Notes

1. David Clark, “Kant’s Aliens: The Anthropology and Its Others,” New Centennial Review 1, no. 2 (2001): 201–89.

2. For an overview of human “interiority,” see Hilary Putnam, “How Old Is the Mind?,” in Words and Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 3–21.

3. Georges Bataille, Theory of Religion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1989), 21. Quoted in Tom Tyler, “Like Water in Water,” Journal for Cultural Research 9, no. 3 (2005): 265–79, quote on 267. Tyler provides an insightful reading of Heidegger in this essay.

4. Obviously, the animal rights movement has listed these cruelties. In terms of Continental philosophy, Matthew Calarco, in Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), outlines how contemporary philosophy has boxed in the animal. Of particular interest here is his chapter on Derrida and the issue of rights. Later, in chapter 3, I will pursue the question of rights through Cary Wolfe’s edited collection, Philosophy and Animal Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

5. Issues of the “real” as appearance, and the association of appearances with art, are taken up in chapter 2 in the discussion of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy.

6. Jean Baudrillard, Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings, ed. Mark Poster (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 174–75.

7. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 62.

8. Steven W. Laycock, “The Animal as Animal: A Plea for Open Conceptuality,” in Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life, ed. H. Peter Steeves (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 271–84, quote on 272.

9. David Clark, private correspondence. I am indebted to Clark for his sincere and generous conversations on this topic.

10. Wolfe, Philosophy and Animal Life.

11. Michel Serres, The Natural Contract (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 41.

12. William Wordsworth, “Tintern Abbey,” in The Lyrical Ballads, and Other Poems, 1797–1800, ed. James Butler and Karen Green (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), 120.

13. Cary Wolfe, “‘Animal Studies,’ Disciplinarity, and the (Post)Humanities,” in What Is Posthumanism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 99–126.

14. Readers may find Britta Jaschinski’s art and Randy Malamud’s texts on the art a useful example of such a mode of inquiry.

1. Luke White, Damien Hirst and the Legacy of the Sublime in Contemporary Art and Culture (London: Middlesex University, 2009).

2. Damien Hirst, I Want to Spend the Rest of My Life Everywhere, with Everyone, One to One, Always, Forever, Now (New York: Monacelli Press, 1997), 298.

3. Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of an Idea, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2006), 8.

4. Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), 168–69.

5. Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 81; Hadot, Veil of Isis, 93.

6. Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. 4, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, et al. (London: Longman,1875), 296.

7. Merchant, Death of Nature, 168–69.

8. Simon Lumsden, “Hegel, Derrida and the Subject,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 3, no. 2–3 (2007): 32–50, quote on 34. Emphasis in original.

9. Genesis 1:28, The New American Bible (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Company, 1986).

10. In contemporary animal training, Vicky Hearn has invoked the story in Genesis as a negotiated respect created between humans and animals in Adam’s Task: Calling Animals by Name (New York: Knopf, 1986). In Companion Species Manifesto (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003), Donna Haraway invokes Hearn in her own training with dogs but respectfully distances herself from the hierarchy implicit in Adam’s naming. Instead, she sees the human–dog relationship as one of co-evolution. Richard Nash outlines this issue of naming (and includes Carl Linnaeus and Comte de Buffon) in his essay “Animal Nomenclature: Facing Other Animals,” in Humans and Other Animals in Eighteenth-century British Culture: Representation, Hybridity, Ethics, ed. Frank Palmeri (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 101–18.

11. Quoted in Michael Gaudio, “Surface and Depth: The Art of Early American Natural History,” in Stuffing Birds, Pressing Plants, Shaping Knowledge: Natural History in North America, 1730–1860, ed. Sue Ann Prince (Philadelphia: Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 2007), 55–73.

12. Quoted in Erica Fudge, Perceiving Animals: Humans and Beasts in Early Modern English Culture (New York: Macmillan/St. Martin’s Press, 2007), 103–4.

13. Ibid., 108.

14. Francis Bacon, The New Atlantis (Hoboken, N.J.: Bibliobytes, NetLibrary, 1998), 19.

15. Hirst, I Want to Spend the Rest of My Life Everywhere, 298.

16. Hirst exhibition program quoted in “Are Modern Animal Mommies Art?,” Animal Mommies, http://www.mummytombs.com/mummylocator/animal/hirst.art.htm (accessed May 15, 2008).

17. Correspondence with the Gagosian Gallery and Hirst’s studio has confirmed that both cattle in Some Comfort Gained from the Acceptance of the Inherent Lies in Everything are females—namely, cows. While Hirst and many critics discuss this piece as desire and the impossibility of union between two cattle separated from each other though interlaced, the sculpture becomes increasingly complicated by the often-overlooked biological nicety of the animals’ sex. Biological sex of the animals affect their being and world, which is under consideration in this chapter. Millicent Wilner, “Technical Specs Inquiry for Hirst’s Cattle,” May 20, 2008, http://www.gagosian.com/exhibitions/soho-1996-05-damien-hirst (accessed May 20, 2008).

18. Lumsden, “Hegel, Derrida and the Subject,” 34.

19. Fudge, Perceiving Animals, 108. Hirst continues the theme of Eden as a haunted cultural past in Adam and Eve Banished from the Garden (2000), Adam and Eve Together at Last (2004), and Adam and Eve Exposed (2004), among others.

20. Mario Codognato, “Warning Labels,” in Damien Hirst, the Agony and the Ecstasy: Selected Works from 1989 to 2004, ed. Damien Hirst, Eduardo Cicelyn, Mario Codognato, and Mirta D’Argenzio (Naples: Museo Archeologica Nationale, 2005), 24–46, quote on 35.

21. Ibid., 25; William Shakespeare, Hamlet 1.2.

22. Much more could be said of Hirst’s use of Christianity to suggest spiritual or failed spiritual teleology. He continually invokes Christian symbols in his works, from a piece in which twelve cattle heads are named after Christ’s disciples to a skeleton stretched on a glass crucifix.

23. Lumsden, “Hegel, Derrida and the Subject,” 37.

24. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. William Wallace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 34–35.

25. Ibid. In his foreword to this edition, John Niemeyer Findlay notes that Wallace’s translation veers slightly from the spirit of Hegel’s work: “Wallace’s words ‘of the object’ are wrongly placed: Hegel does not hold that the mind alters its object, but that by altering the manner in which that object is given to it, it penetrates to its true, its universal nature” (ix). Wallace exchanges penetration for alteration. In his next paragraph of The Logic (23), Hegel goes on to say: “The real nature of the object is brought to light in reflection, but it is no less true that this exertion of thought is my act. If this be so, the real nature is a product of my mind, in its character of thinking subject—generated by me in any simple universality, self-collected and removed from extraneous influences—in one word, in my Freedom” (35).

26. Findlay, foreword to Hegel, Hegel’s Logic, v–xxvii, quote on ix.

27. Lumsden, “Hegel, Derrida and the Subject,” 35.

28. David L. Clark, “Hegel, Eating: Schelling and the Carnivorous Virility of Philosophy,” in Cultures of Taste/Theories of Appetite: Eating Romanticism, ed. Timothy Morton (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 115–40, quote on 128. Also see Mark C. E. Peterson, “Animals Eating Empiricists: Assimilation and Subjectivity in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature,” The Owl of Minerva: Quarterly Journal of the Hegel Society of America 23, no. 1 (1991): 49–62, quote on 56–57.

29. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. Arnold V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 367. The reference here is to the “Organics” section. In discussing the animal body and the concept of assimilation, Hegel takes up the role of ingestion and internalization. The physiology of animal eating doubles the role of sublation for the human subject, where the outside is internalized materially and mentally with nothing lost or destroyed.

30. Howard P. Kainz, Paradox, Dialectic, and System: A Contemporary Reconstruction of the Hegelian Problematic (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988), 93.

31. Ibid., 94.

32. Clark, “Hegel, Eating,” 129.

33. See chapter 1, “Hirst and the Contemporary Sublime,” in Luke White, “Damien Hirst and the Legacy of the Sublime in Contemporary Art and Culture,” http://homepage.mac.com/lukewhite/diss_wip.htm (accessed May 15, 2008).

34. Carol Vogel, “Swimming with Famous Dead Sharks,” New York Times, October 1, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/arts/design/01voge.html (accessed May 1, 2008).

35. Ibid.

36. Quoted in Hadot, Veil of Isis, 32.

37. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust: Part One, trans. David Luke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1.4.672–75.

38. Hadot, Veil of Isis, 148.

39. Renaud Barbaras, “Perception and Movement: The End of Metaphysical Approach,” in Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Flesh, ed. Leonard L. Fred Evans (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 77–88, quote on 78.

40. Ibid., 78.

41. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible; Followed by Working Notes, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 109.

42. Barbaras, “Perception and Movement,” 80.

43. Ibid., 82.

1. Carolee Schneemann and Bruce R. McPherson, eds., More than Meat Joy: Complete Performance Works and Selected Writings (New Paltz, N.Y.: Documentext, 1979), 63.

2. Amy Newman, “An Innovator Who Was the Eros of Her Own Art,” New York Times, February 3, 2002, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9500E3DA103AF930A35751C0A9649C8B63 (accessed June 13, 2008).

3. Laura Muvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” in Issues in Feminist Film Criticism, ed. Patricia Erens (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 28–40, quote on 33.

4. Paul Schimmel et al., Out of Actions: Between Performance and the Object, 1949–1979 (London: Museum of Contemporary Art/Thames & Hudson, 1998), 296; see also Thomas McEvilley, “Carolee Schneemann (What You Did Do),” in Split Decision, ed. Carolee Schneemann (Buffalo, N.Y.: Dual Printing, 2007), 38–49, quote on 41.

5. Schneemann and McPherson, More than Meat Joy, 63–87.

6. Jonas Mekas, “In Praise of the Surface,” in Schneemann and McPherson, More than Meat Joy, 276–77, quote on 276.

7. Schneemann and McPherson, More than Meat Joy, 65.

8. Rebecca Schneider, The Explicit Body in Performance (New York: Routledge, 1997), 31.

9. Mekas, “In Praise of the Surface,” 277.

10. Ibid., 276.

11. Lawrence J. Hatab, “Human-Animality in Nietzsche,” in A Nietzsche Bestiary, ed. Christa Davids Acompora and Ralph R. Acampora (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 211–19.

12. It is worth noting here at the outset of this chapter that Nietzsche and Heidegger both use the generic man for human. The grammatical gesture is part of Schneemann’s own disappointment with the social status quo by which the male gender is the default operator that subsumes the female. Moreover, given Nietzsche’s misogynist aphorisms throughout his career, he may appear to be an odd coupling alongside Schneemann. I hope readers will forgive my own selection and cutting of Nietzsche in this case: I am interested in, and limiting myself to, a particular aspect of his work that coincides with issues of surface, flesh, consumption, and subjectivity in Schneemann’s art.

13. Hatab, “Human-Animality in Nietzsche,” 213.

14. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Francis Golffing (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday/Anchor Books, 1956), 52–53.

15. Carolee Schneemann, Imaging Her Erotics: Essays, Interviews, Projects (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), 165.

16. Schneemann and McPherson, More than Meat Joy, 233.

17. This sense of possession should not be taken as a force that counters female agency or the agency of the female artist (see Schneider, Explicit Body in Performance, 37); rather, this sense of possession works as a part of an extended nervous system of bodies on a plane of immanence.

18. Schneemann and McPherson, More than Meat Joy, 238.

19. Carolee Schneemann, in conversation (May 28, 1975) with Daryl Chin regarding Up to and Including Her Limits, in Schneemann, Carolee Schneemann: Early Work, 1960/70 (New York: Max Hutchinson Gallery/Documentext, 1982), n.p.

20. David Farrell Krell, Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger’s Thinking of Being (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), 136.

21. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 1, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1979).

22. Rodolphe Gasché, “Ecce Homo or the Written Body,” in Looking after Nietzsche, ed. Laurence A. Rickels (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 113–36.

23. Jacques Derrida, ‘“Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida,” in Who Comes after the Subject?, ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy (New York: Routledge, 1991), 114–15. Emphasis in original.

24. Martin Heidegger, “The Thing,” in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 165–66.

25. James George Frazer, The Golden Bough (1922; reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 396–401. For links to Schneemann along these lines, see Jay Murphy’s “Assimilating the Unassimilable: Carolee Schneemann in Relation to Antonin Artaud,” Parkett 50/51 (1997): 224–31.

26. Heidegger, Nietzsche 1:5.

27. Ibid.

28. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 234.

29. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 209.

30. Ibid., 196.

31. Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in Basic Writings, 330.

32. Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” 230.

33. David Ferrell Krell, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 202.

34. Krell salvages this abyss for Heidegger by showing how the philosopher tentatively attempts to fill the abyss with “the question of a fundamental relation to the living” (Daimon Life, 207). Yet even here, Krell must turn the question away from bodily being and living amid other animals to Heidegger’s concern for the unique relationship humans have to death (including our animal death).

35. Mekas, “In Praise of the Surface,” 276.

36. Schneider, Explicit Body in Performance, 31.

37. Heidegger subsumes Nietzsche’s thinking under the guiding question regarding beings, rather than the grounding question that addresses the truth of being. McNeill summarizes Heidegger’s argument as follows: “That which now is, the sensuous in its coming-into-appearance, is still understood by Nietzsche as that which truly is; being as expressed in the ‘is’ continues to be understood implicitly as truth, and such being as truth remains entangled in a Platonic conception of αληθεια [aletheia, truth; unconcealment], a conception in which αληθεια is drawn into a λογος [logos] of ομοιωσις [omoiwsis, the good and upright]” (196). Heidegger finds in Nietzsche an appeal to truth, the truth of illusions, and the truth of beings in their becoming. Heidegger has effectively tried to herd Nietzsche into the sheepfold of metaphysics, even if he is the last to enter the fold and lingers at the gate to escape. Will McNeill, “Traces of Discordance: Heidegger–Nietzsche,” in Nietzsche: A Critical Reader, ed. Peter R. Sedgwick (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995).

38. Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” 225.

39. Ibid., 229.

40. Jakob von Uexküll, “A Stroll through the World of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds,” in Instinctive Behavior: The Development of a Modern Concept, ed. Claire H. Schiller and trans. D. J. Kuenen (New York: International Universities Press, 1957), 5–80; see also Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), 52–55.

41. Agamben, The Open, 16.

42. Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (New York: Doubleday, 1961), 185.

43. Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, 4.

44. Ibid., 10.

45. McNeill, “Traces of Discordance,” 189.

46. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 20; see also McNeill, “Traces of Discordance,” 191.

47. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 20.

48. Heidegger, Nietzsche, 1:213–18.

49. Schneemann and McPherson, More than Meat Joy, 165.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., 167.

52. Lawrence Alloway, “Carolee Schneemann: The Body as Object and Instrument,” Art in America (March 1980): 19–21, quote on 21.

53. Agamben, The Open, 77.

1. Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press), 57. See also Rainer Maria Rilke, “Eighth Duino Elegy,” in Duino Elegies, trans. A. S. Kline (privately printed, 2000), 31; translated in the A. S. Kline edition as “Nowhere without the Not” (31) and “Nowhere without the No” in The Essential Rilke, trans. Galway Kinnell and Hannah Liebmann (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 125. Kline’s thinking about this translation is illuminating. The following is from my private correspondence with Kline, October 28, 2010:

What Rilke says is: “niemals Nirgends ohne Nicht” which does not have the form of Mitchell’s “never the Nowhere without the No,” i.e. you can’t imply a German “where” by subtracting Nicht from Nirgends. . . . It doesn’t work in German . . . though it sounds so neat in Mitchell’s English you kind of expect the German to have the same form, and are surprised when it doesn’t.

I thought long and hard about it. If I translated Nicht as No, which is a perfectly valid alternative to Not, I had to go with Mitchell’s English which inevitably implies to the alert reader: subtract No from Nowhere and get an expansive “Where,” a location, a space but unlike our own space, in which the flowers simply exist . . . a very nice idea . . . but is it what Rilke wanted? . . . whereas my reading simply suggests, as Rilke simply says, I think, that the flowers exist (in themselves and unlike us), in a Nowhere, a Nirgends, a non-location, but one without any Not, any Nicht, i.e. without any craving e.g. “I do not wish to be in this place” or ignorance e.g. “I do not understand this place.” Which has similarities with the Buddhist Nirvana, which is the end of craving and ignorance! Rilke certainly studied Buddhism.

So I had to choose “Not” in order to foil the Mitchell reading which arises from a quirk of English I think, though I do like the way his English flows and maybe the end result is not philosophically so different. Hopefully, though my “Not” jars where Mitchell’s “No” doesn’t, it might alert the reader to consider deeply what Rilke is trying to say.

2. Bryndis Snæbjörnsdóttir, “Spaces of Encounter: Art and Revision in Human–Animal Relations” (doctoral dissertation, Valand School of Fine Arts, University of Gothenburg, May 29, 2007); Anne Brydon, “The Predicament of Nature: Keiko the Whale and the Cultural Politics of Whaling in Iceland,” Anthropological Quarterly 79, no. 2 (2006): 225–60.

3. Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of an Idea, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2006), 148.

4. John Berger, “Why Look at Animals,” in About Looking (New York: Vintage, 1991), 3–30, quote on 3.

5. Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 2 (2002): 369–80.

6. Steve Baker, The Postmodern Animal (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), 186.

7. Martin Jay, “Scopic Regimes of Modernity,” in Vision and Visuality (Seattle: Bay Press, 1988), 4–11.

8. Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” 370.

9. Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 21.

10. Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,” Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 435–50, quote on 441, emphasis added.

11. Ibid., 440.

12. Ibid., 443.

13. Ibid., 444.

14. Ibid., 445.

15. For a study of how biosemiotics deploys Uexküll’s work, see Wendy Wheller’s The Whole Creature: Complexity, Biosemiotics and the Evolution of Culture (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2006), and also the special issue of Semiotica 134, no. 1–4 (2001).

16. Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, trans. Joseph D. O’Neil (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). For a much earlier translation, see “A Stroll through the World of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds,” in Instinctive Behavior: The Development of a Modern Concept, ed. Claire H. Schiller, trans. D. J. Kuenen (New York: International Universities Press, 1957), 5–80; Tim Ingold, Perception of the Environment (New York: Routledge, 2000), 176.

17. Uexküll, Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, 45.

18. Ibid., 53.

19. Ibid., 54.

20. Ibid., 50.

21. Ibid., 53.

22. Agamben, The Open, 41–42.

23. Mark Wilson aptly points out the missing evolutionary component in Agamben’s reading of Uexküll’s spider: “[T]he spider therefore too is fly-like. As in that which we as humans are attuned to make us what we are—our environment, our immunities, our predilections and our survival mechanisms, instincts, physical abilities, etc. The ‘surprise’ in this example has always troubled me because it is coined in such a way that suggests a (coy?) ignorance or denial of the mechanisms of evolution . . . e.g., Dawkins’ ‘arms race’” (Wilson to author, personal correspondence, August 19, 2008).

24. Uexküll, Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, 41, 43.

25. Ibid., 53.

26. See Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, “Afterword: Bubles and Webs: A Backdoor Stroll through the Readings of Uexküll,” in A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, 209–43; see especially 218–21, and on Rilke and Uexküll, 230–35.

27. It is worth noting that the project began under the working title (a)fly. The question of whose soup or whose world one occupies is central to the work.

28. Conversation with the artists, June 25, 2005.

29. Bryndis Snæbjörnsdóttir and Mark Wilson, “Artist Statement,” http://www.snaebjornsdottirwilson.com/artiststatement.php (accessed June 25, 2008).

30. Bryndis Snæbjörnsdóttir and Mark Wilson, (a)fly, http://www.snaebjornsdottirwilson.com/afly.html (accessed August 3, 2006).

31. Uexküll, “A Stroll through the World of Animals and Men,” 5.

32. Bryndis Snæbjörnsdóttir and Mark Wilson, interviewed by Giovanni Aloi, “Nanoq: In Conversation,” Antennae 6 (2008): 28–34, quote on 29; http://www.antennae.org.uk/ (accessed June 27, 2008). Another interview worth noting is: Bryndis Snæbjörnsdóttir and Mark Wilson, interviewed by Steve Baker and Ross Birrell, “On Animals, Death and Derrida’s Cat,” Art and Research 1, no. 2 (2007); http://www.artandresearch.org.uk/v1n2/baker.html (accessed June 4, 2007).

33. Steve Baker quoting Michelle Henning, in Baker, “What Can Dead Bodies Do?,” in nanoq: flat out and bluesome, ed. Bryndis Snæbjörnsdóttir and Mark Wilson (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2006), 148–55, quote on 152; Lucy Byatt, in Bryndis Snæbjörnsdóttir, Mark Wilson, and Lucy Byatt, “Flat Out and Bluesome,” Antennae 6 (2008): 21–27, quote on 24; http://www.antennae.org.uk/ (accessed June 27, 2008).

34. Baker, “What Can Dead Bodies Do?,” 154.

35. Snæbjörnsdóttir, Wilson, and Byatt, “Flat Out and Bluesome,” 22.

36. In discussing the moment of encounter between humans and polar bears in the arctic, Snæbjörnsdóttir and Wilson have noted that this becomes the moment of an “event”—a unique and noniterable moment for this animal—when it enters human history. Citing Erica Fudge’s “A Left-handed Blow: Writing the History of Animals” (in Representing Animals, ed. Nigel Rothfels [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002], 3–18), they have explored how the encounter is the moment of human narrative over and against the animal. (From the question-and-answer session of the artists’ talk, “Engaging Animals,” at the conference “Visualizing Animals,” University Park, Pennsylvania State University, April 3, 2007.)

37. See Michelle Henning, “Skins of the Real: Taxidermy and Photography,” in Snæbjörnsdóttir and Wilson, nanoq: flat out and bluesome, 136–47.

38. Notable among the specimens is the bear housed in the National Museum of Ireland in Dublin. The bear was shot by Sir Leopold McClintock in 1851, and the animal sustained between six and nine shots before being killed; see Snæbjörnsdóttir and Wilson, nanoq: flat out and bluesome, 102.

39. Gary Marvin, “Perpetuating Polar Bears: The Cultural Life of Dead Animals,” in Snæbjörnsdóttir and Wilson, nanoq: flat out and bluesome, 156–65, quote on 163.

40. Cary Wolfe, “Exposures,” in Philosophy and Animal Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 1–42, quote on 8.

41. Ralph R. Acampora, “Bodily Being and Animal World: Toward a Somatology of Cross-Species Community,” in Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life, ed. H. Peter Steeves (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 117–32, quote on 120.

42. Ibid., 123.

43. Ibid.

1. Olly and Suzi worked in the field during the 1990s and early 2000s. Currently, they are producing paper and canvas paintings in their London studio. These canvases weave together real and imaginative narratives of the various animal encounters from their previous work.

2. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 137.

3. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Eye and the Mind,” in The Essential Writings of Merleau-Ponty, ed. Alden L. Fisher (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969), 252–86, quote on 259.

4. See chapters 1 and 2, which take up different methods of knowledge and/as consumption of animal flesh.

5. Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (New York: Doubleday, 1961), 185.

6. J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 28–29.

7. Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 2 (2001): 369–80, quote on 392.

8. Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), 75.

9. Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 185.

10. Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 51.

11. Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 198, emphasis added.

12. Tim Ingold, Perception of the Environment (New York: Routledge, 2000), 176.

13. Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, trans. Joseph D. O’Neil (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Agamben, The Open, 52–55.

14. As an illustration of this problem in George Bataille and Heidegger, see Tom Tyler, “Like Water in Water,” Journal for Cultural Research 9, no. 3 (July 2005): 265–79.

15. Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 128–29; Fredrick Young, “Animality: Notes towards a Manifesto,” in Glossalalia, ed. Julian Wolfreys and Harun Karim Thomas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 9–22, quote on 10.

16. Coetzee, Lives of Animals, 65.

17. Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 198; Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” 53.

18. Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 133.

19. Young, “Animality,” 16.

20. Coetzee, Lives of Animals, 65.

21. Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 104.

22. Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 255, emphasis added.

23. Steven W. Laycock and Ralph R. Acampora provide a language and examples for an animal phenomenology in their respective articles, “The Animal as Animal: A Plea for Open Conceptuality” and “Bodily Being and Animal World: Toward a Somatology of Cross-Species Community,” in Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life, ed. H. Peter Steeves (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 271–84, 117–32.

24. Olly and Suzi, Olly and Suzi: Arctic Desert Ocean Jungle (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2003), 8.

25. Ibid., 184.

26. Ibid., 162.

27. H. Peter Steeves, “They Say Animals Can Smell Fear,” in Steeves, Animal Others, 133–78, quote on 136.

28. Olly and Suzi, Olly and Suzi, 145.

29. It should be noted that in their recent works, from 2007 onward, Olly and Suzi have deemphasized the animal interaction with the paper. They are currently highlighting the role of the environment, which has always had a place in their work. They considered the animals’ endangered environments to be a primary rationale for their art.

30. Clive James, introduction to Olly and Suzi, Olly and Suzi, 2.

31. Conversation with Olly and Suzi, October 1, 2007, London.

32. Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes (New York: Routledge, 1992), 4.

33. Ibid., 6.

34. For an extensive discussion of working with companion species in a “contact zone,” see chapter 8 of Donna Haraway’s When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 205–46.

35. Steve Baker, The Postmodern Animal (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), 126.

36. Ibid., 24–25, 38.

37. Ibid., 117–18, emphasis added.

38. Jacques Derrida, “Geschlect II: Heidegger’s Hand,” in Deconstruction and Philosophy, ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 161–96, quote on 175, emphasis in original.

39. Olly and Suzi, “New Elements,” http://www.ollysuzi.com/galleries/v/newelements/ (accessed June 20, 2008).

40. Agamben, The Open, 16.

41. Coetzee, Lives of Animals, 65.

1. See, for example, Giovanni Aloi, “Marcus Coates—Becoming-Animal,” Antennae 4 (2007): 18–20, and, in the same issue, the interview by Aloi, “In Conversation with Marcus Coates,” 31–34, http://www.antennae.org.uk/ (accessed July 24, 2008). Also see the interview with Marcus Coates on January 22, 2007, Bristol City Museum Art Gallery, in In Profile Marcus Coates (Bristol: Picture This, 2007). For further work on becoming-animal in contemporary art, see Steve Baker, “What Does Becoming-Animal Look Like?,” in Representing Animals, ed. Nigel Rothfels (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 67–98.

2. Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 2 (2002): 369–80, quote on 372.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 399. The original (on page 281 of L’animal autobiographique) reads: “et ce que les soi-disant hommes, ceux qui se nomment des hommes, appellent l’animal. Tout le monde est d’accord à ce sujet, la discussion est close d’avance, et il faudrait être plus bête que les bêtes pour en douter. Les bêtes mêmes savant cela” (emphasis added). My thanks to Steve Baker for suggesting I quote from the French text.

5. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 131.

6. Fredrick Young, “Animality: Notes towards a Manifesto,” in Glossalalia, ed. Julian Wolfreys and Harun Karim (Manchester: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 16.

7. Jacques Derrida, “Psyche: Invention of the Other,” in Acts of Literature, ed. D. Attridge (New York: Routledge,1992), 312, cited in Steve Baker, The Postmodern Animal (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), 41.

8. Baker, Postmodern Animal, 40, 41.

9. Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes (New York: Routledge, 1992), 4.

10. Ibid., 6.

11. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 16.

12. Ibid., 22.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 23, emphasis in original.

15. Ibid., 22.

16. Ibid.

17. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 55–56.

18. Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 22.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” 399.

22. Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, 18, emphasis in original.

23. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 234.

24. Ibid., 261.

25. Mark Bonta and John Protevi, Deleuze and Geophilosphy: A Guide and Glossary (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 94.

26. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 263.

27. Ibid., 234.

28. Alec Finlay, “Chthonic Perjink,” in Journey to the Lower World, ed. Marcus Coates and Alec Finlay (Newcastle upon Tyne: Platform Projects, distributed by Trans-Atlantic Publications, 2007), n.p.

29. Marcus Coates, “Linosa Close (Sheil Park),” in Coates and Finlay, Journey to the Lower World.

30. Marcus Coates, “Transcript of the Ritual,” in Coates and Finlay, Journey to the Lower World.

31. Coates, “Linosa Close (Sheil Park).”

32. Jacques Derrida talks about this future in his concept of “haunting,” an event that was never manifest within culture, yet it lingers: “Untimely, it [haunting] does not come to, it does not happen to, it does not befall, one day, Europe, as if the latter, at a certain moment of its history, had begun to suffer from a certain evil, to let itself be inhabited in its inside, that is, haunted by a foreign guest. . . . But there was no inside, there was nothing inside before it”; Specters of Marx (New York: Routledge, 1994), 4. This event is neither within history as assimilated (think Hegel and digestion in chapter 1) nor as outside, as if culture had an inside apart from that which it rejects as “outside.”

33. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 258.

34. Ibid., 249.

35. Ibid., 238.

36. Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, trans. Joseph D. O’Neil (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 43.

37. Viv Groskop, “Chirps with Everything,” Guardian (London), January 25, 2007.

38. Ibid.

39. Steve Baker, “Sloughing the Human,” in Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal, ed. Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 147–64, quote on 159.

1. Matthew Barney, Matthew Barney: No Restraint, DVD, dir. Alison Chernick, perf. Gabe Bartalos, Matthew Barney, and Barbara Gladstone (Voyeur Films, IFC First Take, USA 2008).

2. Luc Steels, “Matthew Barney’s Narrative Machines,” in Matthew Barney: Drawing Restraint, vol. 2, ed. Matthew Barney (Tokyo: Uplink, 2005), 21–26, quote on 23.