woman who must decide whether or not to donate the organs of a loved one who has suddenly died. When Esteban is killed in the crash, the role suddenly becomes real—she does not have to perform, she can simply be the woman experiencing horrific loss and trauma. Thus Manuela becomes the epitome of the film actress, the nonperformer whose role is determined by the director (in this case represented as fate, though of course we are watching a film, so the ironic coincidence is as constructed as the wooden hospital movie scripts). That Almodóvar is quite in agreement with Tarkovsky on this point about film acting can be ascertained from his remarks about his work with the actress Victoria Abril: “She only understood when she realized that it wasn’t she who had to invent, but me” (93).
The relationship Almodóvar creates between Manuela and Esteban might seem at first to bear little resemblance to Almodóvar’s relationship with his mother. But Esteban promises Manuela, who once acted on the stage, that he will write a role for her and bring her back to the theater, as Almodóvar brings his own mother, never a professional actress, but a countrywoman from La Mancha, to the screen in his films. Viewers and critics view Almodóvar rather consistently as a “women’s” director; it has been remarked that the primary vessels for his self-projection are the actresses Carmen Maura, Penélope Cruz, Victoria Abril, and Chus Lampraeve, among others. But the representation of women in his films deals predominately with camp or drag versions of feminine roles; in fact, roles from films. His mother occupies a different kind of position; one should not be so naive as to claim that she represents herself, but her presence in his films as a body, a body that relates to his “real-life” persona, references the auteur’s presence behind these films. The kind of woman she represents is not derived from a cinematic icon, but in his films she becomes one, and through his work we see the possibility of transformation and gender ambivalence even in a figure that seems at first so solidly female (maternal) and traditional. The way in which Almodóvar engages his mother as actress suggests that even in the midst of capturing the image of his country’s and his personal past through her, he also uses her as an expression of his challenge to traditional culture. For instance, he relates his mother’s enjoyment in shopping for the clothes she will wear on-screen (and apparently then keep for her own use); as a young woman in the village, she found herself limited to black clothing at an early stage of life, while in her son’s later films she wears prints and colors. And it is possible to imagine something subversive in her role as reader, both in the film her son imagines (but only produces as a fiction in All About My Mother) and in Women on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown, where she reads the news as a television announcer. In each instance of reading, the woman gives voice to a masculine script—the news for which one assumes a masculine source and the book by a (gay) man, but ultimately the script written by her own son. Rather than functioning as an anchor for the wandering son, the mother, in becoming a cinematic figure, offers a model of the ultimate transformative power, the site of oscillation between the masculine and the feminine, which Almodóvar portrays throughout his oeuvre.
Herzog’s Kinski
In the examples above, the auteurs employ their mothers as a site or a screen for their self-projections, interrogating and studying and transforming the surface of the maternal body for some hint as to the mystery of their own identities, their personal and cultural pasts. The instances I now want to explore involve a different kind of relationship, one in which the link between the auteur and the actor is not genetic, but sexualized and pressed into a supernatural realm. In first looking at Werner Herzog’s collaboration with Klaus Kinski, I do not mean to say that there is a literal sexual relationship between the two men, but rather that an eroticized violence characterizes the romantic and hypermasculine vision Herzog seems to hold of their relationship. As François Truffaut creates an alter ego, a mirror image that can perform his younger self, Werner Herzog finds and captures a wild child who can perform the savagery of Herzog’s vision and take his place on the altar of artistic sacrifice, to use an expression typical of Herzog’s vocabulary.
In 1999, eight years after the death of Klaus Kinski, his director, Werner Herzog, produced a documentary on their relationship entitled Mein liebster Feind—Klaus Kinski (literally, My Best Enemy—Klaus Kinski). While the German title plays off the relationship between the words Freund (friend) and Feind (enemy), the English-release title, My Best Fiend, implies Kinski’s demonic nature both on- and off-screen, a caricature upheld by both Kinski (in his writing and his acting) and Herzog. In the course of the film we hear how Herzog, still a young man, is struck by a particular performance by Kinski in a German film of the 1950s about World War II.
In an interview, Herzog is asked why My Best Fiend says nothing of Kinski’s personal history or background, and he responds, “It never interested me. I never wanted to make an encyclopedic film on Klaus Kinski. It was always evident to me that it should be my Klaus Kinski, that’s why I have this extra, whom I met at the airport, carry a sign that says ‘Herzog’s Kinski.’”41 The airport scene Herzog describes is an odd and significant one, in fact. After many years, Herzog is returning to Peru, where Kinski and he had their first great success in Aguirre: The Wrath of God. When he arrives at the airport, he is indeed met by a man carrying a sign marked “Herzog’s Kinski.” But we know from the interview that the scene is staged. And upon reflection, it does seem strange to be met at the airport with a sign bearing someone else’s name. It is not the dead Kinski, but Herzog who is expected. In this staged moment of reunion with a cast extra from Aguirre, Herzog creates confusion between himself and his actor, a confusion that the documentary encourages throughout, and that could be an autobiographical statement about his career.
Herzog’s highest degree of success as a feature filmmaker coincides with his collaboration with Kinski. When Kinski died, Herzog’s stock as an auteur of narrative films fell perceptibly, a fact he obliquely expresses in the valedictory tone of My Best Fiend. At that juncture, Herzog began to focus primarily on documentary filmmaking, and it is his documentaries that have maintained his status as an auteur. Once Kinski left his stage, it seems that there was no avatar that could fully take Herzog’s place in a fictive framework. My Best Fiend, while on one level eulogizing the dead actor and looking nostalgically at the lost artistic collaboration between the two men, also works toward erasing or engulfing Kinski. There are moments (like the airport greeting) when Herzog attempts to absorb Kinski entirely into his auteurist vision, a vision that focuses on the blood sacrifice one must make in order to force savage nature into art. If there is a recognizable autobiographical signature in Herzog’s filmmaking, it is this: the repeated performance of Herzog’s belief that art demands human sacrifice, in the form of a human who stands in for the artist. Kinski plays that role for Herzog, takes that important auteurist position for him. It is the violence of their relationship, in which Herzog demands repeatedly that Kinski enact Herzog’s sacrificial fantasies, that leads me to characterize their bond as eroticized under the banner of Death.
The notion of sacrifice comes to the fore from the very beginning of My Best Fiend, which shows us Kinski’s one-man performance as Jesus in the Deutschlandhalle in Berlin. The placement of Kinski’s manic Christ at the film’s opening establishes the actor’s savagery and aggression, but it also underscores his role as a sacrificial victim. This implication will return later in the film, when Herzog relates the striking number of violent accidents and attacks that occur on his film sets. Kinski attacks an extra with his sword and shoots a gun into a tent, grazing the head of another actor. Herzog threatens to shoot Kinski. A cameraman slices his hand to the bone during the filming of a shipwreck in Fitzcarraldo. Another technician has to be airlifted out of the jungle when he cuts his own leg off with a chainsaw in order to avoid death by snakebite. And repeatedly, we have the scenes of Kinski enraged, Kinski foaming at the mouth. Set against the clips of a raging Kinski is the quiet voice of Werner Herzog. Just after the opening sequence in the Deutschlandhalle, Herzog visits the house where Kinski lived for a short time in a type of boarding-house arrangement together with Herzog and his family, when Herzog was thirteen. The building has now been renovated, and the former boarding house is occupied by a single, well-off couple who gutted the apartment and furnished it lavishly. Herzog’s narration of his own family’s poverty, the crowded and sordid conditions of the establishment, and Kinski’s wild and destructive behavior while living there is ironically set off by the utter Bürgerlichkeit of the horrified and fascinated couple, and Herzog’s own recessive, polite, and quiet delivery. In Herzog’s narrative, Kinski throws potatoes at the dinner table, he shrieks obscenities at a visiting journalist, he goes naked to the door to meet the mailman, he locks himself into the only bathroom for forty-eight hours and, according to Herzog, reduces all of the fixtures inside to fragments that “could be sifted through a tennis racket.” Herzog relates all of this to the bourgeois couple in a gentle and humorous tone.
One begins to get the impression in this sequence that the savagery that underlies Herzog’s vision—which demands that a ship be dragged over a mountain, smashing its prow on the rocks; that a young woman fall sacrificial victim to a vampire; that a troop of Spanish conquistadors be crushed by the brutality of a world they cannot understand—has to find expression through Herzog’s demon, Kinski, for Herzog himself is such a kind and gentle chap. Kinski and Herzog, however, both come from a working-class background, displaced by the new German bourgeois. Kinski’s violence is really Herzog’s violence, but Herzog must contain, harness, and control it in order to produce art—Herzog’s art. Not unlike the roaring river in Peru, Kinski performs in Herzog’s cinema as a force of nature that runs into apocalyptic destruction. He becomes the sacrificial victim that art demands.
When asked in an interview about his working relationship with Kinski during Nosferatu, Herzog replies, “Well, Nosferatu was easier than others because he needed so much preparation for stepping in front of the camera, four hours’ make-up. Fangs, ears. . . . It was like a harness. You see, if he threw a tantrum and beat the ground with his fists, the make-up would be ruined and he would be in for another four hours. . . . I managed to domesticate him, to make his real qualities productive for the screen.”42 The notion of harnessing or channeling Kinski emerges in My Best Fiend when Herzog describes how he often pushed Kinski into a rage in order to get the acting affect he desired. Kinski, he explains, wanted to overact, and Herzog wanted him to play his malevolence (as Aguirre) more quietly. So Herzog would bait or tease Kinski, perhaps eating a piece of chocolate in front of him when no one on the set had eaten any chocolate for weeks, thus throwing Kinski into a rage. After the tantrum, Kinski would have lost the energy to play Aguirre at his preferred level of intensity. Even Kinski’s rages, then, are the products of Herzog’s sadistic machinations, according to Herzog.
Kinski, in his autobiography, All I Need Is Love, offers a somewhat different account: “[Herzog] doesn’t possess a spark of talent and has no idea what filmmaking is. . . . I determine every scene, every adjustment, every shot, and refuse to do anything other than what I see as right. This way I can at least save the film from becoming complete trash.”43 Kinski, whose writing style closely mirrors his acting style, showers Herzog with invective; he is “humorless, mendacious, stubborn, narrow-minded, pretentious, unscrupulous, bumptious, spiritless” and much worse (197). Herzog, for his part, makes an astonishing move regarding Kinski’s autobiography in My Best Fiend. He claims to have coauthored it: “We would sit together and think of all the nastiest things to say about me.” Thus the vision of Herzog published as Kinski’s Herzog is still Herzog’s Kinski’s Herzog.
There is a way in which Kinski understands the sacrifice demanded of him. He writes in his autobiography:
[Herzog] confesses that the living and working conditions on location will be filthy and disgusting, as if he were reading a deserved verdict, and explains just as brazenly and coarsely (licking his lips as if savoring some tasty tidbit) that each of the participants will have to endure unimaginable punishment and privation, risking death, to follow him, Herzog . . . “Unto death,” as he obnoxiously expresses himself. The whole time, he keeps his eyes shut to his megalomania, which he imagines to be genius (196).
Here Kinski aids Herzog once again in producing an image that closely parallels Herzog’s signature as auteurist director. The question arises at to whether a “Kinski’s Herzog” might not exist alongside “Herzog’s Kinski.” Despite his repulsion for Herzog’s sacrificial vision, Kinski willingly lays himself on the altar. “I don’t know why I say yes this time [to Nosferatu and Woyzeck]. There must be a point to my choosing to endure someone else’s hell when I’m at my nadir. Will I experience pain myself after I’ve incarnated it? . . . Do I transfer the hell of others into my own life, or is it the other way around? Do I live through everyone, and does everyone live through me? Who can tell?” (245-46).
Kinski’s question is critical to my discussion: placing Herzog’s story of Kinski alongside Kinski’s provides an opportunity for experiencing the avatar as embodied person and intentional agent, a person who questions the directorial vision even as he allows himself to be seduced by it. The sacrifice the auteur demands is represented in the film narratives and the rhetoric of the auteur and the actor as a blood sacrifice, but it seems to be a self-sacrifice on the altar of the auteur’s self-projection. And it is the tension between the two subjects, according to Herzog’s film, that provides the energy for Herzog’s self-projection, Herzog’s Kinski. But at the same time, Kinski’s death provides some support to Bergman’s statement that the auteur cannot exist without an actor: “Without a you, no I.” Herzog stages an end for Kinski’s career as a film actor in the context of My Best Fiend. It is 1988, three years before Kinski’s death, and the actor has just filmed a death scene, the final scene of their last film together, Cobra Verde. “He was spent,” says Herzog, “burnt away like a comet, he was ashes.” He claims that Kinski said at that moment, “We can go no further. I am no more.” This was the end of Herzog’s Kinski and the end of Kinski’s Herzog as well. Neither Cobra Verde nor any of Herzog’s feature films that followed would enjoy the success of their collaborations.
A Painful Connection
Liv Ullmann continued to work with Ingmar Bergman until his death, and she reflects a unique and different sensibility from that between Herzog and Kinski, though here, too, is a form of the erotic fascination and obsession exhibited in the Herzog/Kinski partnership. In 2001, an article about Ullmann appeared in the New York Times Magazine entitled “An Independent Woman,” preceded by the writer’s observation: “She spent years as Bergman’s muse, star, and lover. Now, as she works alone behind the camera, Liv Ullmann understands what their relationship has been about.”44 Like Herzog and Kinski, Bergman and Ullmann seem to oscillate between positions of framing and being framed. And like Herzog and Kinski, there is an intersubjectivity at work that is impossible to disentangle. On the set of Persona in 1966, when the Bergman-Ullmann affair first began, Bergman said to his actress, “I had a dream last night. That you and I will be painfully connected.”45
My Best Fiend: Werner Herzog and Klaus Kinski in action (in Cobra Verde, their last film together)
The connection is achieved through intimacy, but that intimacy embraces both the sexual/spiritual and the cinematic. Of Bergman’s signature close-up images, Ullmann writes:
I love close-ups. . . . The closer a camera comes, the more eager I am to show a completely naked face, show what is behind the skin, the eyes; inside the head …
When the camera is as close as Ingmar’s sometimes gets, it doesn’t only show a face, but also what kind of life this face has seen …
Privately we long for exactly this kind of recognition: that others should perceive what we really are, deep inside. To make a film with Ingmar is, for me, to have this experience. (244)
Ullmann’s interpretation of the close-up’s meaning echoes that of early film theorist Béla Balázs, who claims that “close-ups are often dramatic revelations of what is really happening under the surface of appearances” (56). Ullmann emphasizes the sensual nature of the cinematic exchange between actor and audience via the camera (which is “Ingmar’s”—the lover’s). The whole passage and in particular certain of Ullmann’s words—“eager,” “naked,” “skin,” “long[ing],” “deep inside”—breathe an unmistakable eroticism into filmmaking that finds expression in Bergman’s autobiography, The Magic Lantern. He writes, “Film work is an intensely erotic business. One’s closeness to the actors knows no reservations, the mutual surrender is total. . . . The atmosphere is irresistibly charged with sexuality. It took many years for me to finally learn that one day the camera will be turned off and the lights extinguished.”46 These remarks by Bergman on the eroticism of filmmaking echo those of Truffaut. They appear in his account of his sexual relationship with Harriet Andersson while they were working together on the set of Summer with Monika (Sommaren med Monika, 1953), and in this instance the story is simply “factual,” historic. But I would argue that Bergman refers here both to something quite specific and tangible (his relationships with Harriet Andersson, then Bibi Andersson, Liv Ullmann, and others) and something more metaphysical and universal: sexuality as an act of self-reflection or self-construction that lies at the heart of his film work.
It is not at all coincidental that it is on the set of Persona that this “painful connection” takes shape. Persona is in fact about a painful connection between two women, the linking of two individual subjectivities through film or, more precisely, through a photographic image. At a moment of crisis in the film, the viewer is confronted with the frightening merged image of the faces of the film’s female protagonists. In his autobiographies, The Magic Lantern and Images, Bergman discusses how certain of his films begin with a single, enigmatic mental image. Persona, he says, grew out of a vision of two women, wearing hats, sitting on a beach and comparing hands. This mental image, in its turn, was inspired by an actual photograph of Liv Ullmann and Bibi Andersson. Bergman decided to make a film with the two of them because they were, as he puts it, so “devilishly alike.”47 In evaluating the six-year relationship with Bergman that grew out of their collaboration on Persona, Ullmann asserts, “We were so much alike. What he had not known about himself he began to see in me—as if in a mirror—despite the fact that I was a woman and much younger and perhaps unlike him in ways he didn’t know” (110). In Persona, Bergman explores the permeability of the bounds of selfhood, using the cinematic apparatus and especially the physical nature of film and still photography as a means of projecting questions about intersubjectivity. The figures in Persona regard themselves as real people, and under ordinary circumstances the spectator is engaged to see figures in films as real people. But by creating a vampiric narrative, and by inserting references to the actors as photographed images (when the film “breaks,” for instance, or images of the two women’s faces are merged into an image of one frightening face), the film probes the question of what it means to be “real.”
In this chapter on actors, I have concentrated on the relational and collaborative nature of auteurist self-projection. An exploration of how the intimacy of auteur/actor relationships—sexual, biological, inimical—reveals the embodied and emotional status of what passes between the two agents. Auteurist cinema lays bare that the act of self-formation occurs through other bodies and persons, and that it is through self-projection and spectatorship (in which the roles of projection and spec-tatorship revolve through director, actor, audience) that the sense of a “person” is formed. I do not argue that it is the case that every auteurist act of self-projection involves an intimate relationship between auteur and actor, but such relationships stand as an emblem for the kind of mutual sacrifice and tension that occurs when a self takes shape on the screen.
When we recall the statements of the auteurs on acting at the beginning of this chapter, we could perhaps agree that auteurist cinema can generally be defined as an autocratic mode, with the auteur employing not only actors, but technicians and many others toward the realization of a personal vision. But the actor inserts him or herself stubbornly into the artist’s vision, and must be recaptured by the auteur in various moves intended to assert the primacy of that vision—moves that are not always successful, for the viewer may choose to privilege the actor’s performance as the primary object. Thus the actor, absolutely necessary and intrinsic to the expression of the auteurist’s self-projection, also can pose the greatest threat to authorial control. In the case of Herzog and Kinski, a battle for supremacy becomes obvious. Whose lines will be spoken? In what voice will they be recorded? Who is performing for whom? Whose vision will be realized? In the end, the actor and the director must burn out as individual subjectivities—they exist only in concert with each other in the cinematic performance and they lose themselves as selves there. With Bergman and Ullmann, the confrontation takes a different and less violent form but claims the same sacrifice. Ullmann says at one point that Bergman gives her herself through his close focus on her face. Bergman tells her that they are “painfully connected,” and when he retires from directing himself, he gives Ullmann his scripts to direct—the story of his parents, the story of one of his own stormy (pre-Ullmann) love affairs. In her autobiography, Liv Ullmann writes of the moment Bergman told her about his mother’s death: “‘Now I have no one,’ he cried, and he was completely defenseless. I knew that I could never leave him, and in a way I never have” (222).
After having been convinced by Barthes, Foucault, and others who taught us of the impossibility of “knowing” an author and the foolishness of pursuing the details of an author’s so-called life in the hope of interpreting the author’s work, we still find ourselves confronted with persons, bodies, and the impact of persons and bodies on others. What is ephemeral in film and other forms of discourse keeps straining toward materiality, and it seems to me that the auteur’s relationship with his actors is an arena where we can watch the struggle between the material and ephemeral take place—in fact, they stage that struggle in their films, the struggle to make vision incarnate.